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THE PHILOSOPHIC BASES OF ART AND CRITICISM

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[Concluded]

II

PHILOSOPHIC principles determine the meaning and subject matter of statements about art, and, conversely, the explication and application of statements determine principles, for a single statement—an identical combination of words—may express or follow from different philosophic principles as it is variously defined and applied to various subject matters. Moreover, statements which seem explicitly to express the same or comparable philosophic principles may, as a result of methodological determination in use, apply now to a broad, now to a limited, subject matter, and in so doing they may unite the objects of art with those of nature or separate them, and they may analogize the products of the different arts to each other or differentiate them. Such differences in the application of principles to subject matters—involving questions concerning whether the same principles apply to nature and art or to moral action and artistic production—reflect changes in meaning which can be set forth in terms of method as well as of subject matter, for they result from separating theoretic, practical, and poetic judgments or in turn from merging (in varying manners of identification and varying degrees of mixture) considerations of

knowing, doing, and making. The same differences in the determination and use of principles may therefore be seen in the functions attributed to artist, critic, and philosopher and in their relations to each other, for when subject matters and methods are distinct, the critic is distinguished from the artist and the philosopher, but when they merge the poet is critic, the critic is poet, or both are philosophers or—in lieu of philosophy for those philosophers who hold philosophy in disrepute—historians, sociologists, psychologists, semanticists, or scientists.

To discuss the function of the critic, therefore, is to discuss the function of the poet and philosopher. Indeed, the varying conceptions of the critic are illustrated historically in a dispute, which has been continuous since it was first formulated by the Greek philosophers and rhetoricians, between artist, critic, and philosopher. In the course of that dispute, the function of the critic has sometimes been limited to tasks less constructive or imaginative than those of the artist and less theoretic or intellectual than those of the philosopher; it has sometimes been broadened to include the functions exercised by both, while each of the disputants has claimed the functions of the others and the three have been collapsed

repeatedly and again separated. The function of the critic may be identical with the functions of the artist and the philosopher either because criticism is conceived to be creative or intellectual or because art and philosophy are conceived to depend fundamentally on critical judgment; and if the functions of artist, critic, and philosopher are distinguished, it is because the critic operates in accordance with some form of philosophy which will permit him to seek causes and effects in the materials and forms of the artist. The function of the critic is determined alike in the fundamental assumptions of the philosopher, the critic, and the artist. It is determined in the principles from which the philosopher derives not only his system but the criteria by which to judge it and the rules of art by which to develop it, and even short of the development of a philosophy, the function of the critic is determined in the philosophic principles assumed in the critical judgments and criteria which artists and critics, as well as philosophers, evolve and apply. It is determined, likewise, in the conception of art which is the critic's minimum philosophy as well as the grounds of his judgments of art. It is determined, finally, in the conception of artistic purpose which is the artist's minimum critical theory and philosophy as well as the implicit formulation of his processes of production. The different conceptions of the function of criticism, and the consequent variability of critical judgments, flow from assumptions and involve consequences which extend beyond variations in the function of the critic to variations in art and philosophy, and the examination of criticism may fruitfully proceed through the consideration of (1) variations in the conception of art and the artist, which reflect consequences of criticism, and (2) variations in the conception of philosophy and philo-

sophic method, which involve the grounds of judgments of value, to (3) variations in the conceptions of criticism itself and its applications.

Artists are necessarily critics in the act of artistic construction or composition. They sometimes, in addition to this active and illustrative criticism, explain what they have tried to do and relate it to the productions of other artists or the statements of other critics. Poets in particular have entered not only into that competition with other poets which is involved in the production of new poetic effects but also into competition with critics in defense of a conception of art and criticism, and with philosophers in justification of a view of life consonant with such critical values. They have frequently written as critics, expressing in their verses judgments of other poets, as Aristophanes did, or of poets and critics too, as Byron did. They have developed theories of criticism and poetics, both in verse—as did Horace, Vida, Boileau, Pope, and Browning—and in prose—as did Sidney, Dryden, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Shelley, Emerson, Bryant, and Newman. All the functions which the philosopher and the rhetorician have assigned to the poet reappear in the theories of poets: he is maker, contriver, and imitator; he is engaged in pleasing, instructing, and edifying; his poetry is a source of, as it is derived from, inspiration, enchantment, and imagination. In addition, however, the poet is assigned all the functions which any philosopher has sought to contrast to poetry in a more limited conception of the domain of art, and poets as critics have made converts of other critics and other historians and have taught them to present the poet eloquently, not only as maker, but as seer, prophet, scientist, philosopher, moralist, and legislator, and to trace the history of all human knowledge and ac-

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complishment from poetic beginnings or to poetic fulfilments. What the poet is conceived to be—since it determines how poetry will be read, for scientific truth and moral precept, for imaginative construction and emotional stimulation, for enrichment of experience and impetus to action, for pleasure and edification—becomes in itself the statement of a history, a morality, a politics, and a philosophy.¹

¹ George Puttenham, *The arte of English poesie*, ed. G. D. Willecock and A. Walker (Cambridge, 1936), Book I, chaps. iii and iv, pp. 6-9: "The profession and use of Poesie is most ancient from the beginning and not, as manie erroneously suppose, after, but before, any civil society among men. . . . Then forasmuch as they were the first that intended to the observation of nature and her works, and specially of the Celestial courses, by reason of the continuall motion of the heavens, searching after the first mover, and from thence by degrees comming to know and consider of the substances separate and abstract, which we call the divine intelligences or good Angels (*Demones*) they were the first that instituted sacrifices of placation, with invocations and worship to them, as to Gods: and invented and established all the rest of the observances and ceremonies of religion, and so were the first Priests and ministers of the holy mysteries. . . . So also were they the first Prophetes or seers, *Videntes*. . . . So as the Poets were also from the beginning the best perswaders and their eloquence the first Rethorickē of the world. Even so it became that the high mysteries of the gods should be revealed and taught, by a maner of utterance and language of extraordinary phrase, and briefe and compendious, and above al others sweet and civil as the Metricall is. . . . so as the Poet was also the first historiographer. . . . they were the first Astronomers and Philosophists and Metaphysicks." The sum of all wisdom is frequently found in a single poet; cf. Sir Thomas Elyot, *The Gouernour*, ed. Henry Croft (London, 1880), I, 58-59: "I coulde reherce diuers other poete whiche for mater and eloquence be very necessary, but I feare me to be to longe from noble Homere: from whom as from a fountaine proceeded all eloquence and lernyng. For in his bokes be contained, and most perfectly expressed, nat only the documents marciall and discipline of armes, but also incomparable wisedomes, and instructions for politike gouernaunce of people: with the worthy commendation and laude of noble princis: where with the reders shall be so all inflamed, that they most fervently shall desire and covete, by the imitation of their vertues, to acquire semblable glorie." According to Sidney (*The defence of poesie*, in *The complete works of Sir Philip Sidney*, ed. Feuillerat [Cambridge, 1923], III, 5), poetry is the origin of all learning and the passport by which philosophers and historiographers first "entered the gates of popular judgements"; cf. *ibid.*, pp. 4-5: "This did so notably shew it selfe, that the Philosophers of Greece durst not a long time appear to the world, but under the masks of poets. So Thales, Empedocles, and Parmenides, sang their natural Philosophie in verses. So did Pithagoras and Phocillides,

All sciences are dominated and perfected by poetry;² man and human life are by

their morall Councils. So did Tirteus in warre matters, and Solon in matters of pollicie, or rather they being Poets, did exercise their delightfull vaine in those points of highest knowledge, which before them laye hidden to the world." Or, again, poetry may be made to embrace all the higher activities of man, including the other arts; cf. Shelley, *A defense of poetry* (*The prose works of P. B. Shelley*, ed. H. B. Forman [London, 1880], III, 104): "But poets, or those who imagine and express this indestructible order, are not only the authors of language and of music, of the dance, and architecture, and statuary, and painting: they are the institutors of laws and the founders of civil society, and the inventors of the arts of life, and the teachers, who draw into a certain propinquity with the beautiful and the true, that partial apprehension of the agencies of the invisible world which is called religion." Or similar convictions may be expressed in terms of an evolution in which poets gradually fell from a high estate; cf. James Russell Lowell, "The function of the poet," *Century*, XLVII (1894), 432-33: "And however far we go back, we shall find this also—that the poet and the priest were united originally in the same person; which means that the poet was he who was conscious of the world of spirit as well as that of sense, and was the ambassador of the gods to men. This was his highest function, and hence his name of 'seer.' . . . Gradually, however, the poet as the 'seer' became secondary to the 'maker.' His office became that of entertainer rather than teacher. But always something of the old tradition was kept alive. And if he has now come to be looked upon merely as the best expreſſer, the gift of seeing is implied as necessarily antecedent to that, and of seeing very deep, too. . . . Now, under all these names—praiser, seer, soothsayer—we find the same idea lurking. The poet is he who can best see and best say what is ideal—what belongs to the world of soul and of beauty."

² Sidney, p. 19: "Now therein of all Sciences (I speak still of humane and according to the humane conceit) is our Poet the Monarch. For hee doth not onely shew the way, but giveth so sweete a prospect into the way, as will entice anie man to enter into it." Wordsworth, "Preface to the *Lyrical ballads*" (*The prose works of William Wordsworth*, ed. A. B. Grosart [London, 1876], II, 91): "Poetry is the breath and finer spirit of all knowledge; it is the impassioned expression which is in the countenance of all science. . . . Poetry is the first and last of all knowledge—it is as immortal as the heart of man." These contentions concerning the nature of poetry are made in the face of opposition; cf. Peacock, "The four ages of poetry" (*The works of Thomas Love Peacock*, ed. H. F. B. Brett-Smith and C. E. Jones [London, 1934], VIII, 21): "The highest inspirations of poetry are resolvable into three ingredients: the rant of unregulated passion, the whine of exaggerated feeling, and the cant of factitious sentiment; and can therefore serve only to ripen a splendid lunatic like Alexander, a puling driveller like Werter, or a morbid dreamer like Wordsworth. It can never make a philosopher, nor a statesman, nor in any class of life a useful or rational man." Even in this estimate of poetry the function of the poet is conceived to extend to philosophy, politics, and the prac-

nature poetical;³ the universe itself is the creation, or at least the re-creation, of poetic art.⁴

tical problems of life, and Shelley's reply to Peacock's criticisms merely asserts what Peacock denies. Shelley includes among poets, not only the authors of language and music, but also the institutors of laws, the founders of civil society, the inventors of the arts of life, and the teachers of religion (p. 104), and he denies the distinction between poets and prose writers, philosophers and historians, holding, indeed, that all authors of revolutions in opinion are necessarily poets (*ibid.*, p. 107). "Poetry is indeed something divine. It is at once the centre and circumference of knowledge; it is that which comprehends all science, and that to which all science must be referred" (*ibid.*, p. 136). "Poets are the hierophants of an unapprehended inspiration; the mirrors of the gigantic shadows which futurity casts upon the present; the words which express what they understand not; the trumpets which sing to battle and feel not what they inspire; the influence which is moved not, but moves. Poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world" (*ibid.*, p. 144).

³ Hazlitt, "On poetry in general" (*The complete works of William Hazlitt*, ed. P. P. Howe [London, 1930], V, 2): "It is not a branch of authorship: it is 'the stuff of which our life is made.' The rest is 'mere oblivion,' a dead letter: for all that is worth remembering in life, is the poetry of it. Fear is poetry, hope is poetry, love is poetry, hatred is poetry; contempt, jealousy, remorse, admiration, wonder, pity, despair, or madness, are all poetry. Poetry is that fine particle within us, that expands, rarefies, refines, raises our whole being: without it 'man's life is poor as beast's.' Man is a poetical animal; and those of us who do not study the principles of poetry, act upon them all our lives, like Molière's *Bourgeois Gentilhomme*, who had always spoken prose without knowing it." Or, again, the poetic nature of mankind is at the background of the poet's direction of man and poetry's dominance of the sciences; cf. W. Whitman, *Leaves of grass*, Preface to the original edition (1855), pp. iv, vii: "Of all nations the United States with veins full of poetical stuff most need poets and will doubtless have the greatest and use them the greatest. Their Presidents shall not be their common referee so much as their poets shall. Of all mankind the greatest poet is the equitable man. Not in him but off from him things are grotesque or eccentric or fail of their sanity. Nothing out of its place is good and nothing in its place is bad. He bestows on every object or quality its fit proportions neither more nor less. He is the arbiter of the diverse and he is the key. . . . Exact science and its practical movements are no checks on the greatest poet but always his encouragement and support. . . . In the beauty of poems are the tuft and final applause of science."

⁴ Augustine, *De civitate Dei* xi. 21: "What else indeed is to be understood by that which is said through all things: 'God saw that it was good,' but the approbation of work done according to the art which is the wisdom of God." Shelley, p. 140: "It reproduces the common universe of which we are portions and percipient, and it purges from our inward sight the film of familiarity which obscures from us the wonder of our

To determine the function of the poet is to mark the scope of the other arts, of criticism, and of philosophy; and whatever poetry is distinguished from or opposed to, in one account, may be viewed as essentially poetical in another: music, painting, and the rest of the arts may be instances of poetry; the true critic may be poetic and creative; and Plato may be made a poet by the same processes as made Homer and Shakespeare philosophers. Poetry is expanded and contracted both with respect to the arts conceived as poetic and with respect to the practices thought proper to them. The critic and philosopher—or the poet and amateur functioning as critic and philosopher—may affect the practices and the interrelations of the arts. It is only a recent instance of an old complaint that Lessing expresses when he reproves "modern critics" for having crudely misconceived the relation of painting and poetry, sometimes compressing poetry within the narrow limits of painting, sometimes making painting fill the whole wide sphere of poetry, and for having generated by their spurious criticism a mania for pictorial description in poetry and for allegorical style in painting.⁵ As criticism, operating through

being. It compels us to feel that which we perceive, and to imagine that which we know. It creates anew the universe, after it has been annihilated in our minds by the recurrence of impressions blunted by reiteration. It justifies the bold and true word of Tasso: *Non merita nome di creatore, se non Iddio ed il Poeta* [None deserves the name of creator except God and the Poet]."

⁵ G. E. Lessing, *Laocon*, Introd. (*Werke*, ed. J. Petersen [Leipzig, n.d.], IV, 292). The discussion of the relation of poetry and painting goes back to ancient beginnings, to Horace, Plutarch, and Pliny, and by way of them to Simonides' conception of painting as silent poetry and poetry as speaking painting. Cf. also Dryden, *Parallel of poetry and painting* (1695); Abbé du Bos, *Réflexions critiques sur la poésie et sur la peinture* (1719); Charles Lamotte, *An essay upon painting and poetry* (1730); James Harris, "Concerning music, painting, and poetry," *Three treatises* (1744); Joseph Spence, *Polymetis; or, an inquiry concerning the agreement between the works of the Roman poets and the remains of the ancient artists, being an attempt to illustrate them mutually from one another*

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the activity of artists, affects art, those immanent critical processes in turn affect criticism and the philosophic ideas it embodies; and criticism and philosophy undergo like changes with the variations in art. The discussion of the function of the poet is a philosophic discussion, and its progress through the ages reflects the differences between those philosophers who find poetry and philosophy essentially the same and who seek only to determine whether poetry is perfect or deficient philosophy and whether philosophy is supreme or partial poetry and those philosophers who distinguish artistic constructions from philosophic speculations and make use of art or criticism or philosophy to prevent the confusion of disciplines.

(1747); G. E. Lessing, *Laocoön* (1766); Daniel Webb, *Observations on the correspondence between poetry and music* (1769). Poetry may be conceived as the essential nature or the definition of painting and music, or it may merely share with them some common characteristics or effect some common responses. Cf. S. T. Coleridge, *Shakespeare: with introductory matter on poetry, the drama, and the stage* (*The complete works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*, ed. Shedd [New York, 1853], IV, 39): "In my last address I defined poetry to be the art, or whatever better term our language may afford, of representing external nature and human thoughts, both relatively to human affections, so as to cause the production of as great immediate pleasure in each part as is compatible with the largest possible sum of pleasure on the whole. Now this definition applies equally to painting and music as to poetry; and in truth the term poetry is alike applicable to all three." Cf. also John Stuart Mill, "Thoughts on poetry and its varieties," *Dissertations and discussions: political, philosophical, and historical* (New York, 1882), I, 89: "That, however, the word 'poetry' imports something quite peculiar in its nature; something which may exist in what is called prose as well as in verse; something which does not even require the instrument of words, but can speak through the other audible symbols called musical sounds, and even through the visible ones which are the language of sculpture, painting, and architecture.—all this, we believe, is and must be felt, though perhaps indistinctly, by all upon whom poetry in any of its shapes produces any impression beyond that of tickling the ear." The three seem to overlap, without being identified essentially, according to Leigh Hunt; cf. "An answer to the question What is poetry?" (*Critical essays of the early nineteenth century*, ed. R. M. Alden [New York, 1921], p. 378): "Poetry includes whatsoever of painting can be made visible to the mind's eye, and whatsoever of music can be conveyed by sound and proportion without singing or instrumentation."

There is a rivalry between poetry and philosophy in so far as they are pertinent to the same ends and in so far as the same standards may be applied to both. The quarrel was ancient in the time of Plato,⁶ and it has continued to the present because the tradition of discussion sets poetry to be judged against a standard of truth and reason, and philosophy to be criticized for its ineffectiveness and uncouthness. Plato banished the poets from the perfect state, not despite but because of the charm he acknowledges in their art, for it endangers the highest ends of man and the most vital functions of the state. The danger of poetry lies precisely in the fact that the poet, with all his art, may speak well and badly according to the standard of philosophic truth; and in the dialectic of Plato the indeterminacy for which poetry is criticized is removed only when the poet writes with knowledge, and then the poet is rightly called "philosopher." The standard applied to the poet is the same as that of the law-giver, and therefore in the perfect state the philosopher is poet as well as ruler. Even in the second-best state delineated in the *Laws*, the principles of art are inseparable from those of morals, legislation, and philosophy; and, when a model is sought in that dialogue to indicate what is wrong and what is right in poetry, it is found in the discourse itself, which the interlocutor finds is framed exactly like a poem.⁷ Moreover, the poet is under suspicion in that state as well as in the perfect republic, and writers of tragedies are viewed as rivals of lawgivers who are not philosophers as well as of those who are.

Best of strangers, we will say to them, we ourselves are poets, to the best of our ability, of the fairest and best tragedy, for our whole state is composed as an imitation of the fairest

⁶ *Republic* x. 607B.

⁷ *Laws* vii. 811C-D.

and best life, which we assert to be in reality the truest tragedy. Thus you are poets and we likewise are poets of the same poems, opposed to you as artists and actors in the fairest drama, which true law alone, as our hope is, is suited to perfect. Do not imagine therefore that we will easily permit you to erect your stage among us in the market place and to introduce your actors, endowed with fair voices and louder than our own, and allow you to harangue women and children and all the people, saying concerning the same questions, not the same things as we do, but commonly and on most things the very opposite.⁸

This is a tradition of discussion and opposition which the poets were to continue, reversing the dialectic to find poetry in Plato's works while puzzling over his antagonism to poetry, to criticize the cold insensitivity of philosophy while claiming for poetry high philosophic insight, and to seek a truth in poetry while revising according to its standard the canon of true poets. All of the terms shift their meanings in the dialectic of this discussion. Plato is sometimes a poet, although philosophy is distinct from poetry, since, as Sidney argues, "who so ever well considereth, shall finde that in the body of his worke, though the inside and strength were Philosophie, the skin as it were and beautie, depended most of Poetrie."⁹ He is sometimes an instance of the highest kind of poetry,¹⁰ and philosophy is indispensable to poetry, since "no man," as Coleridge presents the case, "was ever yet a great poet, without being at the same time a profound philosopher."¹¹ He is some-

⁸ *Ibid.* 817B-C. This passage and the other passages from Plato, as well as the passages from Aristotle, Longinus, and Vico quoted in this essay, are translated by the author.

⁹ Sidney, p. 5.

¹⁰ Coleridge, *Biographia literaria* (*Works*, III, 373): "The writings of Plato and Jeremy Taylor, and Burnet's *Theology of the Earth*, furnish undeniable proofs that poetry of the highest kind may exist without metre, and even without the contradistinguishing objects of a poem."

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 381. The statement is applied in a discussion of Shakespeare and Milton.

times essentially a poet, and Shakespeare is a philosopher, despite differences, such as Shelley emphasizes, in literary forms.¹² He is sometimes a true poet; and, since, as Emerson formulates the nature of poetry, poets are scientists and logicians, inspirers and lawgivers, some reservations must be made concerning the poetic quality of Shakespeare.¹³

This rivalry of poetry and philosophy seems to disappear in the tradition of discussion in which poetry is contrasted literally to philosophy on all the points which served for their analogical comparison. Yet in the mixture of the traditions of literal and analogical discussion which constitutes the greater part of the

¹² Pp. 107-8: "Plato was essentially a poet—the truth and splendour of his imagery, and the melody of his language, are the most intense that it is possible to conceive. He rejected the harmony of the epic, dramatic, and lyrical forms, because he sought to kindle a harmony in thoughts divested of shape and action, and he forbore to invent any regular plan of rhythm which would include, under determinate forms, the varied pauses of his style. Cicero sought to imitate the cadence of his periods, but with little success. Lord Bacon was a poet. . . . Nor are those supreme poets, who have employed traditional forms of rhythm on account of the form and action of their subjects, less capable of perceiving and teaching the truth of things, than those who have omitted that form. Shakespeare, Dante, and Milton (to confine ourselves to modern writers) are philosophers of the very loftiest power."

¹³ Emerson, "Poetry and imagination," *Letters and social aims* (Boston, 1883), p. 42: "For poetry is science, and the poet a truer logician," from whence it follows (*ibid.*, pp. 66, 68): "The poet who shall use nature as his hieroglyphic must have an adequate message to convey thereby. Therefore when we speak of the Poet in any high sense, we are driven to such examples as Zoroaster and Plato, St. John and Menu, with their moral burdens. The Muse shall be the counterpart of Nature, and equally rich. . . . But in current literature I do not find her. Literature warps away from life, though at first it seems to bind it. In the world of letters how few commanding oracles! Homer did what he could; Pindar, Aeschylus, and the Greek Gnomic poets and the tragedians. Dante was faithful when not carried away by his fierce hatreds. But in so many alcoves of English poetry I can count only nine or ten authors who are still inspirers and lawgivers to their race. . . . We are a little civil, it must be owned, to Homer and Aeschylus, to Dante and Shakespeare, and give them the benefit of the largest interpretation." Cf., also, Montesquieu, *Penées diverses* (*Oeuvres complètes de Montesquieu* [Paris, 1866], p. 626): "Les quatres grands poètes, Platon, Malebranche, Shaftesbury, Montaigne!"

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history of thought the effect of such distinctions is to supply points to serve as bases for later analogizing. The Platonic analogy of poetry and philosophy, thus, is combated in Aristotle's philosophy by distinguishing the kind of knowledge required for poetic constructions by means of its purpose from other kinds of knowledge; for theoretic knowledge is pursued for its own sake and for truth, practical knowledge for the sake of conduct, and poetic knowledge for the sake of making something useful or beautiful. The distinction having been made, however, the analogizing technique may be applied to it, and philosophers since the time of Aristotle have stated their basic principles by determining whether philosophy is essentially theoretic, or practical, or poetic. The conception of philosophy, therefore, is affected, no less than that of poetry, each time it is decided that philosophy is or is not poetry and that poetry is or is not philosophy: so long as the principles of philosophy are sought in the nature of things, philosophy may pretend to be fundamentally theoretic and speculative for all its practical implications and consequences;¹⁴ when principles are sought in the nature of the human faculties or the development of human knowledge, practical knowledge tends to assume ascendancy in the hierarchy of the sciences;¹⁵ and, finally, when principles

are sought in operations and in the relations of symbols and when we seek substitutes for certainty in the precisions of measurement, philosophy becomes an art again, since art takes precedence over the practical and the theoretic and man ceases to be *homo sapiens* and finds his best characterization in the functions of *homo faber*.¹⁶

The Platonic analogy of poetry and philosophy based on their common ends is closely related to the analogy of art and nature as imitation and exemplar. Aristotle countered that analogy with the distinction of natural objects, in which the principle of motion is internal, and artificial objects, whose cause must be sought in the idea and intention of artist or artisan. Like the analogy of poetry and philoso-

but not with respect to the whole of nature, and moral principles of reason may indeed produce free actions, but not laws of nature. Consequently, the principles of pure reason possess objective reality in their practical and more particularly in their moral employment" (cf. "Introduction to the second edition," pp. 695-96).

¹⁴ H. Bergson, *L'Evolution créatrice* (34th ed.; Paris, 1929), p. 151: "Si nous pouvions nous débouiller de tout orgueil, si, pour définir notre espèce, nous nous en tenions strictement à ce que l'histoire et la préhistoire nous présentent comme la caractéristique constante de l'homme et de l'intelligence, nous ne dirions peut-être pas *Homo sapiens*, mais *Homo faber*." Cf. John Dewey, *Reconstruction in philosophy* (New York, 1920), p. 71. Kant's emphasis on the conditions of thought and on *possible experience* leads to a philosophy in which practical rather than theoretical reason occupies the central place; Dewey's emphasis on the conditions of action and on *experience* yields a philosophy in which theory and practice are both arts; cf. *Experience and nature* (New York, 1929), pp. 357-58: "But if modern tendencies are justified in putting art and creation first, then the implications of this position should be avowed and carried through. It would then be seen that science is an art, that art is practice, and that the only distinction worth drawing is not between practice and theory, but between those modes of practice that are not intelligent, not inherently and immediately enjoyable, and those which are full of enjoyed meanings. When this perception dawns, it will be a commonplace that art—the mode of activity that is charged with the meanings capable of immediately enjoyed possession—is the complete culmination of nature, and that 'science' is properly a handmaiden that conducts natural events to this happy issue. Thus would disappear the separations that trouble present thinking: division of everything into nature and experience, of experience into practice and theory, art and science, of art into useful and fine, menial and free."

¹⁴ Plato *Statesman* 259E, 285E-286A; *Rep.* vii. 518B-519D. Aristotle *Metaphysics* I. 1. 981b25-982a3.

¹⁵ Kant, *Critique of pure reason*, trans. F. M. Müller (2d ed.; New York, 1919), Part II, "Transcendental doctrine of method," chap. II, "The canon of pure reason," pp. 647-48: "Pure reason, therefore, contains, not indeed in its speculative, yet in its practical, or, more accurately, its moral employment, principles of the possibility of experience, namely, of such actions as might be met with in the history of man according to moral precepts. For as reason commands that such actions should take place, they must be possible, and a certain kind of systematical unity also, namely, the moral, must be possible; while it was impossible to prove the systematical unity according to the speculative principles of reason. For reason, no doubt, possesses causality with respect to freedom in general,

phy, the analogy of art and nature was continued either in its original terms as a likeness found in things or in terms (derived from Aristotle's literal distinctions) which connect art and nature in characteristics found in the judgments of man or in his actions. Hobbes, thus, like Plato, not only treats art as an imitation of nature but conceives nature as a kind of art:

Nature, the art whereby God hath made and governs the world, is by the *art* of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it can make an artificial animal. For seeing life is but a motion of limbs, the beginning whereof is in some principal part within; why may we not say, that all *automata* (engines that move themselves by springs and wheels as doth a watch) have an artificial life? For what is the *heart*, but a *spring*; and the *nerves*, but so many *strings*; and the *joints*, but so many *wheels*, giving motion to the whole body, such as was intended by the artificer? *Art* goes yet further, imitating that rational and most excellent work of nature, *man*. For by art is created that great *LEVIATHAN* called a *COMMONWEALTH*, or *STATE*, in Latin *CIVITAS*, which is but an artificial man.

...¹⁷

That analogy of God's creation in nature to man's creations in art lent itself easily to the terminology of Christian theology and, during the Middle Ages, bent even the Aristotelian view of God as First Mover and First Cause to its services. When, however, a philosophic basis was sought for our judgments of things by examination of the nature of our knowledge, art was analogized to nature by means of the human faculties which bring together traits by which Aristotle had distinguished them, as judgment, for Kant, bears on the perception of purpose in nature and the perception of beauty in nature and art and so serves as link between the practical and the theoretical:

¹⁷ *Leviathan* (*The English works of Thomas Hobbes*, ed. W. Molesworth [London, 1808], III, ix).

The concept formed by Judgement of a purposiveness of Nature belongs to natural concepts, but only as a regulative principle of the cognitive faculty; although the aesthetical judgement upon certain objects (of Nature or Art) which occasions it is, in respect of the feeling of pleasure or pain, a constitutive principle. The spontaneity in the play of the cognitive faculties, the harmony of which contains the ground of this pleasure, makes the above concept [of the purposiveness of nature] fit to be the mediating link between the realm of the natural concept and that of the concept of freedom in its effects; whilst at the same time it promotes the sensibility of the mind for moral feeling.¹⁸

When, finally, a philosophic basis for our concept of nature and our judgment of values was sought in the examination of experience, purposiveness disappeared from nature as such and value from things as such, and art was analogized to nature by bringing together traits by which Aristotle had distinguished them, as all objects, for Dewey—the objects of the sciences and the objects of the arts—are tools, and art is natural, since it originates in natural tendencies in man and employs natural means to further natural ends.

In experience, human relations, institutions, and traditions are as much a part of the nature in which and by which we live as is the physical world. Nature in this meaning is not "outside." It is in us and we are in and of it. But there

¹⁸ *Kant's Critique of judgement*, trans. J. H. Bernard (London, 1914), Introd., pp. 41-42. E. A. Poe makes similar, though more simple, use of the faculties of the mind to put Aristotelian distinctions to un-Aristotelian uses; cf. "The poetic principle" (*Works*, ed. Stedman and Woodberry [New York, 1914], VI, 11): "Dividing the world of mind into its three most obvious distinctions, we have the Pure Intellect, Taste, and the Moral Sense. I place Taste in the middle, because it is just this position which in the mind it occupies. It holds intimate relations with either extreme, but from the Moral Sense is separated by so faint a difference that Aristotle has not hesitated to place some of its operations among the virtues themselves. Nevertheless, we find the offices of the trio marked with a sufficient distinction. Just as the Intellect concerns itself with Truth, so Taste informs us of the Beautiful, while the Moral Sense is regardful of Duty."

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are multitudes of ways of participating in it, and these ways are characteristic not only of various experiences of the same individual, but of attitudes of aspiration, need and achievement that belong to civilizations in their collective aspect. Works of art are means by which we enter, through imagination and the emotions they evoke, into other forms of relationship and participation than our own.¹⁹

Nature is art because the universe, like the objects of art, is created, or because the judgment of purpose in nature, like the judgment of beauty, involves the free interplay of our faculties, or because our experience of things permits no sharp separation of our use, our knowledge, and our enjoyment of them; and each of these reasonable analogies is also reduced to literal-minded statements and criticized because it involves fictitious suppositions of eternal patterns of things, universal principles of thought, or collective aspects of epochs and civilizations.

The form in which Plato expressed his philosophy is indistinguishable in his philosophy from other forms of communication; for the subject matters of philosophy, poetry, rhetoric, and history are analogous, and the ends of the various forms of human activity are ultimately the same. It is no dramatic accident that Socrates spent part of the last hours of his life experimenting by divine direction with a poetic form; and there is no sharp line, in Plato's employment, between

dialectic, myth, and history. Aristotle could therefore commend his recording of the Socratic method as the discovery of the universal in science and philosophy, and could deprecate his separation of the universal from the particular.²⁰ Aristotle's favorite means of differentiating the arts from one another is, in his sense, formal; and he therefore separated philosophy from poetry in terms, not of metrical forms, but of comparative universality, illustrating the distinction by placing poetry between philosophy and history.²¹ So long as the principles of philosophy are sought in the nature of things, science is of universals, since it must apply to more than the particular instance; but, when the principles of philosophy are based on a preliminary examination of the nature of thought, the virtue of science may be found either in its universality (since scientific laws must be shown to be necessary, while their objectivity may be assured by the laws of thought) or in its particularity (since scientific laws must be shown to be objective, while their universality may be assured by the uniformity of nature). Poetry may in this stage of the discussion be analogized to philosophy or to history; and the poetic quality, since it is midway between the general and the particular, may combine the two, or indeed it may be the source of the generality of philosophy or the particularity of history. Sidney borrows Aristotle's example to discover Empedocles a poet²² and to assign to poetry the per-

¹⁹ *Art as experience* (New York, 1934), p. 333; cf. also p. 79: "In other words, art is not nature, but it is nature transformed by entering into new relationships where it evokes a new emotional response." Cf. also *Experience and nature*, pp. 136, 150-51, and esp. 358: "Thus the issue involved in experience as art in its pregnant sense and in art as processes and materials of nature continued by direction into achieved and enjoyed meanings, sums up in itself all the issues which have been previously considered. Thought, intelligence, science is the intentional direction of natural events to meanings capable of immediate possession and enjoyment; this direction—which is operative art—is itself a natural event in which nature otherwise partial and incomplete comes fully to itself; so that objects of conscious experience when reflectively chosen, form the 'end' of nature."

²⁰ *Met.* xiii. 1078^b27-32.

²¹ *Poetics* 1. 1447^a16-20: "Even if statements concerning medicine or natural philosophy be set forth in metrical form, it is customary to call the author a poet. Yet there is nothing in common between Homer and Empedocles except the meter, and therefore it is right to call the one poet, but the other physician rather than poet." *Ibid.* 9. 1451^b5-7: "Wherefore poetry is more philosophic and more serious than history, for poetry is expressive more of universals, while history states singulars."

²² Sidney, p. 4.

formance of moral tasks at which philosophy and history fail.²³ According to Bacon, on the other hand, poetry is nothing else than an imitation of history for the giving of pleasure,²⁴ while Newman can quote Bacon to illustrate Aristotle's doctrine that poetry is more general than history and can follow Aristotle's judgment that Empedocles was no poet but a natural historian writing in verse in support of the doctrine that natural history and philosophy are proper materials for poetry.²⁵ Wordsworth, on the other hand, makes use of vague echoes of Aristotle to support the position that poetry is the most philosophical of all writing and to contrast poetry to matter of fact or science.²⁶ Like "philosophy," which

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14: "The Philosopher therefore, and the Historian, are they which would win the goale, the one by precept, the other by example: but both, not having both, doo both hale. For the Philosopher setting downe with thornie arguments, the bare rule, is so hard of utterance, and so mistie to be conceived, that one that hath no other guide but him, shall wade in him till he be old, before he shall find sufficient cause to be honest. For his knowledge standeth so upon the abstract and generall, that happie is that man who may understand him, and more happie, that can apply what he doth understand. On the other side, the Historian wanting the precept, is so tied, not to what should be, but to what is, to the particular truth of things, and not to the general reason of things, that his example draweth no necessarie consequence, and therefore a lese fruitful doctrine. Now doth the peerless Poet performe both, for whatsoever the Philosopher saith should be done, he gives a perfect picture of it by some one, by whom he presupposeth it was done, so as he coupleth the generall notion with the particular example."

²⁴ *De augmentis scientiarum*, Book II, chap. xiii (*The works of Francis Bacon*, ed. Spedding, Ellis, and Heath, IV [London, 1857], 315); *Of the proficience and advancement of learning*, Book II (*Works*, III, 343). Cf. *MP*, XLI, 78, n. 21.

²⁵ Newman, "Poetry, with reference to Aristotle's 'Poetics,'" *Essays critical and historical* (London, 1890), I, 12: "Empedocles wrote his physics in verse, and Oppian his history of animals. Neither were poets—the one was an historian of nature, the other a sort of biographer of brutes. Yet a poet may make natural history or philosophy the material of his composition."

²⁶ Wordsworth, p. 89: "Aristotle, I have been told, has said, that Poetry is the most philosophic of all writing: it is so: its object is truth, not individual and local, but general, and operative; not standing upon external testimony, but carried alive into the heart by passion; truth which is its own testimony, which gives competence and confidence to the tribunal to which it

may be taken either as identical with poetry or as an imperfect truth perfected by poetry, "history" takes on two senses in this Platonic opposition of a complete and partial truth. Shelley contrasts history to poetry:

A poem is the very image of life expressed in its eternal truth. There is this difference between a story and a poem, that a story is a catalogue of detached facts, which have no other connexion than time, place, circumstance, cause, and effect; the other is the creation of actions according to the unchangeable forms of human nature, as existing in the mind of the creator, which is itself the image of all other minds. The one is partial, and applies only to a definite period of time, and a certain combination of events which can never again recur; the other is universal, and contains within itself the germ of a relation to whatever motives or actions have place in the possible varieties of human nature.²⁷

appeals, and receives them from the same tribunal. Poetry is the image of man and nature. The obstacles which stand in the way of the fidelity of the Biographer and Historian, and of their consequent utility, are incalculably greater than those which are to be encountered by the Poet who comprehends the dignity of his art." Cf. *ibid.*, p. 86 n.: "I here use the word 'Poetry' (though against my own judgment) as opposed to the word Prose, and synonymous with metrical composition. But much confusion has been introduced into criticism by this contradistinction of Poetry and Prose, instead of the more philosophical one of Poetry and Matter of Fact, or Science." Cf. J. R. Lowell, "Shakespeare once more," *Literary essays* (Boston, 1894), III, 70-71: "The aim of the artist is psychologic, not historic truth. It is comparatively easy for an author to get up any period with tolerable minuteness in externals, but readers and audiences find more difficulty in getting them down, though oblivion swallows scores of them at a gulp. The saving truth in such matters is a truth to essential and permanent characteristics." Lowell, moreover, appreciated the fashion in which Wordsworth's doctrine that poetry is philosophy involved the further identification of philosophy with a kind of history, the history of the poet's mind; cf. "Wordsworth," *Writings* (Boston, 1898), IV, 397-98: "He was theoretically determined not only to be a philosophic poet, but to be a great philosophic poet, and to this end he must produce an epic. Leaving aside the question whether the epic be obsolete or not, it may be doubted whether the history of a single man's mind is universal enough in its interest to furnish all the requirements of the epic machinery, and it may be more than doubted whether a poet's philosophy be ordinary metaphysics, divisible into chapter and section."

²⁷ Shelley, p. 108.

Froude, on the other hand, finds the universality in that which is better and genuine in man and contrasts prose and verse but identifies the highest history with the highest poetry:

The prose historian may give us facts and names; he may catalogue the successions, and tell us long stories of battles, and of factions, and of political intrigues; he may draw characters for us of the sort which figure commonly in such features of human affairs, men of the unheroic, unpoetic kind—the Cleons, the Sejanuses, the Tiberiuses, a Philip the Second or a Louis Quatorze, in whom the noble element died out into selfishness and vulgarity. But great men—all MEN properly so called (whatever is genuine and natural in them)—lie beyond prose, and can only be really represented by the poet.²⁸

Finally, if the principles of our knowledge and the nature of things are sought in the processes of experience, history may assume dominance among sciences and things, either in the sense of accounting for the historical succession of poetry and philosophy as forms of wisdom and explanation—as Vico finds the “Aristotelian” aphorism that nothing is in understanding that was not prior in sense exemplified in the sequence after an age of poets, whose wisdom is of the sense, of an age of philosophers, whose wisdom is of the understanding²⁹—or in the sense that

²⁸ “Homer,” *Short studies on great subjects*, 1st ser. (New York, 1873), p. 410; cf. also “The science of history,” *ibid.*, pp. 32–35.

²⁹ G. B. Vico, *Principii di scienza nuova*, Book II (3d ed.; Naples, 1744), I, 129 and 376. The relation between poetry and philosophy is conceived in terms of particularity and generality (cf. *ibid.*, Book I, pp. 90–91): “Axiom 53. Men first perceive without noticing; then they notice with perturbed and agitated soul; finally they reflect with a pure mind. This axiom is the principle of poetic judgments, which are formed by the perception of the passions and emotions, unlike philosophic judgments which are formed through reflection by reason. Wherefore the latter approximate more closely to truth the more they are raised to universality, and the former are more certain the more they descend to particularity.” The poetic truth may be true metaphysically when the physical truth is false (*ibid.*, p. 88). The history of mankind is analogized to the life of a man, and the infancy of the race is an age of poetry, prior to the formation of philosophy;

all things are histories—as Dewey finds history basic to all knowledge and histories more truly known than mathematical and physical objects.³⁰ Aristotle’s distinction of philosophy, poetry, and history has been made the basis for assigning to poetry or history functions and characteristics which Aristotle conceived as philosophic, and, as a final irony, historians of philosophy have reproached him for mistaking poets for philosophers, misled in his humorless literal-mindedness by Plato’s gentle irony.³¹

While poets dispute the authority of philosophers, supplementing scientific inquiries, rectifying metaphysical reflec-

the relation of art to nature is therefore complex—men supplement nature by the attentive study of art, but in poetry no one succeeds by art who has not the advantages of nature, and therefore, if poetry founded pagan civilization, from which in turn followed all the arts, the first poets were by nature. The people of the infant world were poets, and the arts are imitations of nature, a kind of *real poetry* (*ibid.*, p. 90). From this poetic wisdom derive on one branch a poetic logic, a poetic morality, a poetic economics, and a poetic politics, and on the other branch a poetic physics, from which proceed a poetic cosmography, astronomy, chronology, and geography (*ibid.*, p. 132).

³⁰ *Experience and nature*, p. 163: “And yet if all natural existences are histories, divorce between history and the logical mathematical schemes which are the appropriate objects of pure science, terminates in the conclusion that of existences there is no science, no adequate knowledge. Aside from mathematics, all knowledge is historic: chemistry, geology, physiology, as well as anthropology and those human events to which, arrogantly, we usually restrict the title of history. Only as science is seen to be fulfilled and brought to itself in intelligent management of historical processes in their continuity can man be envisaged as within nature, and not as a supernatural extrapolation. Just because nature is what it is, history is capable of being more truly known—understood, intellectually realized—than are mathematical and physical objects.”

³¹ J. Burnet (*Early Greek philosophy* [3d ed.; London, 1920], p. 127) argues that Aristotle is mistaken in treating Xenophanes as the founder of the Eleatic school and that this mistake originated in his misinterpretation of Plato. “Just as he [Plato] called the Herakleiteans ‘followers of Homer and still more ancient teachers,’ so he attached the Eleatics to Xenophanes and still earlier authorities. We have seen before how these playful and ironical remarks of Plato were taken seriously by his successors, and we must not make too much of this fresh instance of Aristotle’s literalness.” Cf. *ibid.*, p. 32: “It is often forgotten that Aristotle derived much of his information from Plato, and we must specially observe that he more than once takes Plato’s humorous remarks too literally.”

tions, and expounding lofty and enigmatic visions, and philosophers in their turn borrow the devices of the poet to expound the nature, function, and place of the arts and use the arguments of the moralist or the economist to banish poets from their perfect states or to instruct them in their tasks as educators or propagandists, the critic sometimes conceives his function to be distinct from that of the artist and dialectician and sometimes enters into competition with both, assuming the role of poet among poets and dialectician among dialecticians. The functions assigned to criticism reflect all the analogies and distinctions found in the ends of poetry and philosophy, the objects of art and nature, and the forms of history, poetry, and philosophy. For criticism may be conceived as a technique applied only to works of art, if the literal distinctions are maintained; or it may be implied in any knowledge, involved in any activity, and applied to any object. The history of criticism can be traced and understood, therefore, in part by differentiating kinds of criticism applied to art, and in part by finding the manners in which criticism, conceived more broadly in a variety of ways, applies to art in particular. In the analogical tradition the effort is to avoid unreal distinctions between the emotional and the intellectual, the moral and the aesthetic, the artistic and the practical; and the development of the tradition is therefore the evolution of a single dialectic in which opposed devices for achieving critical universality jostle one another: criticism is sometimes the application of a theory in the judgment of objects and actions; it is sometimes the technique which determines both theories and arts; it is sometimes, like theory, itself an art. In the literal tradition the effort is to find a technique proper to each subject matter and therefore to separate, for the purposes of accuracy and clarity, considerations of

moral, political, scientific, metaphysical, and aesthetic characteristics even in the judgment of a single object; and the development of the tradition is therefore a succession of analyses which achieve critical particularity in application to objects of art, canons of taste, or means of production and manners of social use. Echoes of the one effort emerge from the mingling of the two traditions as speculations concerning the Good, the True, and the Beautiful; and the other effort leaves its mark in discussions of the individual arts.

For Plato, "criticism" was a general term applied to all processes of judgment, those involved in the common distinctions made by the interlocutors in the dialogues as well as the technical distinctions of reason, but used particularly for the judgments pronounced in law-courts in application of the law; the judgment of art is usually treated by Plato in the context of broader political and judiciary functions. There are two intellectual arts or sciences—the science of commanding, which is the proper art of the statesman, and the art of judging, which, since it pronounces on what falls under or is disclosed by the art of commanding, is also part of the statesman's art.³² Judgment is a decision between better and worse in all fields: between the unjust and the just man,³³ between possible kinds of lives and pleasures,³⁴ between pleasure and wisdom,³⁵ between true and false.³⁶ The criteria by which judgment pronounces on its subject matter to determine the comparative value of things among gods and men, and the degree of their approximation to the eternal good, are three: experience, intelligence, and discussion (*λόγος*), the latter being the "instrument" of judgment; in all three the philosopher has the

³² *Statesman* 259E–260A, 292B, 305B.

³³ *Rep.* II. 360D.

³⁴ *Ibid.* IX. 580B–C; *Philebus* 27C.

³⁵ *Philebus* 65A.

³⁶ *Theaetetus* 150B.

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advantage over other men.³⁷ The law-giver, therefore, combats an erroneous doctrine—such as the separation of the pleasant from the just—by habituation, commendation, and discussion; and in the opposition of two judgments the character of the judge is reflected in the soundness of the judgment, for the judgment of the better man is more authoritative.³⁸ One might even concede the opinion of the majority of men that pleasure is the proper criterion of music and poetry, not the pleasure of any chance person, but of that man or those men who excel in virtue and education, for the critic should be a teacher; and when poets adapt their works to the criterion of the pleasure of their judges (so that their audiences become the teachers of the poets), they corrupt themselves as well as their audiences, whose criteria of pleasure ought to be improved by the judgments of better men rather than degraded to the common level.³⁹ The charm which causes pleasure, however, is usually accompanied by correctness or utility; and consequently the arts which are imitative and produce likenesses are not to be judged by pleasure or untrue opinion but by the proportion and equality they possess: to judge a poem, one must know its essence, for one must know what its intention is and what original it represents, if one is to decide whether it succeeds or fails in achieving its intention.⁴⁰ The critic of music, poetry, and the other arts is therefore the philosopher in the perfect state, or, failing that, the lawgiver and the educator.⁴¹

There are numerous ingredients of later criticism in Plato's philosophy—the moral emphasis; the use of the criteria of experience, intelligence, and words or discussion (any one of which might assume a dominant position in derivative forms of criti-

cism); the prominence of pleasure balanced by various forms of rightness or utility; and, finally, the background of an eternal beauty, which things imitate, which philosophers and poets seek in their manipulations of words, and which cannot itself be expressed without recourse to eternal standards of truth and goodness. The influence of Plato on later criticism is to be found for the most part in the emphasis given to one or another of these critical criteria or aesthetic traits rather than in the dialectical association of them and the interplay among them which are essential to Plato's conception of criticism. In particular, criticism is reduced to narrower limits and the dialectic of its discussion is restricted and frozen in either of two ways: by limiting its application to works of art or literature, or by assigning to criticism the role of applying theory to practice in specific subject matters. The first restriction was accomplished, probably under Stoic and Epicurean influences, in Hellenistic Greece. The word "critic" is used in counterdistinction to "grammatician" in the "Platonic" *Axiochos* (366E), which may show Epicurean influences; and Crates, the Stoic philosopher, is credited with having first distinguished "critic" and "grammatician," the former being learned in all the erudite sciences, the latter being equipped to interpret unusual words and to treat of accents and similar properties of words; the critic thus is related to the grammarian as the architect to the craftsman.⁴² It is probable that

³⁷ *Rep.* ix. 581E–583A. ³⁸ *Ibid.* 658E–659C.
³⁹ *Laws* ii. 663A–C. ⁴⁰ *Ibid.* 667B–668B.
⁴¹ *Ibid.* viii. 829D; xii. 948E–949A; vi. 765B.

⁴² *Sextus Empiricus Adversus grammaticos* i. 79. For the evolution of κριτικός, γραμματικός, and φιλόλογος cf. Gudeman's article κριτικός. Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll, *Real Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft* (Stuttgart, 1921), XI, 1912–15. In the course of the discussion "grammatician" is analogized to, or made synonymous with, "critic," and the identification as well as the discrimination of meanings is continued even into modern discussion. This discussion of the relation of grammarian and critic is frequently associated with the second manner of fixing and restricting the meaning of "critic" by consideration of the boundaries of the sciences. Both processes are illustrated, for example, by Octavius Ferrarius (*Prolu-*

this literal distinction of critic of meanings from grammarian of words reflects the influence of Aristotle's restriction of the word "grammarian" to the treatment of words as sounds and symbols apart from significances, while the second manner of restricting "criticism" was developed from a like analogizing and fitting of the meaning of the term "criticism" to his division of the sciences. Aristotle held that every theory and every method admitted of two kinds of proficiency: scientific knowledge of the thing and a kind of broad educational acquaintance with the science, so that it is the mark of a well-educated man to be able to criticize and judge with some probability whether a thing is well or badly expounded.⁴³ In later writers Aristotle's conception of the theoretic and practical is confused with Plato's conception of the intellectual and practical, and every science (contrary to Aristotle's supposition) is made to have a theory and an application between which criticism mediates. Clausewitz, thus, in his treatise *On war*, devotes a chapter to criticism so conceived:

The influence of theoretical truths upon practical life is always exerted more through criticism than through rules for practice. Criticism is the application to actual events of theoretical truth, and so not only brings the latter nearer to life but also accustoms the intelligence more to these truths through the constant repetition of their applications.⁴⁴

The "critical narration" which Clausewitz employs in his treatment of war consists of three parts, each of which has

siones et epistolae: accesserunt formulae ad petenda doctoris insignia (Padua, 1650), p. 116): "Sed Criticos nostros sive Grammaticos duplici crimen arcessit, altero quod inepti sectantur acerrimo, altero quod non contenti finibus suis, audent etiam vestros limites revellere, et in scientiarum campum audacter transcedere."

⁴³ *De partibus animalium* I. 1. 639^a1–6.

⁴⁴ *On war*, trans. O. J. M. Jolles (New York, 1943), Book II, chap. v, p. 92.

its special pertinence and history in the development of criticism: (1) the historical discovery and establishment of doubtful facts; (2) critical investigation proper, which consists in tracing the effect from its causes; and (3) criticism proper, which consists in testing the means employed. These two particularizations of Platonic criticism divide between them the text of the poet (which may be interpreted analogically to apply to any subject) and the truths or significances of the sciences (which may be brought analogically to apply to any text).

The Platonic criticism may, on the other hand, be used to resist such particularization, for it may be made to apply to the whole of philosophy to become a preliminary to or substitute for dialectic. Protagoras and the other Sophists are prominent in the philosophy of Plato because they are the dramatic representation of the consequences which follow from denying objective Truth and Beauty: philosophy then becomes critical; I am the judge of the existence of things that are to me and of the nonexistence of things that are not to me;⁴⁵ we all sit in judgment on the judgment of everyone else;⁴⁶ the criteria by which we judge things are internal, as, for example, the coincidence of thought and sensation;⁴⁷ and each is his own best judge concerning what is future.⁴⁸ Yet those same relativistic devices are used by philosophers to avoid relativism and skepticism, for the certainty of knowledge of things and the universality of moral standards may be based on judgment, either in the sense of making criticism of human faculties a preliminary to philosophy or of making judgment the basis of first principles in each of the branches of philosophy. "Our age," Kant said, "is, in every sense of the word, the age of criticism, and everything must

⁴⁵ *Theat.* 160C.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.* 170D.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* 178B.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* 187E.

submit to it."⁴⁹ Criticism becomes a necessary prelude to the task of philosophy:

It will now be seen how there can be a special science serving as a critique of pure reason. Reason is the faculty which supplies the principles of knowledge *a priori*. Pure reason therefore is that faculty which supplies the principles of knowing anything entirely *a priori*. An Organum of pure reason ought to comprehend all the principles by which pure knowledge *a priori* can be acquired and fully established. A complete application of such an Organum would give us a System of Pure Reason. But as that would be a difficult task, and as at present it is still doubtful whether and when such an expansion of our knowledge is here possible, we may look on a mere criticism of pure reason, its sources and limits, as a kind of preparation for a complete system of pure reason. It should be called a critique, not a doctrine, of pure reason. Its usefulness would be negative only, serving for a purging rather than for an expansion of our reason, and, what after all is a considerable gain, guarding reason against errors.⁵⁰

Aesthetic judgment, which bears on beauty in art or in nature, requires no inference, theoretic or practical, to external things, but depends wholly on the free interplay of imagination and understanding. Judgment may, on the other hand, be the basis of philosophy, because judgment and common sense are equally distributed among men, unlike apprehension or conception of the things we judge, and truth and falsity are qualities which belong only to judgment.⁵¹ Since judg-

⁴⁹ *Critique of pure reason*, p. xix, n. 1.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

⁵¹ Cf. Thomas Reid, *Essays on the intellectual powers of man* (*The works of Thomas Reid*, D. D., ed. Sir William Hamilton [8th ed.; Edinburgh, 1895], I, 366). Reid cites Descartes in support of his position: "Nothing is so equally distributed among men as judgment. Wherefore, it seems reasonable to believe, that the power of distinguishing what is true from what is false (which we properly call judgment or right reason) is by nature equal in all men; and therefore that the diversity of our opinions does not arise from one person being endowed with a greater power of reason than another, but only from this, that we do not lead our thought in the same track, nor attend to the same things." He quotes Cicero to the same effect: "It is

ment may be either intuitive or grounded on argument, the chief problems of philosophy center about the judgment of first principles, among others the first principles of taste:

I think there are axioms, even in matters of *taste*. . . . The fundamental rules of poetry and music, and painting, and dramatic action and eloquence, have been always the same, and will be so to the end of the world. . . . I do not maintain that taste, so far as it is acquired, or so far as it is merely animal, can be reduced to principles. But, as far as it is founded on judgment, it certainly may. The virtues, the graces, the muses, have a beauty that is intrinsic. It lies not in the feelings of the spectator, but in the real excellence of the object. If we do not perceive their beauty, it is owing to the defect or to the perversion of our faculties.⁵²

In either sense the critic discovers the fundamental rules of philosophy and art, of the perception of truth and the apprehension or construction of beauty. Lessing remarks that the first person who compared painting and poetry was a man of taste, an amateur who observed that they both produced pleasure in him, and that the second person, who investigated the inner cause of this pleasure and found that it flowed from the same source, was a philosopher; these two could not easily make a wrong use of their feeling or their reason, but the third person, the critic, who reflected on the value and distribution of these rules, might misapply them and so affect art and taste.⁵³

If, finally, the hope of examining the conditions of all possible experience by criticism or of arriving at common principles of taste by judgment is thought to be as illusory as the appeal to eternal ideas, then principles are sought in actual experi-

wonderful when the learned and unlearned differ so much in art, how little they differ in judgment. For art being derived from Nature, is good for nothing, unless it move and delight Nature." Cf. also *ibid.*, p. 243.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 453.

⁵³ Lessing, p. 292.

ence, and criticism, as well as philosophy itself, becomes an art. Viewed in terms of the activity of man, according to Spingarn, critical judgment and artistic creation are fundamentally the same.

The identity of genius and taste is the final achievement of modern thought on the subject of art, and it means that fundamentally, in their most significant moments, the creative and the critical instincts are one and the same. From Goethe to Carlyle, from Carlyle to Arnold, from Arnold to Symons, there has been much talk of the "creative function" of Criticism. For each of these men the phrase held a different content; for Arnold it meant merely that Criticism creates the intellectual atmosphere of the age, a social function of high importance, perhaps, yet wholly independent of aesthetic significance. But the ultimate truth toward which these men were tending was more radical than that, and plays havoc with all the old platitudes about the sterility of taste. Criticism at last can free itself of its age-long self-contempt, now that it may realize that aesthetic judgment and artistic creation are instinct with the same vital life.⁵⁴

Or criticism may be conceived to be properly neither impressionistic nor judicial, but to consist, as Dewey holds, in reliving the processes the artist went through to the end of deepening the appreciation of others.

For critical judgment not only grows out of the critic's experience of objective matter, and not only depends upon that for validity, but has for its office the deepening of just such experience in others. Scientific judgments not only end in increased control but for those who understand they add enlarged meanings to the things perceived and dealt with in daily contact with the world. The function of criticism is the reeducation of perception of works of art; it is an auxiliary in the process, a difficult process, of learning to see and hear. The conception that its business is to appraise, to judge in the legal and moral sense, arrests the perception of those who are influenced by the criticism that assumes this task. The moral

⁵⁴ "The new criticism," *Creative criticism* (New York, 1917), pp. 42-43.

office of criticism is performed indirectly. . . . We lay hold of the full import of a work of art only as we go through in our own vital processes the processes the artist went through in producing the work. It is the critic's privilege to share in the promotion of this active process. His condemnation is that he so often arrests it.⁵⁵

Or, finally, criticism may be conceived, as it was by Tolstoy, as one of the conditions which lead to the production of counterfeit art in our society, since art criticism is impossible in societies in which art is undivided and appraised by the religious conception of life common to the whole people, but it grows on the art of the upper classes, who do not acknowledge the religious perception of their time.⁵⁶

The literal separation of the arts and the sciences requires the differentiation of subject matters and methods, for the difference between the analogical and the literal is not to be found in any difference in the ease with which arts may be separated or compared by the two methods, but in the priority given to the differences or the likenesses, so that either differences are worked dialectically from basic similarities or similarities are found among things whose differences have been stated.

⁵⁵ *Art as experience*, pp. 324-25.

⁵⁶ Tolstoy, *What is art?* trans. A. Maude, in *Tolstoy on art* (Oxford, 1924), pp. 241-43. The analogy of Dewey's basic principles to those of Tolstoy may be seen in his condemnation of the separation of art from the conditions of life consequent on the growth of capitalism and the *nouveaux riches* and his condemnation of the criticism which results from these conditions (*Art as experience*, pp. 8-11). Conversely, Tolstoy pleads the importance of the proper kind of criticism, modeled on Matthew Arnold's view of the purpose of criticism to find among all that has been written that which is most important and best and to direct attention to it—unlike the actual criticism of the time, which set itself the task of praising such works as have obtained notoriety, devising foggy philosophic-aesthetic theories to justify them, or of ridiculing bad work or works of another camp more or less wittily, or of deducing the direction of the movement of our whole society from types depicted by writers and in general expressing economic and political opinions under the guise of discussing literary productions ("Der Büttnerbauer," *Tolstoy on art*, pp. 382, 386-87).

"Criticism" and the related terms (*κρίνειν*, *κρίσις*, *κριτικός*), which for Plato are general terms, are restricted in Aristotle's usage to one of the three kinds of sciences; and some of the peculiarities of the history of criticism are to be attributed to the fact that they belong properly not to the theoretic, or the poetic, but to the practical sciences or to the practical treatment of any science which is possible since politics is an architectonic science: they do not appear in the *Poetics* (except as part of the title of a tragedy), but they are used extensively in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the *Politics*, and the *Rhetoric*, and their other appearances in the works of Aristotle can be explained by the primarily practical sense given to them there. There are two sources of movement in man, appetite and mind,⁵⁷ imagination being a kind of thinking. The moral problem consists in a sense in submitting the appetitive part of the soul to the rational.⁵⁸ The problem of art, on the other hand, turns primarily on the application of knowledge to the organization of external materials, and therefore, unlike the moral virtues, the arts consist in the possession of knowledge, and their products are themselves capable of excellence or virtue.

Moreover, the case of the arts is not similar to that of the virtues, for works of art have their merit in themselves, so that it is sufficient if they are produced having a certain quality, but acts performed in accordance with the virtues are not done justly or temperately if they have a certain quality, but only if the one who performs them has a certain quality when he performs them: first, he must act knowingly; second, he must act by choice and by choice of the act for its own sake; and third, he must act from a firm and constant character. These are not numbered among the essentials for the possession of the arts, except

only knowledge; but for the possession of the virtues knowledge has little or no weight, whereas the other conditions have, not a little force, but all, since it is the very nature of the virtues to be acquired from the repeated performance of just and temperate acts.⁵⁹

Art and the virtues are both related to knowledge, but in different and characteristic fashions. The arts, since they are external principles of change, are productive (that is, poetic) powers which are rational or (which is the same thing) sciences which are productive; they are themselves intellectual virtues.⁶⁰ The virtues, since they are habits of action, involve knowledge, but they are distinct from prudence, which is the intellectual virtue concerned with action.⁶¹ The arts share with the sciences the peculiarity that they may deal with opposite things and may have opposite effects, as medicine may produce either health or disease, while the virtue or habit which produces a certain result does not also produce the contrary.⁶² It is possible, therefore, to speak of a virtue of art; and, indeed, wisdom, the highest of the intellectual virtues, may be detected in the virtue or excellence of art, but there is no virtue of prudence; in art, moreover, voluntary error is preferable to involuntary, but in matters of prudence and the moral virtues the reverse is true.⁶³ An intellectual process which is not the same as opinion or any particular science is therefore involved in the virtues: intelligence (*σοβητις*) is either the use of *opinion* in *judging* (*κρίνειν*) of what is said about matters which fall under prudence or the use of *science* in *learning* about matters proper to science, and consideration (*γνώμη*) is right judg-

⁵⁷ *Ibid.* ii. 4. 1105^a26–1105^b5.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.* vi. 4. 1140^a1–23; *Met.* ix. 2. 1046^a36.

⁵⁹ *Nicomach.* *Ethics* ii. 6. 1106^a36 ff.; vi. 13. 1144^b1–1145^a2.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* v. 1. 1129^a13; *Met.* ix. 2. 1046^a36 and 5. 1048^a8; *De interpretatione* 13. 22^a36.

⁶¹ *Nicomach.* *Ethics* vi. 5. 1140^b21–25; 7. 1141^a9–12.

⁵⁷ *De anima* iii. 10. 433^a9.

⁵⁸ *Nicomachean Ethics* i. 13. 1102^a28; iii. 12. 1119^b11.

ment (*κρίσις ὁρθή*) of the equitable. Intelligence differs from prudence in that prudence determines what ought to be done or not to be done, that is, it commands, whereas the function of intelligence is limited to making judgments, that is, it is merely critical.⁶⁴ There are, in all, four faculties which treat of ultimate and particular things: intuitive reason (*νοῦς*) perceives principles and the particulars which fall under them in the context of science; prudence (*φρόνησις*) is concerned with action in the context of the right principles; while intelligence (*στήνεσις*) and consideration (*γνώμη*) are concerned with judgment (*κρίσις*) of contingent particulars.⁶⁵ In an important sense, therefore, actions require *judgment*, while objects of art are *known*. Or, to state the conclusion paradoxically in the modern cognates of the terms Aristotle used:

⁶⁴ *Ibid.* vi. 10–11. 1142^b34–1143^b17; esp. 1143^a10, 14, 15, 20, 23, 30.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.* 1143^a25–1143^b7. This differentiation is of the utmost importance, not only for the discrimination of the sciences from one another, but for the separation of knowledge from virtue in Aristotle's philosophy and in the literal tradition in general. The modern revolt against what passed for Aristotelianism may be stated succinctly as the reduction of these four processes or "habits" to judgment. When first principles are known by "judgment" or "common sense" or *bon sens*, and when that ability to judge the true and the false is attributed in general to all mankind, the distinction between theoretic and practical, between moral criticism and artistic knowledge, disappears. The line that runs back from the modern *bon sens* to the Stoic tradition, which Gilson traces, is therefore mediated by the Aristotelian *synesis* and *eusynesis*; and Gilson overemphasizes the exclusive importance of the one element when he says, "La traduction latine de *bon sens* n'est possible qu'au moyen du gallicisme *bona mens*" (René Descartes, *Discours de la méthode*, ed. E. Gilson (Paris, 1925), pp. 81–83). Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *In decem libros ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum expositio*, ed. A. M. Pirotta and M. S. Gillet (Turin, 1934), Lib. VI, lect. 9, par. 1240, p. 409: "Unde dicit quod prudentia est praeceptiva, in quantum scilicet est finis ipsius determinare quid oporteat agere. Sed synesis est solum iudicativa. Et pro eodem accipitur synesis et eusynesis, id est, bonus sensus, sicut et idem dicuntur syneti et eusyneti, id est sensati et bene sensati, quorum est bene judicare." The instrumentalist consequences of this shift may be seen in the fact that "judgment" is by contraries, and is explicated by the analogy of the carpenter's rule, which is the test (*κρίτης*) of the straight and the crooked (cf. *De anima* I. 5. 411^a2–7).

"criticism" is essential in ethics and politics, while art is understood and explained in its proper "science."

The arts and the sciences are therefore associated and distinguished from actions and practical affairs in the manner in which they are subject to knowledge and criticism. We are in general good judges or critics of those matters with which we are acquainted, of a particular subject if we are trained in that or universally if we have a general education. Therefore the scientist is a judge of any matter that falls under his science, but his judgment does not differ from his scientific knowledge; and a well-educated man is a good judge of any matter pertinent to the scope of his interest, but his judgment is the application of the arts he has learned to the argument or the construction. In questions bearing on the moral virtues or political actions, however, the application of reason is less direct, for it is not easy to determine such questions by reasoning or to state the resolution in words, since judgment depends on the particular fact and is based on perception; this is the reason why the young are educated in the arts and the sciences but are improper auditors of lectures on politics.⁶⁶ On the other hand, judgment and criticism have a peculiar place in ethics, since the moral virtues are habits of choice, and choice involves judgments.⁶⁷ Pleasure attends both the operation of the contemplative faculty on intelligible, and that of the

⁶⁶ *Nicomach. Ethics* I. 3. 1094^b27–1095^a2; II. 9. 1109^b20–23; IV. 5. 1126^b2–4; *De partibus animalium* I. 1. 639^a1–639^b14. It should be noted that the general "criticism" is of method and has no bearing on substantive truth or falsity. Cf. *Posterior Analytics* II. 19. 99^b35; and for the psychological bases of judgment in sensation cf. *De anima* II. 11. 424^a5–6; III. 9. 432^a15–16, 12. 434^a3–4.

⁶⁷ The good man judges well of good and noble things; cf. *Nicomach. Ethics* I. 9. 1109^a22–24; III. 4. 1113^a29–31. It is difficult to judge pleasure impartially (cf. *ibid.* II. 9. 1109^b7–9). Judgment is the result of deliberation and is antecedent to choice (cf. *ibid.* III. 3. 1113^a2–14). Responsibility depends on the source of the power to judge (cf. *ibid.* 5. 1114^b5–8).

critical faculty on sensible objects,⁶⁸ and in practical matters judgment of fact takes precedence over the opinions of the wise.⁶⁹ When one proceeds from the sphere of ethics to that of politics, the function of criticism or judgment increases, for the transition is by way of the virtue of justice, and legal justice is defined as the judgment of the just and the unjust.⁷⁰ Something of the Platonic distinction between ruling and judging appears in the political discussion of judgment, for those who govern must command and judge, while those who are governed must judge and distribute offices.⁷¹ The citizen is therefore defined by his participation in the deliberative and judicial processes of the state.⁷² Judgment applies not only to the decision of the law court,⁷³ and to the action of magistrates and assembly,⁷⁴ but also to the general determination of public interest and justice,⁷⁵ and is finally involved also in deliberation.⁷⁶ These considerations of the function of judgment or criticism in politics determine its central place in rhetoric, since that art exists to affect judgments.⁷⁷

To be a good judge in moral and political questions, then, one must have had experience in the sense of having performed actions by which habits have been

formed, while one may be a good judge in most of the arts by means of knowledge and a kind of science of how the thing is made. The teaching of the science of politics presents peculiar problems, because it is a *science or art of actions*, and the application of knowledge to actions is not direct. Aristotle elucidates the difficulty by the analogy of the arts. Unlike the other sciences and arts, politics is not taught by those who practice it, for politicians seem to rely more on experience than on abstract reason, while the Sophists profess to teach it but are ignorant of the science and its subject, since they confuse it with rhetoric and imagine that constitutions can be framed by making collections of existing laws reputed to be good. The kind of teaching and learning that is possible in subjects pertinent to political judgment and criticism is illustrated by music, which differs from the others arts in the knowledge and experience required for its understanding. Even selection among constitutions involves "intelligence" and the ability to "judge" correctly; and, as in music, those experienced in this art are alone able to judge rightly the works produced in it and understand how and by what means they are perfected and what harmonizes with what, while those inexperienced in the art must be content if they do not fail to discern, as they do in painting, that the work is well or badly made. The works of the art of politics are laws, and, though collections of laws may be useful to those who are able to "contemplate" and "judge" them, those who approach them without such trained habits cannot "judge" them correctly, except by chance, and it is only possible that their "intelligence" may be improved by the study of the laws.⁷⁸ Music differs from the other arts in that it alone imitates the passions and the virtues, for the objects of other senses

⁶⁸ *Ibid.* x. 4. 1174^b31–1175^a3.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.* 8. 1179^a9–20.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.* v. 6. 1134^a30–32; cf. also *ibid.* 9. 1136^b32 ff.

⁷¹ *Politics* vii. 4. 1326^b12–20.

⁷² *Ibid.* iii. 1. 1275^b22–23; 1275^b11–21; 6. 1281^b31.

⁷³ *Ibid.* v. 6. 1306^b36–38.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.* iv. 15. 1298^b28–33, 1299^b25–28; ii. 8. 1273^b9–13.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.* iii. 9. 1280^b14–16; vii. 9. 1325^b13–24.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.* iii. 10. 1286^b21–35; this is particularly true in questions of equity (*ibid.* ii. 1287^b14–18).

⁷⁷ *Rhetoric* ii. 1. 1377^b21–29, 1378^a20–23, 18. 1391^b8–20. The kinds of listeners determine the purposes of speeches and therefore the classification of kinds of oratory: the familiar distinction of contemplative from critical reappears among the kinds of hearers (cf. *ibid.* i. 3. 1358^b2–4). Similarly, the commonplace concerning the prudent man is stated in terms of the credit to be given to his powers of judgment (cf. *ibid.* 7. 1164^b11–14).

⁷⁸ *Nicomach. Ethics* x. 9. 1180^b28–1181^b12.

than hearing can be signs but not imitations of virtues.⁷⁹ The one way to become a competent judge of music, since it is directly concerned with virtues and passions, is to become a performer, notwithstanding the contrary conviction of the Lacedaemonians that one could acquire the ability to judge or criticize music by only listening.⁸⁰ The other arts, particularly painting and poetry, are imitations, too, but of agents and actions, not of virtues and passions.⁸¹ The object of art may therefore be treated in those arts as an entity in itself, an artificial object related both to the actions it represents and to the emotions it causes, but not itself a state of mind; in the strict sense, therefore, knowledge rather than criticism is pertinent to those arts, and the "poetic sciences" follow the analogy of the theoretic sciences, which are concerned with entities and actualities, more closely than they do that of the practical sciences, which are concerned with habits and institutions.

The investigation of the nature of tragedy in the *Poetics* proceeds through three stages. Aristotle first differentiates poetry from the other arts by three characteristics possessed by any imitation—its object, its means, and its manner—and uses these distinctions to account for the origin of poetry and its differentiation into kinds. The origin of poetry is traced to two natural causes: imitation is natural to man and it is also natural for man to delight in imitation. Both causes are dis-

cussed in terms of the process of learning, for man learns first by imitation and the pleasure he takes in art is due to the fact that he learns from it. "Learning," however, is one manifestation of "intelligence," distinct from "criticism" because it treats of particulars which fall under science rather than the particulars proper to prudence.⁸² This investigation of the origin and history of poetry, therefore, supplies the distinguishing features of tragedy and comedy—among which one significant conclusion is that the person who "knows" (not "judges" or "criticizes") about tragedies, good and bad, knows also about epics, since their parts are the same⁸³—and it lays the foundation for the treatment of tragedy as such. The isolation of tragedy is accomplished by comparing the various arts as imitations in their relations to the artist's use of means, manner, and object of imitation. Once isolated, tragedy may be considered as itself a kind of whole or object. The distinctions which had previously been made in terms of external agents and exemplars may be translated into traits discoverable in the poem, and the poem may be analyzed in terms of its unity and structure as part and whole (in which the plot, defined as the arrangement of incidents and as the imitation of action, is the principle or soul of tragedy) and in terms of the adaptation of means to ends (in which the plot is the most important part and the end of tragedy).⁸⁴ As a poetic science the results of such inquiry will serve equally for instruction of poets and amateurs, and they are stated, therefore, indifferently as what poets should do or what they have done. This second stage of analysis is knowledge or science of the kind possible in and appropriate to the

⁷⁹ *Pol.* viii. 5. 1340^a12–1340^b19. Cf. Dewey's treatment of the emotional character of hearing as distinguished from sight (*Art as experience*, pp. 237–38); Reynolds, on the other hand, maintains that music and architecture are not imitative arts because they apply directly to the imagination (*Discourses delivered to the students of the Royal Academy*, ed. with introduction and notes by Roger Fry [New York, n.d.], "The thirteenth discourse," p. 365).

⁸⁰ *Pol.* 1339^a42–1339^b4; 6. 1340^a20–39.

⁸¹ *Poet.* 2. 1448^a1 ff.; 6. 1449^a24–28; and esp. 1450^a15–38 and *passim*.

⁸² *Ibid.* 4. 1448^b4–19; cf. above, p. 145.

⁸³ *Poet.* 5. 1449^b17–20.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.* 6. 1450^a15–36.

arts. It is supplemented, finally, by a consideration of tragedy in comparison with the closely related art of epic poetry, first, by analysis of both as parts and wholes, second, by analysis of them with respect to the means used to achieve their comparable ends and the success or failure of those means. Such comparative considerations yield "evaluation" or "censure" (*ἐπιτίμησις*), for in addition to the task which the poet faces in the construction of his play he faces "problems" which take the form of objections to "errors" (*ἀμάρτια*) he has committed. Since they are concerned with "errors," these problems are solved by inference from postulates or assumptions which the poet lays down concerning his art, such as would justify him in using as means to his end (which becomes at this third stage the proper pleasure caused by his work) devices that may be subject to some defect relative to a science or to morals but irrelevant to the considerations of his art. One of these assumptions is that the standard of rightness in poetry differs from that of polities and other arts, for two kinds of error are possible in poetry: failures of art when the poet intended to describe a thing correctly, and technical errors, proper to some other art or science, which might be justified for the purposes of the poetic art.⁸⁵ "Evaluation" or "censure" differs, therefore, from "judgment" or "criticism" as art and science differ from polities and morals: the former is the solution of a problem by demonstration that the end envisaged in the art is achieved by the means employed despite their possible deviation from other standards; the latter is the discrimination, by means of intelligence and in accordance with the command of prudence, of

the contingent circumstances pertinent to actions determined by moral habits and political institutions.

The literal tradition treats of the objects of art or their production or appreciation as something apart from other objects, actions, or sciences. Three ways in which art may be isolated are suggested by Aristotle's cautious procedure and inquiry; and three kinds of treatment may be differentiated, each literal both in the sense that it is concerned only with art, or only with art of a given species or kind, and in the sense that it is sharply differentiated from other attempts to make criticism literal. It may be concerned with the work of art itself and attempt to make "scientific" generalizations or rules; it may be concerned with the work of art as illuminated by consideration of the poet's thought and attempt to make "critical," though poetic not moral, discriminations; it may be concerned with the work of art as effective of an end and attempt to make technical or artistic "evaluations." Poetic "science" differs from theoretic and practical sciences, for it is concerned neither with knowledge as such nor with action but with artificial objects and products; and if such objects are to be isolated for consideration in themselves there must be some preliminary consideration of the conditions of their production and some supplementary consideration of the effects of their contemplation. "Criticism" is the consideration of the work of art primarily in its relation to the artist, and the problem of "making" may therefore be treated either in terms significative of thoughts and emotions (which had been reserved as the material of the practical sciences) in the discrimination and judgment of states of mind and their expression, or in terms significative of facts and knowledge (which had been used as the material of the theoretic sciences)

⁸⁵ *Ibid.* 25, 1460^b6–21; cf. above, n. 63. On the implications of "censure" and its kinds cf. I. Bywater, *Aristotle on the art of poetry* (2d ed.; Oxford, 1909), pp. 328 ff.

for the resolution of problems involved in the circumstances of the poet or in the interpretation of his statements. "Evaluation" is the consideration of the work of art primarily in its relation to the audience, and the change of orientation from poet to audience involves a shift in the uses to which the basic terms are put, for the terms of thought and emotion, of imagination and fancy, are now used for the resolution of problems involved in the effectiveness of devices and the selection of content, while the terms of knowledge and fact are used for precepts to guide the combination of thought and expression and the adaptation of both to circumstances. Criticism and evaluation or censure may then be distinguished from poetic science as variant attempts to set forth the nature and achievements of the arts literally in terms of the objects produced by artists and appreciated by audiences, and all three may be distinguished from the treatment of art in the total context of nature, thought, and experience in which knowledge, criticism, and evaluation are achieved at once and by single analogies or reductions.

The devices of "criticism," like those of "poetic science," bear on the work of art itself, but they are limited to questions similar to those initial considerations of Aristotle's *Poetics* in which the work of art is treated in relation to the artist and the conditions of its production. Criticism may, therefore, consist either in appealing to the known artist as judge or critic of works to be judged or in reconstructing the sense of those works and judging their value by learned commentary. Longinus, in the first manner, undertakes to seek a knowledge (*ἐπιστήμην*) and critical appreciation (*ἐπικρίσις*) of the sublime, realizing that judgment (*κρίσις*) in literature is the result of ripe experience and hoping to express the critical appre-

ciation he seeks in rules and precepts.⁸⁶ The basic terms of his discussion are "nature" and "art," but the nature he is concerned with is the natural genius of the artist which is perfected or curbed by art,⁸⁷ and his rules are stated for the most part in terms of the virtues or faults of artists, which may be discerned by the artist as critic, by the expert, or by all mankind. Natural genius is fundamental, and sublimity is the true ring of the noble mind,⁸⁸ but the achievements of great authors may be used as touchstones and for emulation.

Accordingly it would be well for us, too, when we labor at anything which requires sublimity of style and loftiness of thought, to formulate in our minds how Homer would perhaps have said the same thing, how Plato or Demosthenes or, in history, Thucydides would have expressed it with sublimity. For these illustrious personages, presenting themselves to us for emulation and being as it were preeminent, will elevate our souls in some manner to the standards which our souls conceive. It will however be much more efficacious if we present this also to our mind: how Homer, if he had been present, or Demosthenes would have listened to such or such thing which I say, or how they would have been affected by it. This is truly a great contest, to submit our own statements to such a tribunal and audience, and to make believe that we are submitting the censure (*εἴθηνα*) of our writings to such great heroes as judges (*κριτῆς*) and witnesses. It would be even more stimulating to add: How will all posterity after me hear these writings of mine?⁸⁹

Treatment of literature in terms of the "judgment" of great writers yields rules which constitute a kind of "science" as well as standards for "evaluation," for the prudential discriminations of judgment become the type of knowledge and the basis for the technical and experiential censures of evaluation. The truly sublime

⁸⁶ *On the sublime* vi.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.* II. 1-3.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.* ix. 1-2.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.* xiv. 1-3.

is so constituted in nature that it elevates our souls; moreover, any man of prudence and experience (*έμφρων καὶ ἐμπειρος*) will recognize it; and finally all doubt will be removed concerning both the beautiful and the sublime if all mankind agree despite differences of circumstances in the judgment (*κρίσις*).⁹⁰ Criticism in this first sense bears on the high moments of any branch of literature—poetry, rhetoric, history, or philosophy—and the genius is envisaged as a man of insight and feeling; criticism in the second sense bears on the meanings of all kinds of writings in a literal sense, as well as on the recondite meanings that might be found in poetry and fables, and in both the author is envisaged only in terms of the knowledge or learning to which criticism is an aid. Bacon makes use both of criticism and of “inter-

pretation,” the former applicable to all books, the latter limited to a kind of poetry and to myths.

There remain two appendices touching the tradition of knowledge, the one Critical, the other Pedantical. For all knowledge is either delivered by teachers, or attained by men's proper endeavours: and therefore as the principal part of tradition of knowledge concerneth chiefly writing of books, so the relative part thereof concerneth reading of books. Whereunto appertain incidently these considerations. The first is concerning the true correction and edition of authors; wherein nevertheless rash diligence hath done great prejudice. For these critics have often presumed that that which they understand not is false set down: as the Priest that where he found it written of St. Paul, *Demissus est per sportam*, [he was let down in a basket,] mended his book, and made it *Demissus est per portam*, [he was let out by the gate]; because *sporta* was an hard word, and out of his reading; and surely their errors, though they be not so palpable and ridiculous, are yet of the same kind. And therefore as it hath been wisely noted, the most corrected copies are commonly the least correct.

The second is concerning the exposition and explication of authors, which resteth in annotations and commentaries; wherein it is over usual to blanch the obscure places, and discourse upon the plain.

The third is concerning the times, which in many cases give great light to true interpretations.

The fourth is concerning some brief censure and judgment of the authors; that men thereby may make some election unto themselves what books to read.

The fifth is concerning the syntax and disposition of studies; that men may know in what order or pursuit to read.⁹¹

⁹⁰ *Of the proficience and advancement of learning*, Book II (*Works*, III, 413–14). Cf. *De augmentis scientiarum*, Book VI, chap. iv (*Works*, IV, 493–94), where Bacon emphasizes the place of judgment in the Critical processes: “There belongs thirdly to the critical part (and from this indeed it derives its name) the insertion of some brief judgment concerning the authors edited, and comparison of them with other writers on the same subjects; that students may by such censure

⁹¹ *Ibid.* vil. 2–4. The presuppositions which underlie this transition from the judgment of the genius to that of posterity are well expressed by Ch. Labitte, *Etudes littéraires* (Paris, 1846), I, 181: “Pour moi, ce me semble, il n'est qu'une manière un peu précise de songer à la posterité quand on est homme de lettres, c'est de se reporter en idée aux anciens illustres, à ceux qu'on préfère, qu'on admire avec préférence, et de se demander: Qu'eurent-ils de moi? à quel degré daigneraient-ils m'admettre? s'ils me connaissaient m'ouvriraient-ils leur cercle? me reconnaîtraient-ils comme un de leurs, comme le dernier des leurs, le plus humble? Voilà ma vue rétrospective de posterité, et celle-là en vaut bien une autre.” The same rhetorical criterion of insight and agreement may be applied to other subjects, as when the mark of philosophy is sought in the “common experience” of men as opposed to the “special experience” of the sciences. Gibbon's record of his reading of Longinus illustrates the operation of this mode of criticism. On September 14, 1762, he writes (*Gibbon's Journal to January 28th, 1763*, ed. D. M. Low [New York, 1929], p. 142): “As yet I read my author more as a man of Genius, than as a man of taste: I am pleased and astonished rather than instructed.” On October 3 he writes (pp. 155–56): “The 9th chapter, which treats of the first of these, (the elevation of the ideas,) is one of the finest monuments of Antiquity. Till now, I was acquainted only with two ways of criticizing a beautiful passage: The one, to shew, by an exact anatomy of it, the distinct beauties of it, and from whence they sprung; the other, an idle exclamation, or a general encomium, which leaves nothing behind it. Longinus has shewn me that there is a third. He tells me his own feelings upon reading it; and tells them with such energy, that he communicates them. I almost doubt which is most sublime, Homer's Battle of the Gods, or Longinus's apostrophe to *Terentianus* upon it.”

In the more restricted region of poetry, however, the one relevant deficiency which Bacon notes is in the philosophic interpretation of ancient parables which he illustrates by developing the legends of Pan, Perseus, and Dionysus into significances applicable, respectively, in natural, political, and moral speculation.⁹² Criticism may be achieved, in general, by appeal to what is universal or best in men's minds, or to the reconstruction of what one man said, or to the interpretation of the allegory concealed in stories and histories; the censure that accompanies these criticisms is by standards determined by comparison with great geniuses, or with other books in the field, or with the principles of philosophers. Broadly conceived, criticism so practiced is concerned either with sublime and beautiful feelings and the means by which they are expressed or with the learned and critical interpretation of statements and the meanings they express.

The consideration of the work of art it-

be both advised what books to read and better prepared when they come to read them. This last office is indeed, so to speak, the critic's chair; which has certainly in our age been ennobled by some great men,—men in my judgment above the stature of critics." Machiavelli made excellent use of both fable and history (cf. *ibid.*, Book VIII [Works, V, 56]; *Of the profession and advancement of learning*, Book II [Works, III, 345, 453]), yet the Stoic use of the allegorical interpretation of poets seemed to Bacon vain: "Nevertheless in many of the like encounters, I do rather think that the fable was first, and the exposition devised, than that the moral was first, and thereupon the fable framed. For I find it was an ancient vanity in Chrysippus, that troubled himself with great contention to fasten the assertions of the Stoics upon the fictions of the poets. But yet that all the fables and fictions of the poets were but pleasure and not figure, I interpose no opinion. Surely of those poets which are now extant, even Homer himself, (notwithstanding he was made a kind of Scripture by the later schools of the Grecians,) yet I should without any difficulty pronounce that his fables had no such inwardness in his own meaning; but what they might have upon a more original tradition, is not easy to affirm; for he was not the inventor of many of them" (*ibid.*, III, 345).

⁹² *Ibid.*, pp. 318–35; cf. *On principles and origins according to the fables of Cupid and Coelum* (Works, V, 461–500).

self may be in terms of its effects rather than in terms of its organization or its author, and then the processes of "evaluation" will take precedence over those of "criticism" or "science." If appeal is made directly to audiences, rather than to posterity or any other universal audience which will approve only of the greatest artists, audiences are diversified and numerous; and if meanings are sought directly in words, rather than in the comparison of works on the same subject, the effects to be achieved by words are relatively few. The basic terms of evaluation are words and things, style and content, and the subject of censure may be either the suitability of the manner of statement to achieve effects on various audiences, or faults and improprieties from bad combinations of diction, composition, and subject in various styles. As the concern with the character of the poet and with his treatment of subject matter suggested analogies to the first part of Aristotle's analysis, so the concern with effects on an audience and with the relative effectiveness of various poetic genres may be viewed as a translation of the topics treated in the third part of Aristotle's analysis to a place of central importance. Horace's constant worry over the tastes of actual audiences yields emphases opposite to those which Longinus derives from his audience of heroes: popular judgment is fickle;⁹³ the public is

⁹³ *Epistles* I, 19, 37; cf. also I, 1, 71–76, where he speaks of the public as a many-headed monster imposing its "judgments"; and *Satires* I, 10, 72–77, where he advises the poet not to try to please the crowd but to be content with a few readers. The differentiation of audiences and their preferences or faculties is never far removed from the moral considerations from which this form of criticism takes its origin; cf. Reynolds, p. 354: "Such men will always prefer imitation to that excellence which is addressed to another faculty that they do not possess; but these are not persons to whom a painter is to look, any more than a judge of morals and manners ought to refer controverted points upon those subjects to the opinions of people taken from the banks of the Ohio, or from New Holland."

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sometimes right, sometimes wrong, but its particular error is to esteem the ancient poets and to censure other works, not because they are coarse or inelegant in style, but because they are modern;⁹⁴ the absence of a discerning critic of unmusical verses has an unfortunate effect on Roman poetry;⁹⁵ the recommendation to the poet, therefore, is to choose subjects suited to his own powers, and if Horace imitated Archilochus it was in spirit and meter, not in words or in subjects, so that even the imitation was a novel departure by which he was the first of the Romans to use those numbers:⁹⁶ the preferred critic is the good and prudent man who censures lifeless lines.⁹⁷ Similarly Horace's treatment of kinds of poetry yields the familiar genres rather than the parts of learning which emerge from Bacon's treatment. The effect of literature on audiences, however, may also be sought in the differentiation of styles, for in the rhetorical tradition in which Aristotle undertook to classify kinds of rhetoric in terms of audiences Theophrastus studied the "virtues," not of authors or of audiences, but of styles, and Cicero, Quintilian, Dionysius, and Demetrius classified first three, then four, styles in terms of their respective qualities and faults. Unlike Bacon, who treated words as the form, the content of statements being the matter, Cicero thought of words and speech as the material from which verse and the styles of prose are formed, and the styles are fitted to our thought.⁹⁸ Demetrius' classification of the elevated, the elegant, the plain, and the forcible

styles depends at once on organizing parts into wholes and at the same time on fitting words and compositions appropriately to thoughts, so that his analysis of style differs from Horace's as the respective ends which they both derive from audiences differ, while in the place of the kinds of poetic composition, as classified by Horace or by Bacon, Demetrius arrives at kinds of style because the parts and wholes defined by thought in his analysis are verbal: members, phrases, periods. Finally, unlike Longinus' analysis, which is fixed on the expressions of the loftiest genius, Demetrius' inquiry is concerned with ways of fitting words to a variety of thoughts and with the faults corresponding to each of the possible styles. Evaluation may be achieved, in general, by comparing the effects of what is written on actual or chosen audiences or by measuring it against the canons for statements of the "kind" to which it belongs; the judges are either men conceived by various standards to be good and prudent or men judged to be expert in rhetoric or some other appropriate science of expression. Broadly conceived, evaluation so practiced is concerned either with qualities of genres of literature and art or with the virtues of style and expression.

III

The words used in criticism are relative to their subject matter, but the subject matter changes with changes of philosophic principle. The vocabulary of criticism is therefore applied now to all things—natural or artificial—and again only to artificial things or even to the things made in one art; and so restricted it applies now to entities, now to states of mind, and again to activities or expressions. Moreover, the consequent ambiguity in critical terms is not readily removed by stating critical or philosophic principles—whether for pur-

⁹⁴ *Ep.* II. 1. 63–92.

⁹⁵ *Ars poetica* 263–64; the term used is *iudex*; cf. *Sat.* I. 10. 38, where Horace thinks of his poems as competing before Tarpa as judge: *certantia iudice Tarpa*.

⁹⁶ *Sat.* 38–40; *Ep.* I. 19. 21–34.

⁹⁷ Cf. *MP*, XLI, 86, n. 47.

⁹⁸ *De oratore* III. 45. 177.

poses of elucidating relative meanings or laying down the law of the true meaning—since the critic sometimes employs philosophic principles for the interpretation of art, sometimes uses criticism to dictate the principles of both philosophy and art, and sometimes operates as artist, justifying at most his suspicion of philosophic or critical principles; or, again, if he thinks of his function as in some sense scientific, he conceives his knowledge on the model sometimes of the theoretic sciences, sometimes of the moral or practical sciences, sometimes of the aesthetic or poetic sciences. Changes of subject matter and changes of principles or manner of use of principles are rarely indicated by the introduction of new terms, and, even when they are, coined words or words borrowed from other disciplines merely illustrate anew the fashion in which the meanings of words shift within a discipline or by passage from one discipline to another. The history of critical discussions could be written in terms of a small number of words, which with their cognates and synonyms have moved back and forth from obscurity to prominence in the aesthetic vocabulary, or from neighboring vocabularies to criticism, or from one significance to another in different modes of criticism. Yet such relativity does not mean that standards are impossible or insignificant in criticism. It means rather that significances must be sought in the sense and application which statements of critical doctrines have in their context and relative to their purpose. It means, secondly, that the evaluation of critical statements should consist in a determination of their adequacy to the end for which they were formulated and of the relevance of that end to the explication of art and objects of art. The differentiation of meanings according to the variety of systems and purposes is itself neither

criticism nor philosophy but a device preliminary to both and a substitute for the easy acceptance or refutation of statements according to preferred meanings which the reader justifies because (whether or not they leave the writer who is being interpreted much sense or consistency) they are determined by the *real* nature of art, or the *actual* limits of criticism, or the *true* precepts of philosophy.

The shifts of meaning do not, of course, occur as gross phenomena discernible in an idle glance, describable by simple tags, or remediable by semantic precepts and prohibitions. A purely "analogical" or a wholly "literal" set of terms is as mythical as "climates of opinion" or "dialectics of history" or any of the sets of terms that have been used to give meaning to such devices of explanation and discrimination—like realism, nominalism, conceptualism, or dogmatism, skepticism, criticism, or idealism, materialism, naturalism, and so through the dreary list of tags by which significant explanations are reduced to props for one more explanation that will in turn be honored and dismissed with a technical name. In the mixed tradition of discussion, however, the two usages are distinguishable by two movements in the meanings of terms: the analogical, by a dialectical doubling in which a word takes on two differentiated meanings, one good and one bad, or by a dialectical reduction in which a word retains only the minimal and slightest of its dialectical meanings; the literal, by a shift of the terms from subject matter to subject matter with accompanying changes of meaning.

These two kinds of change are rendered possible, and in turn are obscured, by the fact—on which the peculiarities of refutation and inference depend—that any statement or theory of criticism may be read and interpreted by any method of

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criticism and according to the principles of any philosophy. In the long history of variant uses to which Aristotle's *Poetics* has been put, for example, it would not be difficult to illustrate the fashion in which statements have been interpreted and reinterpreted to assume almost any philosophic form and significance, and have in turn been criticized for failing to take into account some implication of every significance that has been attached to them. Thus, the term "imitation" undergoes a typical series of literal shifts of meaning from Aristotle's application of it to the work of art as an imitation of nature, to the Hellenistic and Renaissance application of it to the artist imitating artists,¹ to the modern application of it to the amateur imitating the work of art or the artist.² Yet none of these need be literal,

since man's imitation of man may be taken as essentially the same as his imitation of objects or as the object's imitation of models which are of a higher degree of reality than man or human arts: the term "imitation" undergoes a typical series of analogical doublings and reductions, which may in turn be given literal definitions, from Plato's use of it to apply to nature, science, and art (in which the imitation of art is condemned unless it is with knowledge of the true), to the application of it to art in two senses, one good and one bad,³ to the use of it in a sense in which it

individual to individual) happens to be united to a high degree of (also individually very varying) muscular responsiveness, there may be set up reactions, actual or incipient, e.g. alterations of bodily attitude or muscular tension which (unless indeed they withdraw attention from the contemplated object to our own body) will necessarily add to the sum of activity empathically attributed to the contemplated object."

¹ Cf. R. McKeon, "Literary criticism and the concept of imitation in antiquity," *MP*, XXXIV (1936), 1-34. The doctrine that the arts, or at least some of them, are essentially imitative of external things is, of course, not limited to antiquity, but has had advocates in all the later ages including the modern; cf. T. B. Macaulay, "Moore's life of Lord Byron" (*Miscellaneous works of Lord Macaulay*, ed. Lady Trevelyan [New York, n.d.], I, 476): "Poetry is, as was said more than two thousand years ago, imitation. It is an art analogous in many respects to the art of painting, sculpture, and acting. . . . Thus the objects of the imitation of poetry are the whole external and the whole internal universe, the face of nature, the vicissitudes of fortune, man as he is in himself, man as he appears in society, all things which really exist, all things of which we can form an image in our minds by combining together parts of things which really exist. The domain of this imperial art is commensurate with the imaginative faculty." Cf. also I. Babbitt, *The new Laokoon* (New York, 1910), chap. I, "The theory of imitation," pp. 3-19.

² Cf. Dewey, *Art as experience*, p. 325: "We lay hold of the full import of a work of art only as we go through in our own vital processes the processes the artist went through in producing the work." In the doctrine of *Einfühlung* or empathy the relation is between spectator and object, but it is contemplative rather than practical, and it is individualized to each spectator; cf. V. Lee, *The beautiful: an introduction to psychological aesthetics* (Cambridge, 1913), chap. II, "Contemplative satisfaction," and pp. 74-75: "I am speaking once more of that phenomenon called *Inner Mimicry* which certain observers, themselves highly subject to it, have indeed considered as Empathy's explanation, rather than its result. In the light of all I have said about the latter, it becomes intelligible that when empathic imagination (itself varying in

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is opposed to genius and the antithesis of art.⁴

While the word "imitation" undergoes these changes, related terms go through like or proportional alterations. When art

of ideas and an ideal beauty, superior to what is to be found in individual nature but discernible by diligent study of the works of our great predecessors and the works of nature; cf. "The third discourse," pp. 49-53: "The first endeavours of a young Painter, as I have remarked in a former discourse, must be employed in the attainment of mechanical dexterity, and confined to the mere imitation of the objects before him. Those who have advanced beyond the rudiments, may, perhaps, find advantage in reflecting on the advice which I have likewise given them, when I recommended the diligent study of the works of our great predecessors; but I at the same time endeavoured to guard them against an implicit submission to the authority of any one master, however excellent; or by a strict imitation of his manner, precluding themselves from the abundance and variety of Nature. I will now add, that Nature herself is not to be too closely copied. There are excellences in the art of Painting beyond what is commonly called the imitation of Nature; and these excellences I wish to point out. The Students who, having passed through the initiatory exercises, are more advanced in the Art, and who, sure of their hand, have leisure to exert their understanding, must now be told, that a mere copier of Nature can never produce anything great; can never raise and enlarge the conceptions, or warm the heart of the spectator. . . . Could we teach taste or genius by rules, they would be no longer taste and genius. But though there neither are, nor can be, any precise invariable rules for the exercise or the acquisition of these great qualities, yet we may truly say, that they always operate in proportion to our attention in observing the works of Nature, to our skill in selecting, and to our care in digesting, methodising, and comparing our observations. There are many beauties in our Art that seem, at first, to lie without the reach of precept, and yet may easily be reduced to practical principles." Invention is the power of representing a mental picture on canvas, and the great end of the art, in turn, is to strike the imagination ("The fourth discourse," pp. 73, 74). But painting is intrinsically imitative, and therefore imitation "in its largest sense" must be contrasted to imitation in the sense of following other masters; even genius is the child of imitation, and we learn to invent by being conversant with the inventions of others, while even nature, which is the source of all excellences in art, may be known through the selections made by great minds of what is excellent in nature ("The sixth discourse," pp. 142-43, 145, 148, 152). If a more liberal style of imitation is distinguished from mere servile imitation of one master (*ibid.*, pp. 156-68), imitation is the one means by which an artist may perfect his art; cf. *ibid.*, p. 171: "Thus I have ventured to give my opinion of what appears to me the true and only method by which an artist makes himself master of his profession; which I hold ought to be one continued course of imitation, that is not to cease but with his life." The fact that art is an imitation of nature does not mean, however, that he who imitates her with the

is an imitation of nature, and tragedy an imitation of action, the analysis may be, as Aristotle's was, in terms of parts of tragedies of which the plot, itself a combination (*σύνθεσις*) or a composition (*σύνθεσις*), is the most important. Plot is important in an analysis of objects of art because it is a combination of things or incidents (*σύνθετος πραγμάτων*),⁵ and it may be viewed for analytic purposes as synthesis or composition (*σύνθεσις*) of things, while only diction is analyzed as a composition of words.⁶ Moreover, since beauty

greatest fidelity is the best artist, for nature is not constituted of particularities ("The seventh discourse," pp. 193-94). The Platonic sources of this dialectic are apparent in the dependence of art as imitation on an eternal beauty; cf. "The tenth discourse," p. 270: "Imitation is the means, and not the end of art; it is employed by the sculptor as the language by which his ideas are presented to the mind of the spectator. Poetry and elocution of every sort make use of signs, but those signs are arbitrary and conventional. The sculptor employs the representation of the thing itself; but still as a means to a higher end—as a gradual ascent always advancing towards faultless form and perfect beauty." Therefore the art of seeing nature or, in other words, the art of using models in the point to which all art studies are directed ("The twelfth discourse," p. 344). Yet, consistently with this doctrine, Reynolds could object to the treatment of painting as only an imitative art, attributing the theory to Plato, and could differentiate the respects in which painting imitates nature from the respects in which it, and all the other arts, depart from nature for the purpose of inspiring the imagination ("The thirteenth discourse," pp. 353-66).

⁴ Kant, *Critique of judgement*, Part I, Div. I, §§ 46-47, pp. 188-90: "Genius is the innate mental disposition (*ingenium*) through which Nature gives the rule to Art. . . . Every one is agreed that genius is entirely opposed to the *spirit of imitation*." Yet even for Kant imitation has its purposes and uses in separating geniuses from teaching, and to make that distinction Kant repeats Aristotle's separation of judgment and knowledge, but assigns judgment, not to moral questions, as Aristotle did, but to the determination of the beautiful; cf. *ibid.*, pp. 191-92: "If now it is a natural gift which must prescribe its rule to art (as beautiful art), of what kind is this rule? It cannot be reduced to a formula and serve as a precept, for then the judgement upon the beautiful would be determinable according to concepts; but the rule must be abstracted from the fact, i.e. from the product, on which others may try their own talent by using it as a model, not to be copied but to be *imitated*."

⁵ Poet. 6. 1450^a15, 32, 1450^b22; 14. 1453^b2, 1454^a14; 15. 1454^a34.

⁶ *Ibid.* 6. 1450^a5; cf. also 1449^b35; 12. 1452^b31, 1453^a3, 19, 23. A riddle is a *σύνθετος τὸν δρυόντων* (22. 1458^a28).

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requires size as well as order and arrangement, the beautiful object of art is comparable as a structure (*σύστημα*) to beautiful organisms or animals.⁷ Again, literature may be viewed, as it was by Longinus, in terms of the constituents (*σύστασις*) which yield sublimity; and of the five constituents chosen, two are natural, being concerned with thought and emotion, while three are the contribution of art, being concerned with words, and of these verbal constituents the last, composition (*σύνθεσις*), when it achieves dignity and elevation, embraces all the rest.⁸ Composition becomes the mere arrangement of words,⁹ and it may be analogized, when the concern is with grandeur, to the structure (*σύστημα*) of the animal organism.¹⁰ Finally, the problems of literature may be conceived, as Demetrius conceived them, entirely in terms of composition (*σύνθεσις*), which becomes a verbal organization to be contrasted to the intellectual meaning and combination (*δίναυσις καὶ σύστασις*) imposed by argumentation.¹¹ In addition to moving literally in this fashion from subject to subject, the concept of "composition" undergoes the dialectical doubling in which verbal composition is contrasted to a higher or freer or more natural composition of feelings or ideas, as well as a dialectical reduction in which it becomes an improper term for aesthetic discussion. According to Goethe, it is a "thoroughly contemptible word."

How can one say, Mozart has composed (*componirt*) Don Juan! Composition! As if it were a piece of cake or biscuit, which had been stirred together out of eggs, flour, and sugar!

⁷ *Ibid.* 7. 1450^b36–1451^a6. For the similar conditions of beauty in nature cf. *De partibus animalium* I. 5. 645^a17–26 and 645^b14–20, and *Meta.* xiii. 3. 1078^a31ff.

⁸ *On the sublime* viii. 1.

⁹ *Ibid.* xxxix.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* xl.; cf. also xi.

¹¹ *On style* i. 30–31. For "synthesis" or composition in Demetrius, cf. *ibid.* 4, 8, 9, 11; ii. 38, 40, 43, 45, 48, 49, 58, 68, 74, 92, 117, 121; iii. 179, 180, 186, 189; iv. 204, 221, 237, 239; v. 241, 246, 248, 299, 301, 303.

It is a spiritual creation, in which the details, as well as the whole, are pervaded by *one* spirit, and by the breath of *one* life; so that the producer did not make experiments, and patch together, and follow his own caprice, but was altogether in the power of the daemonic spirit of his genius, and acted according to his orders.¹²

The terms for imitation were applied to things before imitation became psychological or verbal, and the terms for composition have persisted in their verbal associations and connotations, after they have ceased to be applied to thoughts in their relations to one another and to words and to things in their artificial combinations and organic structures. Between those two sets of terms, controlling them and controlled by them, an even larger set of psychological terms undergoes similar alterations.

Thought (*διάνοια*) may be conceived, as it was by Aristotle, as one of the proper parts of tragedy distinct from character and plot, but relative to the object of imitation, while diction is treated as the means of imitation.¹³ Or thought and emotions may be contrasted as nature to words and expression as art, both thought and words being sources of the sublime, as Longinus held, since the ring of the sublime is due to thought (*διάνοια*) no less than to melody,¹⁴ and the thought (*νόησις*) and diction of a statement may be mutually explanatory, beautiful words being the very light of thought.¹⁵ Or thought (*διάνοια*) may be set forth in words, which, according to Demetrius, express in periods either whole thoughts or parts of whole thoughts.¹⁶ In the analogical traditions

¹² *Conversations with Eckermann and Soret*, trans. J. Oxenford (London, 1913), Sunday, June 20, 1831, p. 556.

¹³ *Poet.* 6. 1450^a7–15, 1450^b4–8.

¹⁴ *On the sublime* xxxix. 4.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* xxx. 1.

¹⁶ *On style* i. 2–3; cf. 30–31; ii. 38, 115; iii. 187; iv. 236, 239. It is worthy of note that in actual discussion thought seems to be equated to subject matter (*πρᾶγ-*

tion thought may appear, not among the parts but among the criteria of art, as when Plato requires that the poet compose with knowledge of the truth, thereby satisfying both moral and theoretic criticism, since virtue is knowledge;¹⁷ or thought may function neither as part nor criterion, practical or theoretic, and the region of art may be found in the interplay of understanding and imagination, as when Kant distinguishes judgment from both pure and practical reason;¹⁸ or thought may be invoked in its practical guise, controlling or guiding the passions and emotions, as when modern critics, like Newman, Tolstoy, or D. H. Lawrence, argue that art is essentially moral.¹⁹

¹⁶ Cf. *ibid.* II. 75-76, where poetry and painting are compared; III. 132-36, 156-62; IV. 190; IV. 239; v. 240, 302, 304.

¹⁷ Cf. Sidney, who borrows from the Aristotelian terminology to argue that poetry is the architectonic science (pp. 11-12).

¹⁸ In Kant's division of philosophy into theoretical and practical, the phenomena of art fall in neither since the feeling of pleasure and pain is intermediate between the faculty of knowledge and the faculty of desire (*Critique of judgement*, § I, pp. 7-8; § III, pp. 14-17). Croce, dividing philosophy into theoretic and practical in terms of activities rather than faculties, finds art one of the two divisions of the theoretic and aesthetics a science of expression and general linguistics (*Estetica come scienza dell'espressione e della lingua generale* [6th ed.; Bari, 1928], chap. VIII, pp. 68-69). Maritain, distinguishing in terms of virtues, finds art one of the two domains of the practical order (*Art et esclastique* [Paris, 1927], chap. III, p. 8).

¹⁹ Newman, p. 21: "We do not hesitate to say, that poetry is ultimately founded on correct moral perception; that where there is no sound principle in exercise there will be no poetry; and that on the whole (originality being granted) in proportion to the standard of a writer's moral character will his compositions vary in poetical excellence." Tolstoy, p. 307: "So that were the question put: Would it be preferable for our Christian world to be deprived of all that is now esteemed to be art, and together with the false to lose all that is good in it? I think that every reasonable and moral man would again decide the question as Plato decided it for his *Republic*, and as all the early Church-Christian and Mahommedan teachers of mankind decided it, that is, would say, 'Rather let there be no art at all than continue the depraving art, or simulation of art, which now exists.' D. H. Lawrence, *Studies in classic American literature* (New York, 1923), p. 254: 'The essential function of art is moral. Not aesthetic, not decorative, not pastime and recreation. But moral. The essential function of art is moral.'

When psychological functions are distinguished in aesthetic theory, reason is reconciled with or opposed to the passions²⁰ and imagination.²¹ In the relations of reason, imagination, and the passions, again, the literal tradition sets up distinctions which are in turn the subject of fruitful comparison by use of the analogical method. In the literal tradition pleasure may be selected among the passions as the distinctive mark of beauty²² or the end of poetry;²³ or a particular pleasure of pity and fear may be the mark of tragedy.²⁴

²⁰ Hazlitt, p. 3: "Plato banished the poets from his Commonwealth, lest their descriptions of the natural man should spoil his mathematical man, who was to be without passions and affections, who was neither to laugh nor weep, to feel sorrow nor anger, to be cast down nor elated by any thing. This was a chimera, however, which never existed but in the brain of the inventor; and Homer's poetical world has outlived Plato's philosophical Republic." Cf. Plato, *Rep.* x. 605A-607A.

²¹ Addison, *Spectator*, No. 421: "The Pleasures of the Imagination are not wholly confined to such particular Authors as are conversant in material Objects, but are often to be met with among the Polite Masters of Morality, Criticism, and other Speculations abstracted from Matter, who, tho' they do not directly treat of the visible Parts of Nature, often draw from them their Similitudes, Metaphors, and Allegories. By these Allusions a Truth in the Understanding is as it were reflected by the Imagination; we are able to see something like Colour and Shape in a Notion, and to discover a Scheme of Thoughts traced out upon Matter. And here the Mind receives a great deal of Satisfaction, and has two of its Faculties gratified at the same time, while the Fancy is busie in copying after the Understanding, and transcribing Ideas out of the Intellectual World into the Material." Cf. also Hobbes, I. 8 (*Works*, III, 58): "In a good poem, whether it be epic, or dramatic; as also in sonnets, epigrams, and other pieces, both judgment and fancy are required: but the fancy must be more eminent; but ought not to displease by indiscretion." In Hobbes's table of the sciences, poetry figures as one of the sciences which treat of consequences from the qualities of men in special, since its subject is consequences from speech manifested in magnifying, vilifying, etc. (*ibid.*, p. 73).

²² Hume, *A treatise of human nature*, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford, 1896), Book II, Part I, sec. 8, p. 299: "Pleasure and pain, therefore, are not only necessary attendants of beauty and deformity, but constitute their very essence."

²³ Dryden, "Defence of an *Essay of dramatic poesy*" (*Essays of John Dryden*, ed. W. P. Ker [Oxford, 1926], I, 113): "I am satisfied if it [verse] cause delight; for delight is the chief, if not the only, end of poesy: instruction can be admitted but in the second place, for poesy only instructs as it delights."

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dy.²⁴ Or, in turn, the passions may be broadened analogically to embrace poetry, which may be defined as the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings,²⁵ or the expression of any feelings²⁶ or of certain moral feelings,²⁷ or art may be concerned with emotions only if they are joined to materials,²⁸ or with pleasure only if joined to utility,²⁹ or, finally, the beautiful may be separated wholly from interest or pleasure.³⁰ Imagination, in turn, apart from its relation to or distinction from understanding and the passions may require causal differentiation into genius as a source and taste as a standard of beauty,

²⁴ *Poet.* 14. 1453b8-14.

²⁵ Wordsworth, pp. 82, 96.

²⁶ Hazlitt, p. 2: "Fear is poetry, hope is poetry, love is poetry, hatred is poetry; contempt, jealousy, remorse, admiration, wonder, pity, despair, or madness, are all poetry." On the circle may be rounded, and the passions may return to truth, beauty, and power by way of imagination and fancy; cf. Hunt, p. 377: "Poetry, strictly and artistically so called,—that is to say, considered not merely as poetic feeling, which is more or less shared by all the world, but as the operation of that feeling, such as we see it in the poet's book,—is the utterance of a passion for truth, beauty, and power, embodying and illustrating its conceptions by imagination and fancy, and modulating its language on the principle of variety in uniformity. Its means are whatever the universe contains; and its ends, pleasure and exultation."

²⁷ Newman, p. 23: "According to the above theory, Revealed Religion should be especially poetical—and it is so in fact. . . . It may be added, that the virtues peculiarly Christian are especially poetical—meekness, gentleness, compassion, contentment, modesty, not to mention the devotional virtues; whereas the ruder and more ordinary feelings are the instruments of rhetoric more justly than of poetry—anger, indignation, emulation, martial spirit, and love of independence."

²⁸ Dewey, *Art as experience*, p. 69: "Yes, emotion must operate. But it works to effect continuity of movement, singleness of effect amid variety. It is selective of material and directive of its order and arrangement. But it is not what is expressed."

²⁹ Plato, *Rep.* x. 607D.

³⁰ Kant, *Critique of judgement*, Part I, Div. I, § 4, pp. 50-51: "In order to find anything good, I must always know what sort of thing the object ought to be, i.e. I must have a concept of it. But there is no need of this, to find a thing beautiful. . . . The satisfaction in the beautiful must depend on the reflection upon an object, leading to any concept (however indefinite); and it is thus distinguished from the pleasant which rests entirely upon sensation."

or dialectical doubling into imagination and fancy.

Such shifts in the meanings of individual terms, of course, select different subject matters for the proper domain of criticism and are selected by principles which determine the interrelations and compendency of terms. But, in addition to their factual consequences and philosophic implications, terms and their meanings may be examined in their interplay in each of the modes of criticism in which they approximate systematic use in individual writers and particular traditions, and in the influence of modes of criticism on one another in the evolution and development of terms and meanings. If terms like "imitation," "imagination," and "communication" change their meanings as they move from context to context, it should be possible not only to trace the pattern of individual changes in such terms but also to sketch the analytic schemes which determine the various meanings and the stages of change. The intermixture of analogical and literal elements in the discussion of art suggests a classification according to six modes as a means of ordering the many forms of aesthetic analysis that have been practiced and that still continue to contest the interpretation, criticism, and evaluation of art. The six modes are differentiated by the variables and constants that are appropriate to their sets of terms and by the means which are used to delimit or define them.

"Dialectical" criticism may be viewed as a single mode among these six, comprising a vast, sometimes amorphous, series of forms, which merge or move from one emphasis to another to take up in altering but appropriate terms the continuing opposition of dialectical criticism to each of the five remaining forms of "literal" criticism. It is a single mode,

despite its diversity, since the full universality of subject matter and scope which it achieved in the hands of Plato is possible in any of the forms which it has assumed since his time. Since it is a dialectical mode, however, that achievement must await, in each form, a great dialectician or poet, while in the hands of lesser critics the mode deteriorates to timid and common-sense apologies for what seems extravagant or sophistical in the moral judgment of art or to literal repetitions of those judgments in limited—and sometimes trivial, sometimes oppressive—applications. In any of its forms, the terms of dialectical criticism reflect the two moments or aspects of the method: the differentiation of terms in application to subjects and their reduction in the solution of problems. In the form which Plato employed, it is a dialectic of things; and his analysis of art and making in terms of imitation, therefore, requires the differentiation of object of imitation (which itself has a quality or value), the imitation (whose value depends on its correctness and the value of its object), and the execution of the imitation (which adds considerations of skill and medium to the previous two criteria). The reduction of these differentiations is achieved by Plato's distinction between being and becoming, knowledge and opinion, for the criterion of excellence is in each case—within art itself as in science, action, and being—found in the eternal pattern of ideas. When the dialectic shifts in the use of other writers to a dialectic of knowledge, it retains its scope in the dimension left free for the judgment of beauty or the practice of art within a rigid and literal distinction between theoretic and practical. This may be accomplished in either of two ways, depending on whether knowledge is conceived in terms of the human faculties or in terms of the branches of

learning. Kant, in the first manner, differentiated the objects and laws of nature from those of freedom—thereby separating natural philosophy from moral philosophy, the metaphysics of nature from the metaphysics of ethics—and in the region between the theoretical and practical uses of reason he found the place of judgment and imagination in the free interplay of the human faculties, unlimited in the sense that they embrace art and nature, beauty, sublimity, and purpose. As a consequence, there is a doubling of both subject matters and problems, for the beautiful is distinguished from the sublime (which is certainly included in the concept of beauty developed in the *Symposium*), and the problems of appreciation are separated from those of production in the distinction of taste from genius (whereas the problems of the poet, the interpreter, and the amateur are inextricably involved in one another as treated in the *Ion*). Art is no longer imitation in this reduction to judgment; but the rules of the arts have become basic and unchanging, and the operation of taste might be made to yield the rules governing the individual objects proper to each of the arts, while the operation of genius might adumbrate the guiding rules of nature. Comte, in the second manner, divides all human activities into theoretic and practical, the latter being the application of the former by means of intermediary arts.³¹ The result is again

³¹ *Cours de philosophie positive*, ed. E. Littré (3d ed.; Paris, 1869), I, 50: "Tous les travaux humains sont, ou de spéculation, ou d'action. Ainsi, la division la plus générale de nos connaissances réelles consiste à les distinguer en théoriques et pratiques." *Ibid.*, p. 55: "On concevra d'autant mieux la difficulté de construire ces doctrines intermédiaires que je viens d'indiquer, si l'on considère que chaque art dépend non-seulement d'une certaine science correspondante, mais à la fois de plusieurs, tellement que les arts les plus importants empruntent des secours directs à presque toutes les diverses sciences principales. C'est ainsi que la véritable théorie de l'agriculture, pour me borner au cas le plus essentiel, exige une intime combinaison de connaissances physiologiques, chimiques, physiques

the double problems, from criticism to method, must be resolved in method and society, poetry and logic. When we come to the theory of taste, I think, and the danger of a superficial formulation of taste, when the logic of taste is contrasted with the logic of imitation, we find that the same problem of taste, the same conflict between the two logics, is repeated in a more complex form. The question is, how can we reconcile the two logics? How can we make them compatible? This is the central problem of the philosophy of art.

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³² *Système des sciences*, 433-35 and abstraites science et discipline.

³³ *Ibid.* tude naturelle rationnelle est donc développée aux femmes extrêmes, tout par la plète la mathématique, qui fut guère étudiée, elle seconde d'après le gent naturel fortifiée au contraire la notion.

the doubling of subject matters and problems, for abstract laws are distinguished from concrete actions, and the objective method which leads to that distinction must be supplemented by a subjective method by which the supremacy of morals and sociology is established.³² The logic of poetry is to be found midway between the logic of thought and the logic of feeling.³³ When the judgment of beauty is assigned to the free activity of imagination and taste, located midway between the pure and the practical reason, there is some danger that the rules regulating the beautiful in art will receive only such vague formulation as is customary in the delineation of taste or the designation of genius; when the operation of art is assigned to a logic of imagination, operating midway between a logic of thought and a logic of

feelings, there is some danger that it will appear primarily in the guise, not of fine art, but of incidents pertinent to morals and sociology or explicable in psychology. The dialectic may undergo a third shift, however, to a dialectic of processes and relations, in which Plato's three basic differentiations appear in the altered form they assume in the realm of becoming: communication or expression takes the place of imitation (with sincerity in the artist taking the place of correctness in the imitation as a criterion), the emotions subsume the relevant problems of execution (for emotion is selective of material or of the ordering of material), and content is determined, not by the nature of the objects imitated, but by the interests of audiences or the interest of artists (for it is justified by its importance to the one or its pertinence to the intention of the other) or its appropriateness to the medium of expression.³⁴ Three problems emerge, where Plato treats the one problem of imitation and Kant the two problems of the production and the appreciation of beauty, for the reduction now operates on the artist (who is conditioned by experience or by his times and circumstances), and the art object (which cannot be considered in isolation), and the audience (which should reproduce in itself the operations of the artist and the structure of the art object) either by means of such inclusive and universal concepts as "experience" or the "brotherhood of man," which reconcile oppositions, or by means of the universalism of symbols which communicate emotions by expressing them and relate objects by signifying them. The resolution remains that appropriate to a dialectic of process and becoming; and, although some philoso-

et même astronomiques et mathématiques: il en est de même des beaux-arts. On aperçoit aisément, d'après cette considération, pourquoi ces théories n'ont pu encore être formée, puisqu'elles supposent le développement préalable de toutes les différentes sciences fondamentales. Il en résulte également un nouveau motif de ne pas comprendre un tel ordre d'idées dans un cours de philosophie positive, puisque, loin de pouvoir contribuer à la formation systématique de cette philosophie, les théories générales propres aux différents arts principaux doivent, au contraire, comme nous le voyons, être vraisemblablement plus tard une des conséquences les plus utiles de sa construction."

³² *Système de politique positive* (Paris, 1851), I, 433-35 and 447-49; IV, 171-84, esp. 171: "Les lois abstraites constituent donc le domaine commun de la science et de l'art, qui les destinent respectivement à discipliner notre intelligence et régler notre activité."

³³ *Ibid.*, I, 451-52; "Quelle que doive être l'aptitude naturelle du nouveau régime envers la logique rationnelle, principalement destinée aux philosophes, il est donc encore plus indispensable pour construire et développer la logique morale, essentiellement propre aux femmes et aux prolétaires. Entre ces deux voies extrêmes, la logique des vrais poètes, qui procède surtout par images, vient placer un lien général qui complète la constitution, à la fois spontanée et systématique, de la méthode humaine. Jusqu'ici l'image ne fut guère employée que pour perfectionner la manifestation, soit du sentiment, soit de la pensée. Désormais elle secondera surtout leur élaboration respective, d'après leur réaction mutuelle, dont elle constitue l'agent naturel. Tantôt l'image, rappelée sous le signe, fortifiera la pensée par le réveil du sentiment; tantôt, au contraire, l'effusion suscitera l'image pour éclaircir la notion."

³⁴ For Tolstoy's use of these distinctions cf. *MP*, XLI, 79 and 84; for Dewey's use cf. *Art as experience*, pp. 69, 18, and *passim*.

phers who take their subject matter from events and relations have, like Whitehead, returned to a Platonic dialectic of eternal objects, no modern semanticist has yet recognized his heritage by enunciating the logos-doctrine that haunts his study.

The terminologies of the five literal modes of criticism bear a double relation to the terminologies of the various forms of the dialectical mode: the terms employed in any form of the dialectical mode are usually also subjected to a literal treatment, intended to define them in the respects in which they were vague and to relate them to clearly distinguished matters, and those literal distinctions are usually analogized, at the next stage of discussion, in a dialectical treatment designed either to broaden them in more sensitive application or more reasonable definition or to show that they correspond to nothing real or essential in art. Since these attempts at literal definition are concerned to establish sharp boundaries, there results from them, not a single variegated mode of criticism, but a series of literal modes more or less sharply and successfully separated from one another and from the dialectical mode. The mode of criticism which balances Plato's form of dialectical criticism, Aristotle's "scientific" criticism, may therefore be taken as the second mode, instituted in terms closely related to those of Plato's dialectic. In spite of the similarity of terms, however, the "scientific" method of the *Poetics* is distinct from the dialectical criticism of Plato; and much as dialectic, which is the method of science and philosophy for Plato, became a second-best method, based on opinions rather than on knowledge of things, for Aristotle, so, too, the treatment of imitation—in terms of object of imitation, the imitation itself, and its execution, which was easily translated in the dialectical tradition to au-

dience, art object, and artist—formed the structure of Aristotle's rhetoric rather than of his poetics. He made use of a scientific method, rather than dialectic or rhetoric, to place his analysis of tragedy, considered as an object, in the context of his philosophic inquiries, for the first five chapters of the *Poetics* treat of phases of the operation of the artist in terms of object, means, and manner of imitation prior to analyzing tragedy in terms of construction and parts, while the last four chapters compare tragedy to a related art form and formulate replies to censures which ignore the ends governing the construction of tragedy. The scientific analysis which is framed between these preliminary and supplementary treatments of tragedy in terms of its efficient causes and its end brings the formulation of the circumstances and purposes of tragedy to bear on the analysis of tragedy as a whole consisting of six parts—plot, character, and thought arising from the object, diction and melody arising from the means, and spectacle from the manner of imitation—by finding a prime importance in plot and by treating plot at once as a combination of incidents, or, more literally, of things, and as the organizing principle of the tragedy. A criterion of unity and structure is thereby rendered available, and on it the possibility of a poetic science depends, for otherwise the analysis of an object of art must reduce the diversity of concepts that might be included under Aristotle's six terms to two broad analytic elements—form and matter—and must go for its criteria directly to the intention of the artist, or the reaction of the audience, or the technical achievement of the structure.

Such a criterion of unity disappears when the terminology of criticism is taken, not from things (the tragedy as an artificial thing and the incidents or

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"things" that compose its action) but from thoughts and aspirations, conceived either as universal, shared by all mankind but given particular expression by the poet, or as peculiar to the poet, and in need of explanation by his life and circumstances to make them intelligible to other men. Following the former principle Poe could argue plausibly that "the phrase, 'a long poem,' is simply a flat contradiction in terms," for the poetic principle is the human aspiration for supernal beauty and the elevating excitement it occasions cannot be of long duration;³⁵ following the latter principle T. S. Eliot could be moved to maintain that it is impossible to understand Shakespeare from any one of his plays, since the relation between the plays taken in order must be studied for years before any slight interpretation may be ventured,³⁶ and that Shakespeare indeed supplies in this personal and individual way a unity, not merely to his work, but to his times.³⁷ The two modes of criticism which employ these two principles approximate the equivalent forms of "dialectical" criticism more closely than other modes of literal criticism do, for the mind assumes a synoptic universality embracing things known and actions contemplated whether they are included analogically within its nature or separated literally from its proper activity.

The third mode of criticism, "poetic" criticism, proceeds from the poet, or more broadly the author, conceived as universal in the sense of being possessed of lofty thoughts and inspired by vehement

emotions intelligible or moving to all mankind, to the particular language of the author's expression. The "objects of imitation" have been translated into the ideas and feelings which are the matter or content of the author's statement, and his "composition" is examined in a part-whole analysis into "periods" and "figures." This mode of criticism is properly called "poetic" both in the sense that it proceeds from the conceptions and expressions of great authors and uses them as touchstones for other statements, and in the sense that the critic's own expression must arouse reactions like those caused by the poet if the criticism is to be effective as a guide. It differs (as practiced, for example, by Longinus) from the equivalent form of dialectical criticism (as developed, for example, by Kant) in that it is concerned not with the conditions of the judgment of beauty and sublimity in general, but exclusively with their sources in literature.

The fourth mode of criticism, "scholarly" criticism, reverses this procedure and attempts to reconstruct the peculiar character and significance of an author from the corpus and development of his work. It was in this mode that the *ars critica* developed to such massive importance in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,³⁸ laying the foundations of the higher biblical criticism, furnishing the example for classical, and later modern, philology, and in the process revolutionizing historical method. It is based on the truth, converse to the basic truth of "poetic" criticism that poets are universal—and quite as obvious as it—that poets are particular, that their words, their references, and their intentions must be under-

³⁵ Poe, pp. 3 ff.

³⁶ Eliot, "Dante," *Selected essays, 1917-1932* (New York, 1932), p. 207.

³⁷ Eliot, "Shakespeare and the Stoicism of Seneca," *ibid.*, p. 119: "It has been said that Shakespeare lacks unity; it might, I think, be said equally well that it is Shakespeare chiefly that is the unity, that unifies so far as they could be unified all the tendencies of a time that certainly lacked unity."

³⁸ For an excellent review of "critical" literature as it bears on theological and historical problems in the seventeenth century see S. von Dunin Borkowski, *Spinoza*, Vol. IV: *Aus den Tagen Spinozas* (Münster i. W., 1936), pp. 136-308 and 523-50.

stood, if their statements and inventions are to be appreciated; that their various works have relations to one another and to the works of other authors, as well as individual marks of unity and particular high points of excitement; that even when most original they seldom originate, but what is novel in their accomplishment may be understood by knowing what they, in turn, experienced and esteemed; and that the patterns of their lives and works are more easily perceived when the elements of which their works are composed are known independently. It differs (as practiced, say, by F. A. Wolf or Dover Wilson) from the equivalent form of dialectical criticism (as practiced, say, by Fechner) in that it is concerned, not with the formulation of scientific aesthetic principles, derived from the natural or biological sciences, to be applied in criticism to specific objects, natural or artificial, but with the use of the devices of the historical sciences to explain the significances of objects of art. The principles of scholarly criticism are the same as those of poetic criticism—expression and thought or emotion; form and content—but, whereas the poetic critic goes to other great authors to test the universal achievement of a given expression, the scholarly critic goes to other sources of information and other statements to elucidate the particular meaning of a given statement. Whereas the poetic critic proceeds from the elevation of soul caused by a statement to the examination of the manner of expression, the scholarly critic proceeds from the recovery of the author's meaning to the discovery of its effectiveness and value. As one consequence of this difference the poetic critic is concerned only with small bits which constitute the high achievement of the author, whereas the scholarly critic tends to treat the whole body and context of his

work. The poetic critic will proceed from the consideration of principles like the "good sense," "fancy," and "imagination" analyzed by Coleridge to abstract by practical criticism the marks characteristic of original poetic genius.

In the application of these principles to purposes of practical criticism, as employed in the appraisal of works more or less imperfect, I have endeavored to discover what the qualities in a poem are, which may be deemed promises and specific symptoms of poetic power, as distinguished from general talent determined to poetic composition by accidental motives, by an act of the will, rather than by the inspiration of a genial and productive nature.³⁹

The scholarly critic will examine all the data bearing on the establishment of the text and its interpretation before venturing an evaluation of the quality of any part of it or the sense or imagination of its author.

Such considerations of genius and the author's circumstances disappear, in turn, when the terminology of criticism is taken, not from thoughts and feelings, whether in their universality or particularity, but from consideration of the effects of their expression. Such a causal analysis may be conducted either by studying the relation of the work to the audience to determine the *effects* that are produced or ought to be produced, or by studying the relation of the content to the style to determine the *means* that are effective or ought to be effective.

The fifth mode of criticism, "technical"

³⁹ *Biographia literaria*, chap. xv (*Works*, III, 375). The characteristics of genius are found in language and thought: (1) in the sweetness of the versification and its adaptation to the subject, (2) in the choice of subjects remote from the private interests and circumstances of the writer, (3) in images modified by a predominant passion or by associated thoughts or images awakened by that passion, (4) in depth and energy of thought. It is in virtue of the last characteristic that Coleridge argues that "no man was ever yet a great poet, without being at the same time a profound philosopher" (p. 381).

criticism, which is developed in "arts" of poetry, constructs its precepts about what pleases or instructs audiences in terms relevant to thought and expression in a manner similar to poetic criticism. Yet the terminology which these two modes largely share is put to different applications and assumes different significances. The concern of poetic criticism is with the sublime and elevated moments achieved by literature; the concern of technical criticism, as practiced by Horace, Vida, or Boileau, is with any device which achieves a pleasant or a profitable effect. Therefore, the criterion for thought and expression is not the loftiness of thought, of expression, or of both together, but the decorum which relates them to each other and to the audience; its application is not limited to isolated moments, since it may apply significantly to the structure and unity of a work; and its incidence falls less upon content than upon devices and style.

The sixth mode of criticism, "formal" criticism, reverses the procedure of technical criticism, beginning with the work and the effort to express rather than with the audience and the effect of the expression. Its terminology, like that of technical criticism, bears a close relation to the terms used in poetic criticism, but the analysis is not limited to elevated thought but runs through a variety of contents and yields, not a single analysis, but a classification of styles (as in the case of Demetrius) or of uses of language (as in the case of I. A. Richards and some of his various rival semanticists). The concern of formal criticism is with the analysis of compositions or communications into their constitutive parts to evaluate the effectiveness or appropriateness of devices to purposes: figures of speech relative to subject matters and effects in the older analysis, strategies and devices of evocation relative to objectives and attitudes in

the newer; it proceeds by a part-whole analysis from words or phrases to the composition as a whole; and the controlling consideration is the characteristic or thought which determines the devices suited to it. Consequently, the consideration of audiences and circumstances in technical criticism yields canons and censures for composition, whereas the consideration of the devices of language in formal criticism, since it takes language (according to the phrase of Demetrius) as a lump of wax from which anything may be molded, yields differentiations in effects to be achieved.

The principles employed by these various modes of criticism and the subject matters to which they are relevant are in the case of most of them so distinct from those of the others that statements constructed of the same words often turn out on examination of their meanings to be unrelated when apparently contradictory or equivalent when apparently opposed. It is important to recognize these variations of meanings, however, not because terms are necessarily inexact and criteria vague in criticism, but rather because the varieties of meanings are determined by the purposes and methods of the modes. Even the most impressionistic and subjective critic writes with the conviction that the expression at least of a personal or skeptical opinion is intelligible and to that minimum extent effective as communication; and in varying manners and degrees the critic works on the assumption that the appreciation, judgment, and evaluation of art follow laws which may be stated in terms of the matter or the form of objects of art, or the imagination, feelings, or reason of man, or his experience, his conditions actual or projected, or his manner of expression. It is therefore true (if the statement be interpreted in the dialectical mode of criticism) that the

philosopher, the critic, the artist, and the amateur express the same thing, when each is sensitive and successful, the philosopher by choosing, through his principles, pertinent and analyzable characteristics, the critic by treating such characteristics in the objects he judges, the artist by embodying them in his appropriate medium, and the amateur by reacting to them in his experience of the object of art. What the critic directs attention to is the result of the labor of the artist and an ingredient in the experience of the intelligent amateur, even though neither would have made the explicit statement of the critic, and it should find a place and explanation in the system even of philosophies antagonistic to the critical presuppositions on which it depends. There are three dimensions of variability in the discussion of art. The artist at work with the natural materials which constitute his media and with the ideas and emotions which he seeks to express has a latitude of choice in the construction of his work and the effecting of his purposes, for the media may be used in a variety of ways and the responses may be secured by new and old devices: among the influences which might bear on the solution of his problem are the devices of other artists, the statements of critics, and the assumptions of philosophers. The critic contemplating the finished work of art finds in it as great a latitude for his interpretations as the artist found in the artistic materials for his manipulations: the example of other artists, the refutation or application of what other critics or scientists have said, and the substantiation of a philosophy may be among the influences which determine his choice. A changed conception of the imagination, or the rise of the proletariat, or the unbelief of the upper classes may lead to the institution of new critical systems and

applications even in a single mode of criticism; and yet the three modern forms of dialectical criticism which have resulted from such changes apply to empirical data which overlap little or not at all: the Humanist critics to cultural, the Marxist to economic, and the Tolstoyan to moral and religious data. The philosopher, finally, takes the phenomena of art, the judgments of criticism, and the formulations of other philosophies among his subject matters, resolving their oppositions and contradictions within the scope of his own principles, and his resolutions become in turn one of the matters which the next philosopher may be concerned to explain. Even though principles do not achieve finality and universal adherence in philosophy, they do serve to state the purposes of the artist and the criteria of the critic. The shifts of artistic styles, critical evaluations, and philosophic principles illustrate the importance of standards and principles, and the alternations of advocacy of a set of principles and attack upon them do not constitute evidence for those who think to avoid the discussion of principles as stultifying in art, futile in criticism, and fantastic in philosophy. For even the technical questions of art and criticism—questions of materials and production, taste and judgment, intention and interests—have philosophic bases which serve to clarify the solutions to those problems and their relations to other proposed solutions.

The purposes and relative effectiveness of the various forms of dialectical criticism may be stated and judged in the terms used in the development of those forms of criticism, for the dialectical process employed in the discussion of art also determines the transition from one form of the dialectic to another and the issues which emerge in the oppositions of forms. The terms of that continued dia-

of criticism—largely the same and different primarily by the addition of technical terms to attach new significances to the continuing terms—are determined in their use and the differentiation of their significances by the things to which they are applied in the reductive scheme of each form of the dialectic. When the reduction is to things, as in the criticism of Plato, the characteristics of art are found in objects: the object of imitation, the object of art itself, and its objective characteristics or style. When the reduction is to faculties of the mind or to thoughts, as in Kant's analytic and dialectic, the characteristics of art are found in the taste by which it is judged and the genius by which it is produced: the objects of art and their relations to nature may be envisaged from rules derived from taste and genius. When the reduction is to processes and events, as it is in Tolstoy's or Dewey's operational inquiries, the characteristics of art are found in the act of expression: the emotions of the artist, the sophistication of the audience's reaction, and even the object of art may be differentiated as moments in the "union of moral community" or the identity of process and product. There is no reason why the complete dialectical development should not be possible in any of these reductive schemes. The peculiar virtue of dialectical criticism, however, is not in the isolation of art from other phenomena or of the aesthetic aspects in art as peculiar phenomena, but rather in the return of both to a broader context in which each object is considered in terms of the good, the true, and the beautiful, or as subject to the operation of pure reason, practical reason, or judgment, or as incident to the living processes of experience. There are, however, three dangers which the analysis of art encounters in the dialectical mode of criticism which arise from the

successive domination of one of the dialectical triad: the good, the beautiful, and the true. The moral implications of Plato's criticism have attracted more attention in the later discussions of art than the role which beauty plays in his conception of the nature of things or in the motivations of human actions; and, although under his influence art takes on a metaphysical significance in the philosophy of Plotinus, the meanings of Platonism have been exploited chiefly by moral critics from the Christian Church Fathers to Tolstoy. Kant, on the other hand, supplied analytical and dialectical devices to isolate beauty and the sublime from the subject matters of science and morality, but he did not himself state the rules which determine the objects of art as fully as he explored those involved in the activities of the pure and practical reason; and his heritage has been exploited less by critics who treat the phenomena of art than by idealists who, like Schelling, make aesthetics the center of philosophy and who do not consider art as a particular phenomenon but, on the contrary, construe the universe itself in the form of art and philosophy as the science of the universe in the potency of art. Dewey, in turn, has found in concepts like "inquiry," "instruments," and "experience," the dialectical device by which to reduce and confute all the distinctions made by idealists and by other philosophers: beauty and utility, art and science, practice and theory, morals and science, mechanical arts and fine arts, experience and nature, inquiry and knowledge—these and all like separations introduce distinctions which are unreal and problems which are false according to the principles of his philosophy; but the therapeutic effect of Dewey's dialectic depends rather on the abundance of mistaken distinctions which he can reduce to experience, there-

by giving the concept a kind of refutative richness, than on specific or positive characteristics isolated in art or on methods evolved for the elucidation of art. As in the analyses of Plato and Augustine, the treatment of art recommended by Dewey is in the context of a synoptic analysis, and the direction of his thought is most nearly analogous to the hope repeatedly expressed by writers on aesthetics that at last, if their respective suggestions are followed, the inquiry will become scientific and the object of art or the appreciation of art will become an instance of physiological, psychological, sociological, ethnological, economic, or psychopathic phenomena, to be explained, used, and, when the circumstances warrant and the techniques are adequate, even cured as such.

The five modes of literal criticism, on the other hand, treat art as art, in some sense, by techniques and according to criteria distinct from those of other disciplines and sciences. The sharpness of this difference, however, does not preclude the possibility that dialectical criticism, sensitively and intelligently employed, may lead to the same conclusions in application to a particular set of problems as those justified by the use of a mode of literal criticism, for the intermingled universal principles of dialectic may, of course, be brought to bear on particular instances, and the specific principles of a literally aesthetic analysis may be supplemented by the application to the same object or event of principles proper to politics, ethics, psychology, or physics. The hope of universality in philosophy, indeed, depends on the possibility of such equivalences among the results of intellectual labor painstakingly and accurately carried forward in different perspectives, and the dangers of error indicated by disagreements arise from the misapplica-

tions, the miscarriages, and the mistaken interpretations of any given method rather than from the oppositions of methods. The dangers in the dialectical method are to be found in the loss of balance consequent on a dogmatic freezing of the dialectic in defense of an unexamined faith, for as a result the consideration of art or of any other subject may be submerged in other concerns or become itself the ruling principle of other considerations. The dangers in literal criticism arise from pedantic concentration on a trait proper to a form of literal criticism and the treatment of it subtly and in detail in isolation from the causes from which it originated, the effects which it might explain, and the phenomena with which it is related. The five modes of literal criticism which have been enumerated are related to one another in their common concern with the object or phenomenon of art as such. They differ from one another in the qualities selected as essential to art and the methods proper to the analysis of art. They may therefore be in opposition to one another; they may supplement one another; and any one of them may be the subject of such exclusive devotion—as program of research or manifesto of art—as to make it the peculiar interest of a school rather than a technique for inquiry or elucidation. Any one of them, finally, may suggest the terminology and the distinctions for a rerudescence of dialectical criticism devoted to the attempt either to give generality and therefore vitality to the distinctions used in a restricted fashion in literal criticism or to reduce and therefore rectify its separations.

The respective purposes and subject matters of the five modes of literal criticism may be isolated by consideration of the use they make of the causal analysis—the causes which contribute to the con-

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struction of the work and the effects which may be traced back to the work—and of the analysis of form and content or whole and part. In "scientific" criticism, as practiced by Aristotle, the causes and effects—the peculiarities of poets, their media, and their subjects, the proper pleasures of art forms, their peculiar structures, and probable criticisms—are translated into terms which may be identified in the work of art itself, and therefore the probability and necessity by which incidents are knit together in the unity of the plot may be distinguished from the natural probability which is imitated in the manner appropriate to the medium; character and thought in tragedy may be subordinated to the needs and end of plot; and diction may be treated as the matter whose potentialities are exploited in the construction of forms. In "poetic" criticism, as practiced by Longinus, natural causes are not translated into artistic causes, but nature and art alike contribute to the production of the sublime, for the causal analysis is analogical, the prime element in all natural production and therefore in literary effectiveness is the exemplar, and the function of scientific method is to control the effects of natural genius not to explain the product of art.⁴⁰ The sublime, therefore, is contrasted as an overwhelming excellence and distinction of language to the arrangement and economy of things,⁴¹ and the ideas and content become the "matter" organized in the organic whole of the composition of a great genius.⁴² Thought, metamorphosed from the function it has

for Aristotle as expressive of character and subservient to plot, has become the thought of the author and matter for his composition, and the effect of the sublime is not dependent primarily on the form and arrangements of facts or things. In "technical" criticism, as practiced by Horace, the diversification of effects considered is derived from the character of audiences, and therefore his analysis, like that of Longinus, depends on the nature of the poet and proceeds by considering content and expression, but the exemplar is found in the life and custom to be portrayed rather than in the performance of genius, and words no longer achieve effects independent of the persuasiveness of matter but follow the matter that is given. Horace's analysis, like that of Aristotle, embraces larger units than the analysis of Longinus and supplies even a criterion of unity; but, where Aristotle thought the complex plot preferable, Horace's methods incline him to simplicity. All three modes of criticism treat of causes to account for literary forms: the scientific mode treats the formal cause of objects of art by analyzing their structure; the poetic mode finds form in that union of thought and expression which is consequent on the causality of the poet; the technical mode finds form in the verbal structure which secures effects in audiences. The virtues of the scientific mode are to be found in the analytic technique it supplies; the virtues of the poetic mode are in its manuductive guidance for judgment among monuments of art; the virtues of the technical mode are in the devices for censure and evaluation which may be derived from technical or strategic rules of the artist's craft. The perversions of the three modes are likewise characteristic: the scientific mode may be reduced to a routine and dialectical application of "classical" rules for the unity of

⁴⁰ *On the sublime* ii. 1-3.

⁴¹ *Ibid.* i. 3-4. Where the plot had been a combination of "things" for Aristotle, the composition becomes for Longinus the means of adumbrating slowly the arrangement and economy of things (*τάξις καὶ οἰκονομία τῶν πραγμάτων*). Cf. the treatment of arrangements of thought and words in the consideration of the figure Invasion (*ibid.* xxii. 1-2).

⁴² *Ibid.* x. 1; xlii. 4.

action, time, and place, the genealogical nobility of characters, and the rigid elevation of thought; the poetic mode may be translated from a method of judgment to a random dialectical biography of the adventures of a soul and the dialectical justification by selective example of any preference; the technical mode may degenerate from the canonic reaction of a selected audience as a standard—the Roman audience of Horace, the prince's court during the Renaissance, the urban population of Reynolds, the plain men of Tolstoy, the proletariat of the Marxists, or even a vaguely envisaged posterity which will rectify the errors of contemporary evaluation—to a dialectical relativity in which standards may be treated either in a history of the themes, forms, and media that were successively esteemed or in a canon of methods to achieve any results thought to be effective on the audiences of the moment.

The excesses or perversions of these three literal modes are avoided or rectified by other devices of literal criticism and by other subject matters to which those devices are applied. The "scientific" analysis usually occurs in the context of other methods appropriate to other aspects of art phenomena, and therefore the consideration of the form, structure, and material of works of art may be balanced by the consideration, in other sciences, of its psychological origins, social effects, and historical developments, which return the art object to its context in nature and society. "Scholarly" criticism, in like fashion, returns the genius and his expression from a universal and sublime isolation to the conditions of his life, times, and interests, which determined the idiom and manner of his expression as well as the temporal and local peculiarities of his objects. "Formal" criticism marshals the verbal or other technical de-

vices by which a medium may be made to achieve any of the effects of which it is capable and from which the artist may choose, or the amateur recognize, devices and means. All three modes of criticism treat of content and form to account for the peculiarities of literary and artistic objects: in literature the scientific mode treats words as matter and other scientific methods are designed to seek the other manners in which the forms—the actions and incidents, the necessities and probabilities—appropriately expressed in literature may exist; the scholarly mode seeks in the circumstances of the artist the matter to which he gave form; the formal mode analyzes the verbal forms in which the vast variety of matters may be presented effectively. The virtues of the scientific mode are in the distinctions it makes possible between natural and artistic forms by means of their respective matters, and in the analysis that is therefore possible of particular artistic forms; the virtues of the scholarly mode are in the concrete significance it may give to the forms of an artist by considering the matters assembled in his experience and life and in the poetic appreciation and critical understanding that are thereby rendered possible of particular works; the virtues of the formal mode are in the differentiation of means of presenting the varieties of matter appropriate to communication, and in the practical evaluation and comparison of particular devices that is therefore possible. The scientific mode is perverted when artistic form or cause is confused dialectically with natural thing or cause, and art is treated as the exclusive or peculiar subject of some other science than the poetic; the scholarly mode is perverted when the investigation of the circumstances of the artist is pushed into details irrelevant to the traits of the art objects he produced, and still further

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perverted when those irrelevant traits are dialectically converted into the only explanation of his art; the formal mode is perverted when the machinery and terminology of distinction is carried to such refinements in the dialectical ordering and discrimination of tropes and figures that differences of effects and of matter are obscured or lost.

Needless to say, a given critic may successively employ more than one of these modes of criticism and may even combine two or more of them, crudely or effectively, in a single theory or application of criticism. Purity in adherence to a single mode is not necessarily a virtue in criticism since the differentiation of modes is in terms of the purposes envisaged in the criticism, and the identification of the mode employed by a critic is only a step toward the evaluation of his achievement in so far as such identification may indicate the appropriate criterion and thereby contribute to both the understanding and the judgment of his statements. The pertinence of an examination of philosophic and critical principles to art and criticism may, therefore, be illustrated by applying the distinctions treated in this essay to the essay itself. It is an essay in the dialectical mode of criticism, using as its reductive device concepts derived from semantics. It does not, however, use those semantic concepts in the form of dialectic in which the controlling principles are processes or symbols (as I. A. Richards, for example, reduces all meanings to symbolic or emotive uses of language) but rather takes advantage of the possibility of achieving full dialectical scope in any form of the dialectical mode of criticism to return to a dialectic of things on the model of Plato's usage. The manner of adherence to that mode may be seen in the subjects of the three parts into which the essay is divided: they are

concerned in turn with the objects of criticism, criticism itself, and the terms of criticism, which are an adaptation of what Plato said about the criticism of art to the criticism of criticism, whereas the semantic mode of dialectic would translate these three (as was pointed out above when the three forms of dialectical criticism were considered) into some such considerations as the intention of the critic, the form of his criticism, and its pertinence to or effects on the audience. The effect envisaged in the threefold division of subjects employed in the essay is to prevent the reduction of the treatment of criticism to some partially literal dialectic frozen to some one conception of the nature of art, or of the domain of criticism, or of the principles of philosophy. The essay is not, however, concerned directly with the criticism of art but with the criticism of criticism. It might be made the propaedeutic to an essay in the criticism of art which would then, under the guidance of the criteria and subject matters distinguished in the six modes of criticism, pursue one mode in an appropriate manner and to a relevant conclusion with some grounds for the expectation that its meaning and purpose might be more clearly perceived. But, although it adumbrates no solution of the problems of art or beauty, it may pretend to adequacy in treating what has been said about art and beauty, for being a dialectic of what medieval philosophers used to call second, as distinct from first, intentions, it accounts for the literal modes, as well as for the dialectical mode in which it is couched, without distortion or prejudice, since in the positive operation of the dialectic the virtues of each mode may be isolated and the refutative elenchus may disclose indifferently the failures and perversions of each mode.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

CHAUCER AND GEOFFREY OF VNSAUF

KARL YOUNG

AT A very early period, readers of Chaucer observed that the mention of "Gaufred, deere maister soverayn," and his lament for King Richard I in the *Nun's priest's tale*, is a derisive reference to a passage in the *Nova poetria* of Geoffrey of Vinsauf. Chaucer mentions both the lament as a whole, beginning "Neustria, sub clypeo regis defensa Ricardi," and, more specifically, the chiding of Friday in the lines beginning "O Veneris lacrimosa dies! O sidus amarum!"¹ The reference was discerned by John Bale, in the mid-sixteenth century, was recorded by Thomas Speght in his second edition of Chaucer in 1602, and was further commented upon by William Camden, John Selden, and Thomas Tyrwhitt.² The substance of Tyrwhitt's observations has been duly transmitted by the more recent editors without noticeable alteration.³

Quintum exemplum apostrophacionis:

Temporibus luctus hijs verbis exprime luctum:
"Neustria, sub clipeo regis defensa Ricardi,
Indefensa modo, gestu testare dolorem;

¹The *Nova poetria* (written ca. 1208-13) is conveniently edited by E. Faral, *Les Arts poétiques du XII^e et du XIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1924), pp. 194-262. The complete lament for King Richard I occupies ll. 368-430; the chiding of Friday, ll. 375-79. For the complete lament (ll. 368-430) see also the hitherto unpublished text from Brit. Mus., MS Cleopatra B.VI., printed below. The relevant passage in the *Nun's priest's tale* is ll. B 4537-44. I use the text of F. N. Robinson, *The complete works of Geoffrey Chaucer* (Boston, etc., [1933]), p. 244. [The manuscript of this article was received by *Modern Philology* shortly before Professor Young's recent death. The proofs have been read by Professors J. Burke Severs and J. R. Hulbert.—Ed.]

²In listing Vinsauf's "Monodiam in mortem Ricardi regis" in his *Index Britannicus scriptorum* (ed. R. L. Poole [Oxford, 1902], p. 82), John Bale notes the source of his information as "Ex Chaucero, fo. 97." On fol. xvif in *The works of Geffrey Chaucer* (London, 1542) is found the passage of the *Nun's priest's tale*

In attempting a fresh study of the relationship between the *Nun's priest's tale* and the *Nova poetria*, one observes, first of all, that Vinsauf's lament for King Richard had more fame, and hence that Chaucer's ridicule had a keener edge, than has been commonly recognized. Probably the Chaucerian commentators have emphasized insufficiently the fact that, in the later Middle Ages, this particular passage in the *Nova poetria* had exceptional vogue as a literary gem. Even in its place as part of an extended didactic poem, this lament was conspicuous as the longest of the literary "examples" in the treatise and was, in some manuscripts, furnished with rubrics or glosses drawing attention to its structure and significance. Such rubrics appear, for example, in the following text of the fifteenth century, dividing the piece into five sections:⁴

under consideration. Bale lists the "monodia" again in his *Scriptorum illustrium maioris Brytannie . . . catalogus* (Basel, [1559]), p. 239. For the other early references to the matter see Thomas Speght's second edition, *The works of our ancient and learned English poet, Geoffrey Chaucer, newly printed* (London, 1602), sig. UUU7r; [William Camden], *Remaines of a greater worke* (London, 1605), pp. 6-7; *Joannis Seldeni jurisconsuli opera omnia* (London, 1726), Vol. II, col. 1168; Thomas Tyrwhitt, *The Canterbury tales of Chaucer* (London, 1775), III, 294.

⁴ See W. W. Skeat, *The complete works of Geoffrey Chaucer* (Oxford, 1900), V, 257; K. Sisam, *Chaucer: The nun's priest's tale* (Oxford, 1927), p. 54; J. M. Manly, *Canterbury tales by Geoffrey Chaucer* (New York, [1928]), pp. 644-45; Robinson, p. 861.

⁵ Brit. Mus., MS Cotton Cleopatra B.VI., fol. 8r-9v. This text has not, I think, been printed before. I follow the folio numbers written by lead pencil.

Exudent oculi lacrimas; exterminet ora
 Pallor; connodet digitos tortura; cruentet
 Interiora dolor; et verberet ethera clamor.
 Tota peris de morte sua; mors non fuit eius [fol. 8^v],
 Sed tua; non vna, sed publica mortis origo."

370

Hic au[etor] apostrophat diem quo vulneratus erat rex Ricardus:

"O Veneris lacrimosa dies! O sidus amarum!
 Illa dies tua nox fuit, et Venus illa venenum.
 Illa dedit vulnus; sed pessimus ille dierum,
 Primus ab vndecimo, qui, vite vitricus, ipsam
 Clausit. Vterque dies homicida tirannide mira.
 Traiecit clausus exclusum,^b tectus apertum,
 Prouidus incautum, miles munitus inermem
 Et proprium regem. Quid miles, perfide miles,
 Perfidie miles, pudor orbis et vnicula sordes
 Milicie, miles manuum factura suarum,
 Ausus es hoc in eum? Seclusus hoc,^c seclusus istud es ausus?"

375

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Hic apostrophat mortem regis Ricardi:

"O dolor! O plus quam dolor! [O mors!] O truculenta
 Mors! Vtinam esses, mors, mortua! Quid meministi
 Ausa nephias tantum? Placuit tibi tollere solem,
 Et tenebris dampnare solum. Scis quem rapuisti?
 Ipse fuit iubar in oculis, et dulcor in aure,
 Et stupor in mente. Scis, impia, quem rapuisti?
 Ipse fuit dominus armorum, gloria regum,
 Delicie mundi. Nichil addere nouerat vltra;
 Ipse fuit quicquid potuit Natura. Sed istud
 Causa fuit quare rapuisti; res preciosas
 Eligis, et viles quasi dedignata relinquis."

390

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Hic apostrophat au[c]tor Naturam:

"Et de te, Natura, queror, quia nonne fuisti
 Dum mundus puer esset adhuc, dum nata iaceres
 In cunis, in eo studiosissima? Nec ante senectam
 Destituit hoc studium. Cur sudor tantus in orbem
 Attulit hoc mirum, cur tam breuis abstulit hora
 Sudorem tantum? Placuit tibi tollere^d mundo
 Et reuocare manum, dare sic et tollere donum.
 Cur irritasti mundum? Vel redde sepultum,
 Vel forma similem. Sed non tibi suppetit vnde;
 Quicquid erat tecum vel mirum vel preciosum [fol. 9^r],
 Huic erat impensum; thesauri deliciarum
 Hic sunt ex[h]austi. Ditissima facta fuisti
 Ex hac factura; fieri pauper[r]ima sentis
 Ex hac iactura.^e Si felix ante fuisti,
 Tanto plus misera quanto felicior ante."

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^b exclusum] exclus non (MS).

^c Seclusus hoc] celus (MS).

^d tollere] tendere may be the word intended (see Faral, p. 209).

^e iactura] natura (MS).

Sextum exemplum apostrophacionis:

"Si phas est, accuso Deum. Deus, optima rerum,
 Cur sic degeneras? Cur obruis hostis amicum?
 Si recolis, pro rege facit Iope tua, quam tot
 Milibus oppositis solus defendit, et Acon,
 Quam virtute sua tibi reddidit, et Crucis hostes
 Omnes quos viuus sic terruit, vt timeatur
 Mortuus. Ipse fuit sub quo tua tuta fuerunt.
 Si, Deus, es, sicut esse decet, fidelis et expers
 Nequicie, iustus et rectus, cur minuisti
 Ergo dies eius? Potuisses parcere mundo;
 Mundus egebat eo; sed eum magis⁹ eligis esse
 Tecum quam secum; mauis succurrere celo
 Quam mundo. Domine, si phas [est] dicere, dicam
 Pace tua: pot[er]as fecisse decencius istud,
 Et properasse minus, saltem dum frena dedisset
 Hostibus, et facti mora tanquam nulla fuisset,—
 Res erat in foribus,—tunc posset honestius ire
 Et remeare tibi. Sed in hac re scire dedisti
 Quam breuis est risus, quam longa est lacrima mundi."

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A more elaborate treatment of the lament is found in a manuscript of the thirteenth century, in which the composition is viewed as containing six divisions and in which the marginal glosses furnish informing observations upon the rhetorical *colores* used by Vinsauf. Concerning the content and organization of the piece as a whole and concerning the first division ("Temporibus luctus," ll. 367-74) in particular, the chief glosses provide the following comment:¹⁰

Temporibus luctus, et cetera. In parte ista [ll. 367-430] ponit auctor quintum capitulum apostrophacionis, in quo dat doctrinam apostrophandi ad aliquem qui cum dolore doleat de aduersitate uel tristitia impulsa a fortuna; et quia exemplum apostrophandi luctuosum est, ideo auctor exemplificat de morte regis Ricardi, quia mors ipsius fuit amarissima. Multipliciter decet exprimere inexplicabiles dolores. Et primo apostrophat ad Angliam [ll.

367-74],¹¹ secundo ad Diem in quo mortuus est [ll. 375-79], tertio ad Militem per quem uulneratus est [ll. 379-85], quarto ad Mortem [ll. 386-96], [quinto ad Naturam, ll. 397-411], sexto ad Deum [ll. 412-30]: secunda ibi *O Veneris lacrimosa*, tertia ibi *tirannide mira*, quarta ibi *O dolor*, quinta ibi *Et de te, Natura, queror*, sexta ibi *Si fas est*.

Nam¹² si tota prouincia doloris habeat materiam, hec tamen ciuitas super omnes de dolore, ideoque ad eam specialiter apostrophat; et utitur prosopopeia sic et¹³ prius, quantum ad rem carentem loquela sermonem dirigit. Vtitur etiam metaphora, quia ponit continens pro contento sic etiam prius, loquitur enim ad loca quasi ad homines in eis contentos.

Quasi¹⁴ diceret tempore flectus et aduersitatis imminentis ex morte alicuius: Tu potes apostrophare ad aliquem inducere ad flectum his uerbis quibus ad Neustria ego apostropho, ut eam ad flectum inducam; et hoc est in temporibus luctus.

⁹ *magis] minus* (MS).

¹⁰ Brit. Mus., MS Add. 37495, fol. 7v. So far as I know, this manuscript has not been published. I follow the folio numbers written in lead pencil. In studying this manuscript I have had generous aid from my friend, Professor Edmund T. Silk, to whom I express my gratitude.

¹¹ *Angliam*. Thus *Neustria* (l. 368) is interpreted as *Anglia*.¹² This paragraph refers to *Tota* in l. 373.¹³ *et] error for ut?*¹⁴ This paragraph refers to *uerbis* in l. 367.

The chief glosses for the remaining divisions may appropriately be presented seriatim. Glosses for the second division ("O Veneris lacrimosa dies," ll. 375-79):¹⁵

415 In parte ista docet apostrophare ad diem, dicens: *O Veneris lacrimosa dies*, quasi diceret, *O dies denominata a Uenere*, quia unusquisque dierum qui appellantur ferie proprie loquendo.

420 Nota¹⁶ quod dicendo *illa Uenus fuit uene-* num uititur colore uerborum qui dicitur anomia- nacio, et prouenit quando de nomine ad idem nomen acceditur commutacione uel addicione unius litere uel silabarum aut literarum, ut patebit in capitulo de coloribus uerborum.

425 A gloss for the third division ("Uterque dies homicida tyrannide mira," ll. 379- 85):¹⁷

Nota quod dicendo *miles perfide*, *miles per-* fidie, et cetera, quantum ad istas dictiones *perfide* et *perfidie* est color anomia- nacio, de quo iam supra dixi, quantum uero ad hanc dictio- nem *miles* que repetitur in principio plurium clausularum est alias color uerborum qui dicitur repeticio; sed quantum ad *hoc* quod dicit *hoc in eum*, *scelus hoc scelus*, et cetera, est alias color uerborum qui dicitur duplicatio, et pro- uenit ex narracione unius uerbi aut plurimo- rum, non habito respectu ad situm, ut supra patebat.

Glosses for the fourth division ("O Dolor . . . O Mors," ll. 386-96):¹⁸

O dolor. In parte ista apostrophat ad mortem, increpando eam de tanto scelere ex eo quod auss fuit terminare sibi dies uite, ostendendo quomodo in aspectu erat placibilis et in mente admirabilis, et dominus erat armorum, et nil poterat tanto uiro addi, nec ex parte nature, nec ex parte fortune.

Nam¹⁹ per hoc quod dicit *ipse fuit iubar*, id est radius splendus in speculis, commendat eum a pulcritudine.

¹⁵ MS Add. 37495, fol. 7v.

¹⁶ This paragraph refers to l. 376.

¹⁷ MS Add. 37495, fol. 7v.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, fol. 7v.

¹⁹ This sentence refers to *iubar* in l. 390.

A gloss for the fifth division ("Et de te, Natura," ll. 397-411):²⁰

In parte ista apostrophat ad Naturam, que²¹ conformasset maxima diligencia regem Ricardum a limine uite non debuit²² Natura, quia quoisque rex Ricardus puer fuit omni studio fouisti eum, nec destitisti circa tempus senectutis, nec debuisti; sed si tam brevis hora abstulit tantum sudorem, si in mundo fuit hoc infiniti miri, nec debuisti reuocare donum²³ quod dederat irritando mundum. Sed de duobus ergo tibi eligas unum: *uel redde sepultum vel forma similem*.

Glosses for the sixth division ("Si fas est, accuseo Deum," ll. 412-30):²⁴

In parte ista ultima apostrophat ad Deum; sed quanto aliquis reprehendere debet maiorem, primo licentia est petenda. Cum ergo aut intendat reprehendere Deum de morte regis Ricardi, petit licenciam primo; et in hoc facit colorem qui dicitur licentia, et dicit.

Non²⁵ debes degenerare. Est enim degenerare contra ipsam naturam facere uel contra parentum naturalem utilitatem. Cum ergo Deus ad solum bonum intendat, uidetur degenerare auferendo regem Ricardum, nam rex Ricardus faciebat²⁶ pro Iope tua (in textu uocatiuus casus est, aliter enim forent uersus corrupti), et pro Aeri, nam aliter per Saracenos ciuitas hec fuit inuasa et expugnata. Rex uero Ricardus eam recuperauit, et sic ter- ruit eos, quod etiam mortuus timetur.

Non²⁷ debuisti enumerare dies eius, etsi mundus offendebat te, et propter hoc uolebas tollere protectorem ipsius.

Sed²⁸ hoc fecisti quia libertius uis eum tecum quam mundo, et uititur colore qui dicitur licentia.

²⁰ MS. Add. 37495, fol. 8r.

²¹ que] quam (MS).

²² Is an infinitive (*reuocare?*) lacking before *debuit?*

²³ donum] domum (MS).

²⁴ MS Add. 37495, fol. 8r-8v.

²⁵ This paragraph refers to l. 412.

²⁶ faciebat] fatabat (MS).

²⁷ This sentence refers to l. 419.

²⁸ This sentence refers to *mundo* in l. 421.

Sed²⁹ distulisse quounque refrenasset hostes suos, quia iam quasi ueniebat ad metas, et tunc honestissime uenisset ad te; et hoc est quod dicit, *Et properasse minus.*

Tu³⁰ significasti hominibus mundanis quod gaudium huius mundi est breue; flere autem reatum est longum.

As a whole these instructional glosses are concerned about equally with elucidating the meanings of the text and with expounding the author's literary elegances. The meanings are explained through simple paraphrases, and matters of prosody and history are not ignored. Such rhetorical *colores* as *metaphora*, *anominatio*, *repetitio*, *duplicatio*, and *licentia* are defined with considerable precision. Clearly, then, Vinsauf's lament for King Richard was treated with respect as a forcible and finished literary production and as a significant illustration of superior rhetorical practice.

Further prominence seems to have accrued to the piece through citation from it in other books of rhetorical instruction. An example of this use of it is the quoting of lines 386-88 to illustrate a definition of *exclamatio* in an anonymous fifteenth-century treatise on *colores*:³¹

Exclamacio est quando apostrofando ex aliqua mocione cum causa meroris, odij, doloris, gaudiij, laudis, vituperij, indignacionis aut admiracionis uel huiusmodi exclamamus, vt:

O dolor! O plus quam dolor! O mors!
O truculenta³²
Mors! Vtinam esses, mors, mortua!
Quid meministi
Ausa nephax³³ tantum,

²⁹ This sentence refers to *properasse* in l. 426.

³⁰ This sentence refers to *re* in l. 429.

³¹ Brit. Mus., MS Royal 12.B.xvii, fol. 6^v. The treatise, occupying fols. 1^r-43^r of the manuscript, is, I believe, unpublished.

³² Over *truculenta* is written the contemporary vernacular gloss *cruel*.

³³ Over *nephax* is written the contemporary vernacular gloss *synne*.

et cetera. Et sic tam ad rem absentem quam ad presentem, tam [ad] animatam quam ad inanimatam.

The most striking evidence of the fame of this Latin *monodia*, however, was its circulation as an independent literary blossom, quite apart from the *Nova poëtria* and from the purposes of instruction. It appears by itself, for example, under the title "Planctus de morte Regis Ricardi Cuir de Lyon," in a somewhat weighty and varied anthology compiled partly in the thirteenth and partly in the fifteenth century.³⁴ In an inventory of the books of Thomas, duke of Gloucester, of the year 1397, it is mentioned as a separate "book" in the entry, "Item j livre appellez Neustria."³⁵ It is used in its entirety, with noteworthy appropriateness, as the chief literary adornment of the life of King Richard I in the *Annales* of Nicholas Trivet (†1328).³⁶ Faral suggests the plausible possibility that this *monodia* may have been composed originally as a separate poem and may have been included later in the *Nova poëtria* as a serviceable literary "example."³⁷

³⁴ Oxford, Bodl. Libr., MS Add. A.44 (30151), fols. 7^r-8^v. Concerning this manuscript see A. Wilmart, "Le Florilegium mixte de Thomas Bekynton," in *Mediaeval and Renaissance studies*, ed. R. Hunt and R. Klibansky, I (1941), 41-84; Faral, p. 18. The "Planctus de morte Regis Ricardi" is among the pieces added to the manuscript in the fifteenth century.

³⁵ Printed by Viscount Dillon and W. H. St. John Hope in the *Archaeological journal*, LIV (1897), 302. The editors do not identify the "livre appellez Neustria," but it must be Vinsauf's lament for King Richard beginning "Neustria sub clypeo regis." No one familiar with the variety of meanings attached to the word *liber* in the later Middle Ages will be troubled over the designation *livre* for a separate short piece like the *planctus* under consideration here.

³⁶ See Nicolai Triveti Dominicani *Annales sex regum Angliae*, II (Oxford, 1719), 135-37. Trivet introduces the lament thus: "Hujus mortem Magister Galfridus de Vinosalvo, in libro quem de Eloquentia composuit, versibus his deplorat: *Neustria sub clypeo regis. . . .*" The editor appends this note: "Hic est illi poeta, nomine Galfridus, quem tantopere celebrat Chaucerius."

³⁷ See Faral, p. 19.

Such evidences of the vogue of Vinsauf's *planctus* as an independent literary composition do more than add pointedness to Chaucer's ridicule, for they seem also to raise the question whether, in mentioning this lament in the *Nun's priest's tale*, Chaucer shows an acquaintance with it as a mere part of the *Nova poetria* or only as an independent poem. Such questioning is discouraged, however, by further study of the relationships between the English tale and the Latin treatise, for the bearing of the *Nova poetria* upon Chaucer's poem appears to have been somewhat broader than the editors of Chaucer have indicated and to have extended considerably beyond the limits of the lament for King Richard.³⁸

One of the notable elements of originality in the *Nun's priest's tale* is the portrayal of Chauntecleer's proud bearing and complacent feeling of prosperity, which prompt the narrator to mention the dangers of pride and the instability of earthly happiness. These moralistic warnings give to Chaucer's tale a significance and a grimly humorous suspense which are absent from the earlier versions of the story. This added element is part of the "sermonistic development" to which Professor Hulbert has called attention and for which, as he says, "no specific source can be cited."³⁹ It may be, however, that for some part of this moralistic element Chaucer found in the *Nova poetria* itself, if not a specific source, at least a number of serviceable suggestions.

Cui nimis in laetis mens surgit, apostropha, surge,
Et sic castiges ipsum: "Quid gaudia tanta
Concutiunt animum? Plausum sub fine modesto
Stringas et fines ejus non amplius aequo

³⁸ T. R. Lounsbury (*Studies in Chaucer* [New York, 1892], II, 341) seems to have been on the verge of suggesting this broader view of the matter. Valuable, and somewhat neglected, suggestions toward such a view have been made by C. S. Baldwin, *Medieval rhetoric and poetics* (New York, 1928), p. 294, n. 39, and by Marie P. Hamilton, in *PMLA*, XLVII (1932), 407-9.

The sermonistic, or moralistic, element in the *Nova poetria* to which I refer lies outside the lament for King Richard but is inseparably associated with it. This lament was composed by Vinsauf as an example of the apostrophe, the apostrophe being one of the eight devices by which an author could amplify his treatment of a given theme. Of the apostrophe Vinsauf furnishes six examples, of which the one on the death of King Richard is the fifth, as shown in the following list:

1. To a person elated in prosperity (ll. 276-91)
2. To an arrogant person (ll. 292-303)
3. To a person frightened in adversity (ll. 304-23)
4. For times of prosperity (ll. 324-66)
5. For times of sorrow (ll. 367-430): the complaint for King Richard, beginning "Neustria," containing the address to Friday, beginning "O dies Veneris" (ll. 375-79)
6. To a ludicrous person (ll. 431-54)

If, then, Chaucer is known to have made telling use of the fifth of these model apostrophes in his story, we may well inquire whether there are evidences that he drew also upon others in the series. We observe at once that the first and fourth apostrophes show marked resemblances in theme to that moralistic element of the *Nun's priest's tale* which, as we have seen, is not found in the sources or analogues of the fable. The first apostrophe is a *castigation*, or reproof, addressed to the person heedlessly abandoned to the enjoyment of his good fortune:⁴⁰

³⁹ See J. R. Hulbert in *Sources and analogues of Chaucer's Canterbury tales*, ed. W. F. Bryan and Germaine Dempster (Chicago, 1941), p. 646. Professor Hulbert presents fully (pp. 645-63) the passages from the French and German versions of the story which represent Chaucer's chief narrative source and provides the desired bibliography.

⁴⁰ *Nova poetria*, ll. 276-91 (Faral).

Extendas, sed, mens casus incauta futuri, Aemula sis Jani: retro speculeris et ante, Si bene successit. Ne prima, sed ultima spectes. A casu describe diem, non solis ab ortu. Ut sis ad plenum secura, verecere futura: Cum totum viciisse putes, latet anguis in herba; Exemplar Syrenes habe: docearis in illis, Sub meliore statu semper pejora cavere. Nulla fides rerum: sequitur post mella venenum, Et claudit nox atra diem, nebulaeque serenum. Cum soleant hominum feliciter omnia verti, Majori levitate solent adversa reverti."	280 285 290
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The fourth apostrophe is a *praesagium* addressed to England, congratulating her upon her good fortune under Richard, the

mirror of kings, but warning her that such prosperity, by its very nature, is unstable and must be followed by calamity:⁴¹

Tempore successus, jocundi tempore fati, Haec potes ore loqui, luctus praesaga futuri:	325
"Anglia, regnorum regina, superstite rege Ricardo, cuius laus est diffusio tanti Nominis et mundi cui monarchia relicta Est soli, secura fides sub regimine tanto. Rex tuus est speculum, quo te speculata superbis;	330
Sidus, de cuius rutilas splendore; columna, Per quam fulta viges; fulmen, quod mittis in hostes; Laus, qua paene deum pertingis culmina. Sed quid Singula? Non illo potuit fecisse priorem Nec voluit Natura parem.—Sed viribus absit	335
Prorsus habere fidem: mors est quae fortia frangit. Omnibus ne crede tuis; si tempore parvo Illuxere tibi, mox sunt clausura serenum Nubila fata diem, ducentque crepuscula noctem.	340
Jam cito rumpetur speculum, speculatio cuius Gloria tanta tibi; sidus patietur eclipsim, A quo fulges; nutabit rupta columna, Unde trahis vires; cessabit fulminis ictus, Unde tremunt hostes; et eris de principe serva.	345
Omina laeta vale tibi sunt dictura: quiescis, Sudabis; rides, flebis; ditescisi, egebis; Flores, marcebis; es, vix eris.—Attamen istud Unde scies? Quid ages? Volucrum rimaberis aure Murmura? Vel motus oculo? Vel Apolline fata?	350
Tolle mathematicos! Est augur surdus, aruspex Caecus et ariolus amens. Praesentia scire Fas homini, solique Deo praescire futura. Non habet hic patriam; vetus ille repatriet error Et pater erroris gentilis nutriat illum Quem genuit, quia sana fides a lumine tollit	355

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, ll. 324–66.

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Ecclesiae tripodes Phoebi soliumque⁴² Sibillae.
 Hoc unum praescire potes quia nulla potestas
 Esse morosa potest, quia res fortuna secundas
 Imperat esse breves. Si vis exempla, priores
 Respice fortunas. Emarcuit illa priorum
 Florida prosperitas: Minos subvertit Athenas,
 Ylion Atrides, magnae Cartaginis arces
 Scipio, sed Romanum multi. Fuit alea fati
 Tempore versa brevi. Brevis est distantia laeti
 Ominis et maesti; nox est vicina diei.
 Haec aliena docent, sed te tua fata docebunt."

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Now the kind of reversal in fortune predicted in these two model apostrophes is precisely the phenomenon emphasized in Chaucer's tale. At the very height of Chauntecleer's complacency, "sodeynly hym fil a sorweful cas":⁴³

"Madame Pertelote, my worldes blis,
 Herketh thise blisful briddes how they syngē,
 And se the fresshe floures how they spryngē,
 Ful is myn herte of revel and solas!"
 But sodeynly hym fil a sorweful cas,
For everē the latter ende of joye is wo;
God woot that worldly joye is soone ago;
 And if a rethor koude faire endite,
 He in a cronycle saufly myghte it write
 As for a sovereyn notabilitē.

The Latin and English passages before us show resemblances not only in general content but also in particular aspects. Chauntecleer, in his ostentatious strutting and his expansive self-satisfaction, seems to be a perfect example of the person "cui nimis in laetis mens surgit" (l. 276), and the English narrator's words predicting a sudden reversal in fortune are obviously "luctus praesaga futuri" (l. 325). The theme of the aphorism (ll. B 4395-96),

For everē the latter ende of joye is wo;
 God woot that worldly joye is soone ago,
 is certainly the general theme of the first and fourth apostrophes in the *Nova poētīa*.

⁴² *solumque*] The MSS to which I have access have *oliumque*. See Brit. Mus., MS Add. 37495, fol. 7v; MS Cleopatra B.VI., fol. 8r; Oxford, Balliol Coll., MS 263, fol. 34v.

⁴³ *Nun's priest's tale*, ll. B 4390-99.

tria. In the Latin passages the thought of these two English verses is expressed repeatedly; and, although the idea is commonplace and although Chaucer's lines are not precise translations of any of Vinsauf's, such Latin verses as the following seem worthy of notice:

Brevis est distantia laeti
 Ominis et maesti.⁴⁴

Hoc unum praescire potes, quia nulla potestas
 Esse morosa potest, quia res fortuna secundas
 Imperat esse breves.⁴⁵

For verbal resemblance to Chaucer's lines, however, the most arresting utter-

⁴⁴ *Nova poētīa*, II. 364-65, from the fourth apostrophe. This passage is cited by Mrs. Hamilton (p. 408), who offers also the following lines from the first apostrophe (ll. 288-91):

"Sequitur post mella venenum
 Et claudit nox atra diem, nebulaque serenum.
 Cum soleant hominum feliciter omnia verti,
 Maiori levitate solent adversa reverti."

⁴⁵ *Nova poētīa*, II. 357-59, from the fourth apostrophe. One might mention also ll. 287-88:

"Sub meliore statu semper pejora cavere;
 Nulla fides rerum."

A gloss attached to l. 325 in Brit. Mus., MS Add. 37495, fol. 6v (thirteenth century), quotes the following from Boethius, *De consolatione philosophiae*, II. Pr. I, 44-45 (Loeb): "Quid est aliud fortuna fugax quam quoddam future calamitatis indicium?" If one chooses to glance outside the range of the apostrophes discussed above, one finds in an earlier part of the *Nova poētīa* the following relevant passages (ll. 181-84, 194-95), cited by Mrs. Hamilton (p. 408):

"Quod magis optatur, magis effluit. Omnia lapsum
 Spondent et citius sunt prospera prompta ruinae.
 Insidias semper ponit sors aspera blande
 Anticipatque fugam melior fortuna repente.

"Tristis ab incerto furit aura sub aere laeto.
 Nubilus exsudat aer sub sole sereno."

ance known to the present writer is an unpublished gloss to the concluding verses of the fifth apostrophe, with which the English poet was unquestionably familiar (ll. 429-30):

Sed in hac re scire dedisti
Quam brevis est risus, quam longa est
lacrima mundi.

The position of these verses at the conclusion of the famed lament for King Richard gives them, of itself, a certain prominence, and their basic meaning is that of Chaucer's aphorism. Accompanying the Latin lines, moreover, in a manuscript of the thirteenth century,⁴⁶ is found the following gloss, as we have seen above:

Tu significasti hominibus mundanis quod
gaudium huius mundi est breve; flere autem
reatum est longum.

Here are certain rather striking verbal resemblances to Chaucer's line,

God woot that worldly joye is soone ago.

"Worldly joye," for example, is close to "gaudium huius mundi," and "soone ago" is a fair equivalent of "breve." The words "God woot" direct one's attention to the fact that Vinsauf's lines and the accompanying gloss are addressed to the Deity. In pointing to these resemblances, I am, of course, not insisting that Chaucer is translating this particular gloss, but I venture to say that his use of a glossed text of the *Nova poetria* of the sort that I am citing is not improbable. It is evident, in any case, that the profusion of appropriate *sententiae* in Vinsauf's text and in the glosses removes the necessity of our looking abroad for the source of Chaucer's aphorism.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Brit. Mus., MS Add. 37495, fol. 8v.

⁴⁷ Robinson (pp. 798, 860, 943) mentions Chaucer's use of the same aphorism in the *Man of law's tale*, ll. B 421-27 (from Pope Innocent's *De contemptu mundi*, I, 23) and in *Troilus and Criseyde*, IV, 836 (from Prov. 15:13), and refers to other appearances of it in Boethius, Book II, Pr. 4, and in Eccles. xi, 25.

Somewhat related to these matters, perhaps, are one or two details in the lines that immediately follow the aphorism in Chaucer's text (ll. B 4397-99):

And if a rhetor koude faire endite,
He in a *cronycle* saufly myghte it write
As for a sovereyn notabilitee.

The intent of these verses seems to be: "If a writer on rhetoric had a gift for elegant composition, he might safely record this aphorism in a chronicle, as a profound truth." This passage has been characterized by one commentator as "rather pointless elaboration";⁴⁸ but may we not discern in it a modicum of genuine vivacity if we read it as another light-hearted gibe at Geoffrey of Vinsauf, the "rhetor"? Surely he had a remarkable reputation for writing "faire," and surely the *Nova poetria*, as we have seen, plays all the variations upon the aphorism that Chaucer is forcing upon our attention. The word "cronycle" in itself may, or may not, have significant implications. Perhaps it only suggests, with playful irony, that this "sovereyn notabilitee," which is the merest commonplace but upon which Vinsauf has repetitiously lavished his rhetoric, deserves solemn recording in a historical work! Actually, as we have seen, Nicholas Trivet does quote in his *Annales* the entire fifth apostrophe, with its concluding *sententia* (ll. 429-30),

Sed in hac re scire dedisti
Quam brevis est risus, quam longa est
lacrima mundi.

Although this fact could have been in Chaucer's mind, I can cite no definite indication that it was. Nor can we draw any

⁴⁸ Sisam (p. 48) writes: "These lines seem to be rather pointless elaboration. Perhaps they are meant as humorous support to the truth of the story, like ll. 445-7 [ll. B 4401-3]; the argument being—that woe follows bliss is certain enough to be recorded in a chronicle history; therefore the Cock's mishap, which is an instance of this, is as true as a chronicle."

illuminating inferences from the fact that, opposite the lines containing the word "cronycle," five manuscripts of the *Canterbury tales* contain the marginal gloss, "Petrus Comestor."⁴⁹ Since the aphorism under consideration seems not to be found in Comestor's writings⁵⁰ and since there is no evidence that the gloss emanates from Chaucer himself,⁵¹ it seems likely that a scribe or editor, conscious of the commanding authority of Comestor's *Historia scholastica* and of his pre-eminence as

the *Magister in historiis*, was prompted by the word "cronycle" in Chaucer's text to write in the margin the name of the "standard" chronicler as having a certain erudite relevance.⁵²

One other apostrophe in Vinsauf's remarkable series seems to deserve at least passing notice. The third example, addressed to the person who is terrified by adverse occurrences, urges him to conceal his mental agitation by assuming a bold exterior:⁵³

Rebus in adversis si laxet frena timori,
Hac ope⁵⁴ verborum timido succurre potenti:
"Ne timeas; si forte times, assume timentis,
Non animum timidi. Quando subit ostia mentis,
Sit timor hospes ibi, non incola. Disce timere:
Si timeas, sine teste time, mentisque timorem
Ignoret facies; quia, si timor intimus ora
Carpit et emacerat, animus jocundior hostem
Nutrit et impinguat, et gaudia suggestit illi
Exsugens tua membra dolor. Consultius ergo,
Si timor incurvet animum, simulatio vultum
Erigat, et clypeo vultus succurre timori;
Ut, si mens timeat, facies velit ipsa timeri.
Immo magis sperare velis pudeatque timentem
Vulgari pallere metu. Si posse sit, artum
Dilates animum."

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The kind of behavior recommended to the affrighted person here is similar to that adopted by the hero of Chaucer's tale. Probably a good many readers have been struck by the suddenness and aggressiveness with which Chauntecleer emerges from his perturbation over his

ominous dream and not only recovers his geniality but also assumes a lofty and menacing manner. His terrifying experience he expounds fully. After having been "drecched sore" by his "sweven" and after confessing that his "herte is sore afright," he launches into a lengthy justi-

⁴⁹ See J. M. Manly and Edith Rickert, *The text of the Canterbury tales* (Chicago, 1940), III, 520.

⁵⁰ See Hamilton, p. 408; Robinson, p. 860.

⁵¹ Manly and Rickert (p. 520) remark that this gloss "need not have been inherited."

⁵² There is considerable evidence that Peter Comestor's *Historia scholastica* (written before 1179) came to be regarded as the history par excellence and that the author was the acknowledged *magister* of the subject. Since the *Historia scholastica* consists of a series of *historiae*, each book of the Bible treated being called a *historia*, the work is often mentioned in the plural. Guillelmus Brito, in his "Vocabularium" (early thirteenth century, still unprinted), not only refers to Comestor as *Magister in historiis*, without giving his name (see Bodl. Lib., MS Rawlinson C.896,

fols. 3v, 13r, 33r, etc.), but also uses the word *Historiae* to indicate the *Historia scholastica* without giving either the author's name or the title (see *ibid.*, fol. 81v: "Ita dictur in Hystoris super Genesim"). For further discussion of the matter see Skeat, *Oxford Chaucer*, V, 278, and *Piers the plowman* (Oxford, 1886), II, 121; M. Manitius, *Geschichte der lateinischen Literatur des Mittelalters* (Munich, 1931), III, 156-59; H. Vollmer, *Eine deutsche Schulbibel des 15. Jahrhunderts: Historia scholastica des Petrus Comestor* (Berlin, 1925), p. xvi.

⁵³ *Nova poetria*, ll. 304-19 (Faral).

⁵⁴ *ope] opere* (Faral)—which I assume to be a misprint. See, e.g., Brit. Mus., MS Add. 37495, fol. 6r; Brit. Mus., MS Cotton Cleopatra B.VI., fol. 7r; Oxford, Balliol Coll., MS 263, fol. 34r.

fication of his fright and summons abundant evidence that ominous dreams are really meant as terrifying warnings. Ignoring Pertelote's skepticism and scorning her nostrums, he persists in declaring that danger is imminent (ll. B 4341-43):

Shortly I seye, as for conclusiou,
That I shal han of this avisiooun
Adversitee.

But in the very next breath Chauntecleer announces his determination to "stynt al this" and to "deffyen bothe sweven and dreem" and assumes a lover's cajolery, a regal manner, and the expression of a "grym leoun" (ll. B 4360-76):

*I am so ful of joye and of solas,
That I diffye bothe sweven and dreem."*
And with that word he fleydoun fro the beem,
For it was day, and eke his hennes alle,
And with a chuk he gan hem for to calle,
For he hadde founde a corn, lay in the yerd.
Real he was, he was namoore aferd.
He fethered Pertelote twenty tyme,
And trad hire eke as ofte, er it was pryme.
He looketh as it were a grym leoun,
And on his toos he rometh up and doun;
Hym deigned nat to sette his foot to grounde.
He chukketh, whan he hath a corn yfounde,
And to hym rennen thanne his wyves alle.
Thus roial, as a prince is in his halle,
Leve I this Chauntecleer in his pasture,
And after wol I telle his aventur.

Some such reversal in Chauntecleer's behavior, to be sure, must have been suggested in the narrative source that Chaucer used, for in both of the extant analogues of the English tale the cock, after his disturbing dream, recovers some measure of his accustomed aplomb. In these analogues, however, this recovery is represented as very mild and tentative, containing no assumption of "roial" demeanor and the aggressiveness of "a grym

leoun." In the *Roman de Renart*, indeed, Chantecler returns to his dust heap and falls asleep, and in the *Reinhart fuchs* Scantecler seeks safety by flying up into a thorn tree.⁵⁵ Clearly, then, Chauweer's portrayal of Chauntecleer departs from that found in the traditional story and incorporates features of the sort recommended in the third of Vinsauf's apostrophes.

It is understood, of course, that in this modest study I do not pretend either to prove definitively that Chaucer was influenced by Vinsauf's model apostrophes—other than the fifth—or to gauge exactly the extent of any such influence. It does seem clear that the literary fame of the *planctus* for King Richard gave a special force and humor to Chaucer's ridicule of it; and, in view of his conspicuous use of this fifth apostrophe, there is no unlikelihood of his having found serviceable suggestions in other apostrophes in the series. The general absence of *verbal* resemblances between the Latin lines and the English is not, perhaps, an important consideration, for, after ridiculing the language of one Latin passage, Chaucer could hardly be expected to adopt the exact wording or phrasing of neighboring passages. These neighboring passages, however, clearly offer features and themes that reappear in the *Nun's priest's tale*; hence it seems unsafe to ignore their presence in the *Nova poetria*. To me it seems likely that they served Chaucer suggestively and that they are reflected in his tale. I should not be astonished, indeed, if other students were to discern further evidences of this suggestiveness which are not brought forward in the present brief study.

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⁵⁵ See Hulbert's texts in *Sources and analogues*, pp. 653, 660; and Kate O. Petersen, *On the sources of the Nonne prestes tale* (Boston, 1898), pp. 54-55.

PSEUDO-JOHNSONIANA

EDWARD L. MCADAM, JR.

DURING the past decade many notable additions have been made to the canon of Johnson's prose works, but little has been done in the way of subtraction. In the course of years many hasty attributions have been made, seven of which I now propose to examine for the first time. Not one of these is mentioned in Courtney and Smith's *Bibliography*, in the *Supplement* by Chapman and Hazen,¹ or in the article in the *Cambridge bibliography* by Professor D. Nichol Smith. Their very existence may surprise some Johnsonians. But every one is attributed to Johnson by a standard reference work or by one of the great libraries, and that is enough, I believe, to call for this study. The largest number of these attributions begin, so far as I have found, with Sabin's *Dictionary of books relating to America* (1877), a mine of misinformation unfortunately relied on by many cataloguers because of its imposing size. If Sabin made a careful distinction between books by Johnson and related books on the same subject, his work would be very useful; as it is, such distinctions as he makes are wholly unreliable.

The first of these incorrect attributions to Johnson is *A letter to a member of Parliament in the country from his friend in London, relative to the case of Admiral Byng: with some original papers and letters which passed during the expedition* (London: J. Cooke, 1756). This is assigned to Johnson by the New York Public Library, probably because of Johnson's known sympathy with the ideas expressed in it and possibly because of confusion over the

fact that Johnson reviewed the pamphlet.² The author is not known, but he cannot be Johnson, for the style is quite undistinguished. Moreover, Johnson would probably have thought the following paraphrase of the General Confession impious:

I believe, by this time, you are at no loss to account for the Motives, which induced the Concealment of this Letter; the vindictive Effects it must have produced, and consequently, the present unpopular Situation of its Author, who seems to labour under the Calumny of having done those Things which he ought not to have done; only to screen others from the Imputation of having left undone those Things which they ought to have done.

The tract is not rare; there are copies in the British Museum, Yale, the Library of Congress, and the New York Public Library. Johnson's favorable review appeared in the *Literary magazine*,³ com-

¹ The review, which has not been reprinted, concludes:

"It appears to us that *Byng* has suffered without sufficient cause.

"That he was sent to the relief of *Minorca*, when relief was known to be no longer possible.

"That he was sent without land forces, the only forces that could raise the siege.

"That his fleet was inferior, and long before the battle was known to be inferior to that of the *French*.

"That he fought them, and retreated only when he could fight no longer.

"That a second engagement would only have increased the loss suffered in the first.

"That a victory at sea would not have saved *Minorca*.

"That there was no provision for the chances of a battle.

"That the nation has been industriously deceived by false and treacherous misrepresentations.

"That *Minorca* if not betrayed has been neglected.

"That *Byng's* letter has been mutilated injuriously, fraudulently mutilated.

"That every act of defamation has been practised against him.

"That unless other evidence can be produced, *Byng* will be found innocent."

² I (September 15—October 15, 1756), 299–309.

¹ But to Mr. Hazen I am indebted for calling to my attention the pamphlet on Dr. Dodd.

menting at the same time on John Shebbeare's *Appeal to the people, containing the genuine and entire letter of Admiral Byng to the Secr. of the A——y* (London: Morgan, 1756). It might be supposed that Johnson would not have reviewed one of his own productions, but in the same volume of the *Literary magazine* Johnson's review of Browne's *Christian morals*, to which he contributed the biographical and critical introduction, consists of two short paragraphs followed by thirteen paragraphs of his own criticism of Browne from the book. It may be added, however, that the review of the Byng pamphlets was acknowledged to Boswell,⁴ whereas the authenticity of the review of Browne was decided on internal evidence only.

The next work in chronological order was wrongly listed under Johnson by Sabin:⁵ *Papers relative to the late negotiation with Spain; and the taking of Falkland's Island from the English* (Almon, 1777 [i.e., 1771]). Sabin could not have examined the book or the review which he cites,⁶ since the work is merely a collection of state papers, mostly letters, without preface or commentary, a sight of which the opposition to the ministry had demanded in the controversy over the Falklands in the winter of 1770–71.⁷ The pamphlet seems to have appeared about a month before Johnson's *Thoughts on the late transactions respecting Falkland's Islands*, which was reviewed in the *Monthly review* in April (XLIV, 330). Johnson quotes from two

⁴ *Life* (1934), I, 309.

⁵ No. 36300; IX, 293.

⁶ "The parliamentary debates afford the best account of these state-papers" (*Monthly review*, XLIV, 261). This is the entire review. Copies of the *Papers* may be found at Harvard and in the British Museum, which catalogues the book under "England and Ireland—George III."

⁷ Hansard, *Parliamentary history of England*, XVI (for 1765–71), 1359–62. On pp. 1336–38 are printed the Declaration and Acceptance, both dated January 22, 1771. These are two of the papers printed by Almon.

papers included in the publication, but differences in spelling of proper names suggest that he did not use this text but rather, as Boswell says, "materials furnished to him by ministry,"⁸ that is, manuscript copies of the original papers. To recapitulate, Johnson could have had nothing whatever to do with writing or publishing this book.

The next productions wrongly fathered on Johnson are three pamphlets concerned with the American question. I can identify the authors of none of them, but the pieces cannot have been written by Johnson, in spite of showing some similarity to his views. The first is *The right of the British legislature to tax the American colonies vindicated and the means of asserting that right proposed* (T. Becket, 1774). A second edition, with lengthy additions, was published in 1775. This is attributed to Johnson by the New York Public Library. The style is good, even learned, but unlike Johnson's. There are many unusual words, which may have strengthened the attribution, such as *illustrate* in the sense of "make illustrious," given in Johnson's *Dictionary*; *speechified*, not in the *Dictionary* but used by Johnson's friends Foote and Fanny Burney; and *superlucration*, about obsolete by Johnson's time and not included in the *Dictionary*. The argument is generalized and moderate in tone, with emphasis on constitutional law and frequent reference to such authorities as Puffendorf and Locke. There is also much emphasis on economics, though the author seems rather unfriendly to mercantilism. In addition, the author's belief in "virtual" as opposed to "universal" representation is similar to Johnson's view. This is the anonymous author:

If then the British parliament, as we have seen, enjoys a right of taxation independent of individual representation; if the dominion and

⁸ *Life*, II, 134.

property of the vacant lands of America were acknowledged to belong to the crown, that is to the state of England, before any English subject ever emigrated thither; if the settlers of those lands, who sailed thither as English subjects, received them, and are daily receiving them from the bounty of the parent state, as portions of her dominion, those settlers or colonists are then equally amenable to the same supreme power with all other British subjects, liable with them to the same vicissitudes of adverse or prosperous fortune in peace and war, and consequently liable with them to bear their share of all the public burdens, which the support and defence of the state may render necessary.⁹

Johnson managed to say much the same thing in less than half the space and with his characteristic vigor:

It must always be remembered, that they are represented by the same virtual representation as the greater part of Englishmen; and that, if by change of place, they have less share in the legislature than is proportionate to their opulence, they, by their removal, gained that opulence, and had originally, and have now, their choice of a vote at home, or riches at a distance.¹⁰

The next pamphlet is *Hypocrisy unmasked; or a short inquiry into the religious complaints of our American colonies* (Nicol, 1776).¹¹ This is listed under Johnson by Sabin, who cites no evidence of authorship. The British Museum, the John Carter Brown Library, the New York Public Library, Yale, Cushing, Halkett and Laing, and Stonehill all follow. But I have discovered no reason to think that Johnson had any connection with the pamphlet, although again the contents show some similarity to Johnson's ideas.¹²

⁹ P. 25.

¹⁰ *Taxation no tyranny*, in *Works* (1825), VI, 246.

¹¹ This attribution was called to my attention by Mr. Archie Kotz of New York University.

¹² See *The patriot*, in *Works*, VI, 217-18; also *Taxation no tyranny*, in *Works*, VI, 248-49, 253.

"Being now, in their own opinion, free states, they [the colonies] are not only raising armies, but forming

The style is totally undistinguished and so far below that of the work just discussed that it is unnecessary even to quote from it. Sabin summarizes the book thus:

The object of the author seems to be to defend the Quebec Bill, which protects the Canadians in the exercise of the Roman Catholic religion. The American Colonies classed this bill among their grievances. The author of the tract in question shows that many of the colonies extended the same rights to Roman Catholics that the Quebec Bill did to the Canadians.

Hypocrisy unmasked was reviewed in the *Gentleman's magazine* for May, 1776, page 225, and in the *Monthly review* for the same month, page 410; neither suggested any author. But the *Critical review* had said in April, page 323, that the style resembled *The plain question upon the present dispute with our American colonies* (Wilkie, 1776), which the *Monthly review*, page 330, had called a "little ministerial handbill." This last cannot be Johnson's, because of its laudatory attitude toward William III, here called "the immortal

alliances, not only hastening to rebel themselves, but seducing their neighbours to rebellion. They have published an address to the inhabitants of Quebec, in which discontent and resistance are openly incited, and with very respectful mention of 'the sagacity of Frenchmen,' invite them to send deputies to the congress of Philadelphia; to that seat of virtue and veracity, whence the people of England are told, that to establish popery, 'a religion fraught with sanguinary and impious tenets,' even in Quebec, a country of which the inhabitants are papists, is so contrary to the constitution, that it cannot be lawfully done by the legislature itself; where it is made one of the articles of their association, to deprive the conquered French of their religious establishment; and whence the French of Quebec are, at the same time, flattered into sedition, by professions of expecting 'from the liberality of sentiment distinguishing their nation, that difference of religion will not prejudice them against a hearty amity, because the transcendent nature of freedom elevates all, who unite in the cause, above such low-minded infirmities.'

".... Those who wrote the address, though they have shown no great extent or profundity of mind, are yet, probably, wiser than to believe it: but they have been taught, by some master of mischief, how to put in motion the engine of political electricity; to attract, by the sounds of liberty and property; to repel, by those of popery and slavery."

founder of the Revolution," "the great deliverer," and the "Prince to whom we are indebted for the glorious Revolution."¹³ Just a year before, Johnson had called William "one of the greatest scoundrels that ever existed."¹⁴ The style, I may add, bears no resemblance to Johnson's.

These two last pamphlets may be related to a third "said to be by the author of *Hypocrisy Unmasked*, i.e., Dr. Samuel Johnson":¹⁵ *A short appeal to the people of Great Britain upon the unavoidable necessity of the present war with our disaffected colonies* (Kearsley, 1776). This tract quotes *Hypocrisy unmasked* and *The plain question* with approval, and all three may perhaps be by the same author. The style is lively but not much like Johnson:

But when the Stamp Act was weakly repealed—when the disobedience of the Colonies was wickedly applauded by the first favourites of the people—when our very rulers declared, that the existence of the kingdom essentially depended upon America—when it became actually unpopular to talk of parliamentary powers, even within the walls of parliament; and when the nation grew so infatuated, as to celebrate with the wildest demonstrations of joy, the victory obtained by the Provinces over her own supremacy, the Provincials thought it needless to temporize any longer, and accordingly flew from claim to claim with the most astonishing insolence of rapidity.¹⁶

The next pamphlet, *A letter to Messrs. Fletcher and Peach of the City of London; on their negotiation with Dr. Dodd; which has unhappily deprived society, etc.* (G.

¹³ Pp. 18, 13, 12.

¹⁴ Boswell, *Life*, II, 342.

¹⁵ Sabin, No. 80608. As usual, Sabin does not cite his authority. He quotes the *Monthly review* (LV, 64): "Another ministerial hand-bill," which in turn refers to its review of *The plain question*, but in neither review is Johnson mentioned or any suggestion made as to authorship. Sabin cannot have imagined that Johnson was the only writer on behalf of the ministry.

¹⁶ P. 4.

Kearsley and B. Bristow, 1777), was incorrectly attributed to Johnson by the Newberry Library, apparently on the strength of a bookseller's note that Johnson wrote some things for Dodd. The style is wholly dissimilar to Johnson's. It might, indeed, be thought to be influenced by Sterne's. Here are two examples:

. . . . I have a heart tremblingly alive at the distress of every human Being; and if there is an occasion to remonstrate with my fellow-creatures on the particular misfortune of an individual, I think it is the present.

Consider, Gentlemen, this just and liberal argument, while health you continue to enjoy—Then strike your pensive bosoms, while you meditate over the manes of a Dodd, whether on your pillow, when reclining your drowsy heads, now or hereafter, or when age and sickness may overtake you, and then exclaim, Alas, poor Dodd!¹⁷

The author's point of view is quite unlike Johnson; he is not just sure what he wants, except that he wishes to save Dodd's life and to attack the bankers Fletcher and Peach, who were responsible for the indictment of Dodd. But Dodd was executed before the pamphlet was published, and a hasty and incomplete revision after that event makes the author's muddled thinking appear even worse. Johnson could have had nothing to do with this production.

The commonest of all pieces wrongly attributed to Johnson, and the only one in which an attempt was apparently made to deceive the public, is a life of Goldsmith frequently prefixed to editions of *The vicar of Wakefield*. Editions published in New York by G. Long in 1825 and by E. Gee in 1826, available in the New York Public Library, and a Philadelphia edition of 1830 in the Library of Congress all, on the title-page, ascribe the life to

¹⁷ Pp. 15-16, 22.

Johnson. I am unable to say who is responsible for this attribution, which is followed by the libraries where the book is found, but the origin is unimportant. The work is substantially that by Edmond Malone, first anonymously printed, according to Professor Crane's article in the *Cambridge bibliography*, in Goldsmith's *Poems and plays* (Dublin, 1777) (see also Prior's *Malone*). The earliest edition available to me is *The poetical and dramatic works* (London, 1786). By 1797¹⁸ this had been abridged by omitting the footnotes and by substituting one paragraph for the last five, with other minor abbreviations, and used as a memoir for Cooke's edition of the *Vicar*. By 1808 it had been again slightly condensed under direction of the same publisher, still without attribution. It may be recognized by its opening, "The life of a scholar," Dr. Goldsmith has remarked . . . , and by its last paragraph:

¹⁸ Probably in 1793, but I have not seen this edition.

To attempt to convey a proper idea of his great genius in the former, would be a task to which we must acknowledge ourselves totally incompetent: their beauties cannot be pictured by relation; they can only be known by his writings.

The whole, excluding Goldsmith's Address to the Public, is thirty-six paragraphs in length. The attribution to Johnson was probably made for commercial reasons, hardly from ignorance, since the style bears no relation to Johnson's, and at one point the epitaph on Goldsmith is given as "by his friend Dr. Johnson," in which way Johnson would surely not have referred to himself.

Seven works, then, must now be removed from any connection with Johnson. It should be noted that in no case is there any external evidence of his authorship, and internal evidence is at least lacking and, in most cases, positively against his authorship. We may be glad, finally, that no work of distinction is being denied him.

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LA DANSE DEVANT LE MIROIR: THE EVOLUTION OF A TRAGEDY

WILLIAM M. SCHUYLER

LESS familiar to the average student of the theater of François de Curel than many of the dramatist's other works, *La Danse devant le miroir* is, nevertheless, worthy of a more detailed study than has heretofore been devoted to it. Actually, this play offers numerous points of interest. In the first place, it represents, in its primitive version, Curel's earliest attempt at writing a play. Second, its development through four distinct stages enables us to observe the evolution of Curel's technique over a period of more than twenty years. And, lastly, the final version, written when Curel had reached his full powers as a dramatist, is a fascinating psychological tragedy in itself, unencumbered by the social theories which the author was fond of introducing into his works and which at times render his plays dull and discursive.

The fact that Curel spent so much time revising and re-writing this early work makes it evident that the subject must have preoccupied him greatly and that he was determined to discover some way of presenting it convincingly on the stage. One is thus tempted to surmise that the drama may partially represent some personal experience of the author. Curel himself is extremely reticent on this point, saying only: "J'ai complètement oublié comment m'a été suggéré ce sujet redoutable,"¹ but suggesting that he modeled the character of his heroine on that of a young woman of his acquaintance.² However that may be, the dramatist's obvious fondness for this particular work

¹ François de Curel, *Théâtre complet* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1931), I, 3.

² *Ibid.*, p. 56.

lends it an added interest, especially since it differs so greatly from what we now consider Curel's characteristic productions.

The primitive version of *La Danse devant le miroir*, entitled first *Une Epave* and later *Sauvé des eaux*, was written in 1889, when François de Curel was already thirty-five years old. Up to this time the author had produced three novels and two short stories of indifferent merit, which had been almost completely ignored by the critics. Finally, however, a friend of Curel requested Charles Maurras to write a few words about the last of these works, the novel called *Le Sauvage du grand-duc*,³ in his regular column of literary criticism. Maurras consented to do so, but it is evident from his synopsis of the story that he had not troubled to read the book very carefully. He noticed, however, that it was written almost exclusively in dialogues and monologues, with stage directions occasionally added. The burden of his article therefore was that Curel was "un malheureux vaudevilliste perdu dans la toge du romancier," and he concluded by exclaiming: "Au théâtre! au théâtre! Monsieur de Currel [sic]."⁴ This phrase of Maurras has become famous, and it is always cited as the deciding factor which led Curel to write for the theater. The author himself mentions it,⁵ adding that after reading this article he immediately began to write plays.

Unfortunately for the legend of the in-

³ Paris: Ollendorff, 1889.

⁴ "Jean Castanet" [Charles Maurras], "Le Sauvage du grand-duc," *Observateur français*, August 25, 1889. For an example of the peculiar style observed by Maurras in this novel, see *Le Sauvage du grand-duc*, pp. 137-38.

⁵ *Théâtre complet*, I, xv.

fluence of Maurras on Curel's career, we are confronted here with a conflict in dates. Curel himself, in quoting the famous article, says that it appeared in the *Observateur français* of April 25, 1889, whereas an examination of the files of this newspaper shows that it actually did not appear until August 25. Perhaps misled by this original error, Curel goes on to say in his reminiscences that he began to write plays in the spring of this same year, and the manuscripts of his first dramatic works do, in fact, bear the inscription "Printemps 1889."⁶ This indefinite date is in itself rather suspicious, and it may be that the author, who was usually more specific, added it to his manuscripts in later years, possibly at the time he composed the *historique* of the play under discussion. If we cannot accept this explanation, we are then obliged to suppose that Curel, more tempted by the theater than he was willing to admit,⁷ had already actually commenced the composition of plays some months before the publication of Maurras' article. In any case, it is no longer possible to accept the story of Maurras' influence on Curel without some reservations.

Many years later Curel acknowledged that the first of his plays to be performed, *L'Envers d'une sainte*, was very different from what Charles Maurras might have expected (if the latter had not already forgotten the young author of *Le Sauvage du grand-duc*): "... combien a dû être comique la physionomie de Maurras, lorsqu'après m'avoir expédié sur les planches pour y recommencer les éternelles pitreries du vaudeville, il m'y a vu porter l'austère psychologie de *l'Envers d'une sainte*.⁸ This is quite true, but *L'Envers*

d'une sainte was not written until 1891; and, if Maurras could have read Curel's very first dramatic effort, he would have been gratified to observe that the young man had faithfully followed his advice, for *Sauvé des eaux* has all the characteristics of the typical *vaudeville*.

The plot of *Sauvé des eaux* is extremely complicated, and for this reason Curel was forced to devote practically the whole of the first act to exposition. We first become acquainted with Gabrielle, an extraordinarily eccentric young woman, who lives with her uncle Raphaël and her aunt Agnès, simple, kindly old people who are, incidentally, perfect types for a *vaudeville*. Gabrielle has fallen in love with Cyrille de Garcignies, whom she pursues brazenly. Cyrille, however, is much annoyed by Gabrielle's protestations of affection, for he already has a mistress, Jeanne de Villepré, whose husband is in America, "occupé à fabriquer du Corned beef..." "Corned lui aussi, et biffé de la belle façon," as Gabrielle rather coarsely remarks;⁹ and the bad taste of this pun is an accurate gauge of the tone of the whole play. Now Jeanne is tired of Cyrille and would be only too happy to pass him on to Gabrielle, but the latter has a more subtle plan.

She has learned that a young man with whom she is only slightly acquainted, René Quitterie, ruined by the life he has been leading, has thrown himself into the Seine but has been "sauvé des eaux." Gabrielle does not know, however, that Cyrille has visited René and has offered him a large sum of money if he will intimate to the newspaper reporters that he tried to commit suicide because of his hopeless love for Gabrielle. Cyrille hopes thus to rid himself of Gabrielle, who will now, he thinks, turn to René. The young woman, meanwhile, has decided to try an

⁶ François de Curel, MSS, Bibliothèque Nationale, *Nouvelles acquisitions françaises*, No. 23314, Vol. I, fol. 1^r.

⁷ *Théâtre complet*, I, xiv.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. xv.

⁹ Curel MSS, Vol. I, fol. 5^r.

experiment. She will intimate to René that she is with child and will ask him to marry her. If he is willing to sell himself, she will become his wife on condition that he pretend to be very much in love with her. Gabrielle hopes thus to attract Cyrille, who seems to prefer married ladies. She does not hesitate to confide her strange idea to Jeanne de Villepré, who thinks it delightful.

Gabrielle sends for René and executes her plan. When she persuades him that Cyrille is not the father of her child, he consents to marry her, but he tells Jeanne that he will commit suicide after the wedding.

In the second act Gabrielle, convinced that René is an honorable man, is about to tell him the truth, when they are interrupted by Cyrille. Gabrielle's plan has succeeded, and Cyrille has suddenly fallen in love with her. Now, however, it is her turn to dismiss him coldly,¹⁰ while she continues to experiment with René's emotions.

The third act takes place at Gabrielle's country house, the evening of the wedding. Gabrielle now finds herself in love with René, but she cannot resist testing him one last time. She is, nevertheless, somewhat wary, for she has found in René's room a revolver and a letter addressed "à ma femme"; so she begs Jeanne to watch him. But Jeanne has some interesting news for her friend: Cyrille, who now cannot bear to give Gabrielle up, is prowling around the house. Gabrielle decides to profit by Cyrille's presence for her final experiment. René appears and tells her that he will commit suicide the next day, after having passed

¹⁰ In doing so, Gabrielle suggests that her uncle tell Garcignies the whole story, saying quaintly: "Allez. ... Ne lui cachez rien. ... Il sait que j'ai été élevée à l'américaine ..." while Agnès, scandalized, cries: "Non, mon enfant, ce mot éveille des idées de folle coquetterie, qui rendent mal la sainteté de ton amour!" (Curel MSS, Vol. I, fol. 47^a.)

the night in her room, thus apparently legitimatizing her child. But Gabrielle informs him brutally that she is not pregnant and that she only wanted a complacent husband. René, in despair, leaves her; but she is unconcerned, since Jeanne has removed the cartridges from his revolver. Jeanne now disguises herself in Gabrielle's wedding dress and signals to Cyrille, who seizes her in his arms. René, returning, exhibits furious jealousy, believing that it is his wife who is embracing another. Gabrielle is finally convinced that he loves her, and the newly wedded pair retires to the next room, while Jeanne, still dressed in Gabrielle's costume, waves to Raphaël, who has slipped into the garden in order to assure himself, in his innocent way, of his niece's happiness.

This absurd last act, with its ridiculous climax, completely spoils the effect of the first two acts, which in spite of their faults do contain some interesting material; for, even though Gabrielle seems abnormal and neurotic, her character is well worked out and dominates the play. The plot is at least original, and the style is vigorous if not distinguished. Curel probably knew that he would have to revise this play, but he put it aside temporarily in order to write *La Figurante*. Having finished this second work and knowing nothing of the difficulties of having a play produced, he took his two manuscripts to the Odéon and later to the Comédie-Française. Both these theaters, however, refused the plays with scorn. Curel, very much discouraged, sent *La Figurante* to Antoine as a last resort. While waiting to hear from the director, he returned to *Sauvé des eaux* and revised the last act of this play.

In this second version¹¹ Cyrille does

¹¹ *Sauvé des eaux* has never been acted or published (although it appears in its final version as *La Danse devant le miroir* in Curel's *Théâtre complet*); but the

not appear during the last act; and the play closes with a long dialogue between Gabrielle and her husband, who is now called Charles Méran instead of René Quitterie. Charles, about to shoot himself as he had threatened, has to confess that he cannot summon the courage to take his own life. Not until after this humiliating admission does he discover that the cartridges have been removed from his revolver. He reproaches Gabrielle bitterly and again threatens to kill himself; but Gabrielle, touched at last by his evident misery, takes him in her arms. However, it is impossible to imagine that any happiness is in store for two such strange and complex personalities. The bitterness of this new conclusion, which, of course, changes entirely the tone of the whole play, is striking, and this final scene is already much improved.

Having still had no word from Antoine and not knowing that the director was waiting until summer to read all the manuscripts sent to him, Curel decided that his aristocratic name had caused Antoine to regard him as an unimportant amateur. It then occurred to him to send the director two more plays under assumed names: the manuscripts of *Sauvé des eaux* and of *L'Envers d'une sainte*, written in the spring of 1891. When Antoine at last had time to read the various works which had been submitted to him during the winter, he was particularly impressed by the three plays of Curel, thinking, of course, that they were by three different authors, and he accepted all of them. Later, upon learning the truth, Antoine decided to produce *L'Envers d'une sainte* first, since it seemed to him the best, but

author discusses it at length in the *historique* of *La Danse*. However, an examination of Curel's manuscripts discloses that he is concerned in the *historique* only with this second version of *Sauvé des eaux*, which he analyzes in great detail (*Théâtre complet*, I, 7-27), completely disregarding the farcical dénouement of the primitive work.

at the same time not a play which was likely to be accepted at one of the *théâtres des boulevards*.

L'Envers d'une sainte was performed in February, 1892, and it was followed the next fall by *Les Fossiles*, which had been written during rehearsals of the former play. Both were fairly well received, although several critics, notably Francisque Sarcey, were far from enthusiastic in their reviews. In January, 1893, *L'Invitée*, written soon after the composition of *Les Fossiles*, was presented at the Théâtre du Vaudeville with considerable success—so much, in fact, that Albert Carré, the director, decided to put on *La Figurante*. Thus, of all Curel's plays written up to this date, only *Sauvé des eaux* still remained to be placed. Curel had now had enough experience to recognize the faults of his first play; but, nevertheless, he was not inclined to abandon it. Antoine had praised it; and Curel was sure that, with certain revisions, *Sauvé des eaux* could be made into a good play. Therefore, in February and March, 1893, he re-wrote this comedy under the name of *L'Amour brode*.¹²

In going over *Sauvé des eaux*, it was not difficult for Curel to realize the weakness of this first dramatic effort. He says:

Je me suis moqué de moi-même chaque fois que je coupais l'intérêt d'une situation par l'irruption d'un personnage inutile, et c'était souvent! ... Le style manque de fermeté. ... Les scènes sont rarement d'un dessin bien net.¹³

What was to be done, then? In the first place, the original situation was far from plausible. How was the author to make

¹² *Théâtre complet*, I, 31. It must be noted that *L'Amour brode*, like *Sauvé des eaux*, is not included in Curel's *Théâtre complet*. However, it was published in the early edition of Tresse and Stock (1893) and later in the *Petite illustration* of January 31, 1914, which also includes *La Danse devant le miroir*, in order that the two plays might be compared.

¹³ *Théâtre complet*, I, 28.

the public accept Gabrielle's pretended pregnancy? For a while Curel could not resolve this difficulty:

Qu'on se représente à quelle invention diabolique un Sardou aurait eu recours... Avec quelle élégante adresse il aurait fait sortir d'une boîte de baptême arrivant à propos, la grossesse de Gabrielle. Moi, je loge dans le cerveau de mon héroïne une pensée: qu'il n'y a pas d'amour sans mensonge et grâce à l'obsession de cette vérité douloureuse, je prétends la conduire où je voudrai. Là où Sardou se tire d'affaires avec une aventure, je me débrouille avec une idée... Plus j'avancerai dans la pratique de mon métier, plus souvent on me verra, lorsque je serai aux prises avec des situations délicates, les dénouer par des catastrophes d'idées, au lieu de placer les coups de théâtre dans les faits.¹⁴

Here Curel has himself stated one of his favorite methods. The originality of his plays consists precisely in this theory of "la catastrophe d'idées." However, it must not be assumed that *L'Amour brode* is one of Curel's typical *pièces d'idées*, for that expression now seems more applicable to such plays as *La nouvelle idole*, *Le Repas du lion*, and *La Fille sauvage*, in which grandiose and far-reaching social concepts are advanced. Nevertheless, his statement is interesting, for it shows that he already had this theory in mind; and it is quite true also that his method in *L'Amour brode* differs considerably from that of Sardou, to choose the example cited by Curel himself.

Having decided to emphasize the idea of hypocrisy in love, the author continued with less important but, nevertheless, necessary modifications. To begin with, would a young girl in the care of two old people be as free to come and go as Gabrielle apparently is? Curel did not think so, and Gabrielle therefore becomes a young widow. Next, the author realized how inane Cyrille had been made to ap-

pear. We recall that this young man disappears completely after the second act of *Sauvé des eaux* (in its revised form) and is henceforth forgotten. Thus Cyrille is a *personnage inutile*, and Curel always made an effort to dispense with such characters.

The frivolous Jeanne de Villepré is transformed into Cousin Emma, an old maid who knows the ways of the world and can advise Gabrielle. Emma is the most normal and sympathetic person in the play.¹⁵ She is also a sort of *raisonneur*: Curel himself says that he confided in her "le soin de dégager la philosophie des événements."¹⁶ Raphaël and Agnès continue to supply rather silly comic relief, although Curel might well have disposed of them while suppressing useless characters. In *Sauvé des eaux* they were not at all necessary to the plot, and one would willingly dispense with these "saintes âmes," who are no better than ridiculous. It is true that they do gain some importance in *L'Amour brode*, for it is they who first imagine that Gabrielle is with child; but they nevertheless continue to be absurd and unconvincing characters.

Gabrielle and Charles are essentially little changed, although Curel tried his best to make these two characters less strange and abnormal and to define their personalities clearly. For example, he insists from the beginning, through Emma's reminiscences, on what he calls Gabrielle's "originalité." In turn, Emma attempts to explain Charles's personality:

Il y a en lui, comme dans tout amoureux, un adorable histrion qui fanfaronne et cabotine, mendie l'approbation de deux beaux yeux, et

¹⁴ Even Camille Beillaigue, who, in a vitriolic review of *L'Amour brode*, declared himself outraged by the characters of the play, made an exception in favor of Emma: "Emma, qui n'est pas une personne compliquée, ayant été jadis, avec une simplicité dont on lui sait gré, la maîtresse d'un capitaine de cavalerie" (*Revue des deux mondes*, CXX [November 15, 1893], 455).

¹⁵ *Théâtre complet*, I, 32.

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s'imagine rester en dessous de la vérité quand il l'enfle outrageusement. Mais s'agit-il de rendre un personnage imaginaire, il ne fait que des bavures. ... A cet égard, tu [Gabrielle] es beaucoup plus forte! ...¹⁷

But, in spite of all Curel's efforts, Gabrielle and Charles still appear as neurotics who, because of the subtleties in their characters, are not likely to appeal to an audience.

The exposition of *L'Amour brode* reveals a somewhat altered state of affairs. We learn that Gabrielle was at one time in love with Charles Méran and declared herself to him. He did not, apparently, return her affection; and, in spite, Gabrielle married the elderly M. de Guimont, a friend of Uncle Raphaël. Later Gabrielle began to understand why Charles had received her protestations so coldly. He loved her, but in offering herself to him she appeared inferior to his ideal conception of her.¹⁸ After Gabrielle's marriage Charles regretted his decision and even persuaded her to visit his rooms by assurances of fraternal affection. Upon her arrival, however, she grew frightened and disillusioned by his far from fraternal advances and fled. After this incident Charles, in despair, dissipated his fortune and finally attempted to commit suicide by the fumes of a charcoal stove. (We note that he is no longer "sauvé des eaux.")

This elaborate exposition is, of course, designed to make Gabrielle's subsequent actions more plausible. Instead of planning to marry, as in *Sauvé des eaux*, a man

she scarcely knows, she now seeks to win the man she has always loved. Nevertheless, her procedure continues to be more or less extraordinary.

Having thus set out to attenuate Gabrielle's peculiar behavior, Curel also attempts to make his hero more sympathetic. When Gabrielle, who has been for some time a widow, confides to Emma that she feels partly responsible for Charles's attempted suicide and that she still desires to marry him, fearing only that she will not find him the man she has believed him to be, Emma is able to reassure her from her own experience. It appears that Charles had once done Emma a great favor, which she has never forgotten. The story of this incident proves Charles's honor to Gabrielle's satisfaction, and she prepares to proceed with her plan.

When she asks Charles to marry her, however, she meets with a refusal, for Méran feels that it is impossible, since she is wealthy and he is ruined. He would consent only if she asked of him a sacrifice equal to the sacrifice she would be making in marrying him. Gabrielle is exasperated and tells her uncle and aunt that she is determined to be married:

Je veux. ... Il faut! ... Je ne respire plus que pour le conquérir! ... Si j'échouais ... autant recevoir un coup de poignard dans le cœur! ... Et qui sait même s'il n'y aurait pas deux existences en jeu?¹⁹

Uncle Raphaël and Aunt Agnès at once are convinced that their niece is in need of a husband to save her from scandal; and their misapprehension gives Gabrielle the idea of forcing Charles to marry her by telling him this story.

By introducing this idea in the manner just described, Curel does at least succeed in making Gabrielle somewhat less repulsive than his original heroine, who originates the plan herself and carries it

¹⁷ *L'Amour brode* (Paris: Tresse & Stock, 1893), p. 79.

¹⁸ This idea, which is related to Stendhal's theory of crystallization, may well have been taken by Curel from the former's *De l'amour*. Likewise, the dramatist may be indebted to Voltaire's *Dictionnaire philosophique* for the title of his play. At the beginning of the article on love in this volume, we find these words: "C'est l'étoffe de la nature que l'imagination a brodée" (Voltaire, *Oeuvres complètes*, XVII [Paris: Garnier Frères, 1878], 172).

¹⁹ *L'Amour brode*, p. 47.

through more or less as a joke. However, certain obscurities still remain: What exactly does Gabrielle mean when she speaks of "deux existences en jeu"? We do not know and are therefore tempted to believe that Curel inserted this phrase for the express purpose of leading the old people to draw the very conclusion which they do draw. One might also object that Raphaël and Agnès are represented as too innocent to put the worst construction on the wild utterances of a hysterical woman. Thus the play, in spite of certain improvements, still does not succeed in convincing the reader.

At the last moment Gabrielle lacks the courage to carry out her plan, so she sends Emma to tell Charles the supposed secret. But Emma so pities the young man that she tells him the truth instead and suggests that, when Gabrielle arrives, he play the hero. Unfortunately, he is not a good actor, and Gabrielle at once guesses what has happened. She convinces him that what she has told Emma as a joke is actually the truth, and he promises to marry her under these conditions. At this, Gabrielle is tempted to admit everything, but she still hesitates, for Charles has talked of committing suicide, and she must find out if he is still a *poseur*.

The last act of *L'Amour brode* is almost word for word that of the second version of *Sauvé des eaux*. Only the dénouement is changed. Although Emma has emptied his revolver, Charles has kept a box of cartridges in his pocket; and in the end he commits suicide, realizing that he and Gabrielle are both too complex and too artificial to hope for happiness together and that death is the only escape from this frightful situation.

Although *L'Amour brode* is a decided improvement on *Sauvé des eaux*, it is still far from being a good play. In the first place, it is badly constructed, the transitions in thought are too evident, and the

exposition is much too long. The second act is uninteresting, and the whole play leads up too obviously to the long dialogue of the last act. The dénouement is carefully and logically prepared, and yet not sufficiently so to make it acceptable to an audience. In a novel the story might be made convincing, but no ordinary play could be long enough for this purpose. The style is still hesitant: Charles's speeches are too flowery, and the dialogues of Raphaël and Agnès too naïve. We also find further examples of bad taste which are out of place in such a play. For example, Emma, who is described as a "femme de 42 ans, qui garde de beaux restes," tells Gabrielle that when she was thirty years of age, she had an affair with an officer:

EMMA: J'avais l'âge où l'on dit d'une fille à marier: Elle est tout à fait à point ... Cela signifie: trop vieille pour être épousée, mais très désirable encore.

GABRIELLE: Fruit trop mûr pour le fruitier, qu'on croque sous l'arbre avec délices.

EMMA: Tu y es.

GABRIELLE: Ah! ma pauvre Emma! ... Tu t'es laissée croquer sous l'arbre. Par qui?²⁰

Such dialogue seems more suitable for the early *Sauvé des eaux* than for a supposedly serious play.

It is interesting to note in passing that, in spite of the inelegance of her speech, Gabrielle bears a curious resemblance to Ibsen's *Hedda Gabler*. Is it possible that after writing the first version of his play, Curel read or saw Ibsen's masterpiece and modeled his heroine on the neurotic *Hedda*? *Hedda Gabler* was written in 1890, and it was first acted in Paris in 1891. Although it was poorly interpreted at this time, Curel may, nevertheless, have been impressed with it; or he may have seen it in Germany or Austria during one of his trips to these countries. Curel himself denies that he was influenced by Ibsen, and

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 27-28.

many critics have upheld him in this statement, whereas others have exaggerated his subservience to the Norwegian master; but it seems at least likely that in this particular case he did owe something to Ibsen.

Both Hedda and Gabrielle have been on friendly terms with a young man before marrying another. Each wishes to continue this intimacy after marriage, but neither Eilert Lövborg nor Charles Méran is willing to consent to such an arrangement. Disillusioned by marriage, each young woman regains her influence over the man in question and finally drives him to suicide, each exhibiting what has been called a "cruel dilettantism"²¹ in her love affair. True, Gabrielle is a widow and has therefore the right to recall her former sweetheart; but she does not have the psychological justification for her conduct which Ibsen shows Hedda to have. The latter's neurosis is comprehensible; but Gabrielle has no such excuses, and her perversity is for this reason all the more revolting. This similarity between the two plays is interesting, for Curel seldom drew from the work of other authors. More often he was inspired by contemporary incidents and trends, as in the cases of *La nouvelle idole* and *Le Repas du lion*.

L'Amour brode was accepted by the Comédie-Française, for reasons decidedly unfair to the author. This theater had been criticized for presenting trite and unimportant works while the Théâtre-Libre was giving new and original plays of great significance. The directors had no illusions as to the value of *L'Amour brode* but thought that it might silence the critics for a time at least. Unfortunately, however, the play was a conspicuous failure and was withdrawn after three per-

formances. Even the most favorable critics found little to praise in it, and for the moment Curel was completely discouraged.

In the years following the production of *L'Amour brode*, Curel achieved his greatest succès d'estime with *Le Repas du lion* in 1897, *La nouvelle idole* in 1899, and *La Fille sauvage* in 1902; but *Le Coup d'aile*, which is, in fact, one of his poorest plays, met with definite failure in 1906; and, depressed by the lack of interest which his audiences showed very plainly, Curel withdrew temporarily from the theater. He did not cease writing, however, and the subject of *L'Amour brode* continued to attract him, although he realized that the play must be radically changed to achieve any success. In 1903, 1907, and 1909 he made some attempt at correcting it, but it was not until the summer of 1913 that he set seriously to work.

Having gone one evening to the Casino de Paris, he saw a sketch, which, though apparently new at this time, has since become ordinary enough. Two actresses, made up to look exactly alike, faced each other on either side of a frame. Each performed an identical dance, giving the illusion of one woman dancing in front of a mirror. This sketch gave Curel the symbol of *la danse devant le miroir*, which is the point of departure of the new play. This symbol is introduced by the *confidente*, who says:

Devant celui qu'on aime, on contemple son propre idéal qu'un être, jaloux de vous plaire, vous offre plus ou moins bien imité. ... Lorsque l'accord de deux amants est parfait, chacun d'eux se voit dans un miroir, se prend pour l'autre et se contemple avec ivresse, sans s'apercevoir qu'il est seul! ...²²

In composing *La Danse devant le miroir*, Curel retained the original plot of *L'Amour brode* but re-wrote the play entirely, modernizing it completely. Ra-

²¹ Carl A. Swanson, "Ibsen and the French drama" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Romance Languages and Literatures, University of Chicago, 1930), p. 118.

²² *Théâtre complet*, I, 153.

phaël and Agnès finally disappear, and the reader's attention is concentrated on three characters, who might very well be called simply *Elle*, *Lui*, and *La Confidente*. The heroine of *L'Amour brode*, Gabrielle de Guimont, now becomes Régine; in the same way, Charles Méran is transformed into Paul Bréan, and Cousin Emma into Louise, a poor relative of Régine. Their personalities, however, remain much the same.

The action takes place in Paris in 1913. Régine, a wealthy young orphan, chaperoned by her cousin Louise, is in love with Paul Bréan, who seems to be fond of her but will not declare himself. Régine, having finally decided to take the matter into her own hands, visits him in his rooms; but upon her arrival she finds him with a young woman of dubious reputation. After passing the night in tears, she confides the story to Louise, who informs her that Bréan has just thrown himself into the Seine but has fortunately been rescued. (It is to be noted that the hero is once again "sauvé des eaux"; also that the heroine, a widow in *L'Amour brode*, now returns to her original unmarried status. Times had changed between 1893 and 1913, and Curel apparently considered that his heroine's conduct would no longer seem implausible in a *jeune fille*.) Just as Régine learns this shocking news from Louise, Paul himself is announced. He tells Régine that he loves her, but since he has no money he cannot marry her. This is the reason for his attempted suicide.

Régine is determined to marry Bréan and asks him if he would consent in order to save her from scandal. This is apparently an idle remark, but Paul suspects at once that she is indeed dishonored, and he takes his departure abruptly. Régine is completely bewildered by this behavior, but Louise has no difficulty in guessing the reason for Paul's anger. Régine is so indignant at this idea that she decides to

test Bréan by telling him that what he suspects is true.

The principal change in the play is thus the method of introducing the heroine's cruel deception. In *Sauvé des eaux*, she coldly experiments on a man with whom she is barely acquainted; in *L'Amour brode*, a misunderstanding on the part of her aunt and uncle gives her the idea for her test; but in this final version, the fault rests with the hero, who is ready to doubt the virtue of the woman he is supposed to love. Régine's anger is perfectly comprehensible; and, if her subsequent conduct seems extravagant, there is, nevertheless, some excuse for her.

The action of the rest of the play is approximately that of *L'Amour brode*. However, the new version was entirely rewritten, and there is no question of its superiority. Useless scenes are omitted, and the construction of the play is greatly improved. The insipid or bombastic dialogue of *L'Amour brode* also disappears, and the author finally succeeds in making the predicament of his hero and heroine genuinely moving. When Paul enters Régine's room after their marriage and begs her to kiss him, he can hardly fail to notice her scorn, and he bursts out:

Vous me prenez pour un souteneur! ...
Vous avez mis sur moi une tache ineffaçable, et, quand je vous ai demandé un baiser, ce n'était pas dans l'espoir d'obtenir une caresse, mais pour faire éclater votre mépris ... et aussi pour autre chose, Régine ... c'était pour vous témoigner le mien. Oui, ce n'est pas impunément qu'une jeune fille porte un masque de honte. ... Vous resterez toujours à mes yeux la fille coupable que vous avez trop bien incarnée.²³

And Régine, wild with rage, replies (with some justification, we must admit): "Qui m'y a forcée? ... Vous! ... Vous dont le cœur de débauché n'a pas su comprendre mon cœur de vierge et qui avez apporté sous mon toit vos imaginaires

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 192-93.

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perverse...²⁴ But these recriminations cannot go on, and Régine falls into her husband's arms. Paul, however, knows all too well that this happiness is ephemeral and that their quarrels will never cease. The final dialogue, ending with Bréan's suicide, is surprisingly artificial; but Curel may well have considered it consistent with the personalities of his characters:

PAUL: Tes yeux ... plus près ... encore plus près! ... que j'y contemple le héros de ton cœur! ...

RÉGINE: Décidément, toi aussi, tu es pour le miroir! ...

PAUL: J'y suis superbe! ... O cher et capricieux miroir! ...

RÉGINE: Surtout n'aie pas la tentation de le briser sur ta belle image, comme on brise le verre où a bu le roi! ...

PAUL: Non, pas le miroir! ... Qu'il conserve ma belle image!²⁵

The unhappy situation implicit in this play might perhaps seem more real and terrible were the leading characters less neurotic and unsympathetic; but, nevertheless, there is genuine tragedy in this somber story of two "précieux pervertis" (as Henry Gaillard de Champis called them)²⁶ whose tortuous mental processes make each inaccessible to the other. Louise, the *raisonneur*, describes them accurately in these words:

Enfants trompeurs et sincères, tous deux vous déclamez des rôles. ... Mais d'où vient qu'à tout bout de champ vous vous évadez du programme? ... Quel personnage invisible traverse la scène et vous fournit des répliques si belles que, si vous avez l'audace de les prendre, le reste de la pièce ne paraît plus qu'une farce grossière. ... Oui, décidément, deux comédiens, mais avec un mystérieux associé. ... Votre amour, un vaudeville avec l'idéal pour souffle!²⁷

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 193.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 196-97.

²⁶ "Le Théâtre de M. François de Curel," *Revue des deux mondes*, XLV (June 1, 1918), 597.

²⁷ *Théâtre complet*, I, 139-40.

La Danse devant le miroir was first acted under somewhat unfortunate circumstances. Since Curel was convinced that it should be considered as an entirely new work, no mention was made of its connection with *L'Amour brode*; but many persons in the first audience, prepared by a malicious hint in a newspaper article,²⁸ recognized the plot at once, and, thinking that they had been deceived, they received the play in a more or less hostile manner. However, since Régine was played by Mme Simone, who had a considerable following, *La Danse* was not a failure and ran for some time after opening at the Nouvel-Ambigu on January 17, 1914. As the author himself remarks in his preface: "Eh bien, *l'Amour brode* a eu trois représentations, *la Danse* en a eu cinquante-cinq. ... Il y a tout de même progrès! ..."²⁹

As we have already seen, the number of performances is by no means the only evidence of progress in the evolution of this play. One who is only superficially familiar with its history might be inclined to dismiss *La Danse devant le miroir* as a trivial work, since it is, after all, only a re-working of an earlier failure. Yet it is for this very reason that *La Danse* should seem all the more remarkable. A brief synopsis can, of course, convey no adequate idea of such a drama, but the reader can scarcely fail to find it interesting and even pathetic. It is perhaps too subtle a play to find favor with an ordinary audience; but, in spite of this, it must be ranked high among Curel's works, because of its striking psychological analyses of character and excellent exposition of a difficult theme.

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

²⁸ Léopold Lacour, "François de Curel," *Le Figaro*, January 14, 1914.

²⁹ *Théâtre complet*, I, 83.

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Anglo-Saxon minor poems. Edited by E. V. K. DOBBIE. ("Anglo-Saxon poetic records," Vol. VI.) New York: Columbia University Press, 1942. Pp. clxxx+220.

Several well-known poems in this collection have been minutely re-edited in the last ten years: *Waldere*, for example, by Norman in 1933, the Finnsburgh fragment by Klaeber in 1936, *Maldon* by Gordon in 1937, *Brunanburh* by Campbell in 1938, and *Solomon and Saturn* by Menner in 1941. At no time have the editors of the "Anglo-Saxon poetic records" sought to displace publications of so specialized a character; indeed, for the most exhaustive study of *Caedmon's Hymn* and *Bede's Death song* we must still consult Dobbie's own monograph of 1937. Nevertheless, the student of these poems, some of them admittedly major, will find the present anthology adequate for all but the severest needs. Many less favored poems, on the other hand, infrequently and not too well edited in the past, come together here in newly certified texts, with accessory materials unsurpassed elsewhere. Among them are the pieces that Grein called *Hymns*, various other bits of didactic verse, the *Charms*, and a number of lesser items that became prominent after the completion of the *Bibliothek der angelsächsischen Poesie*. As a final guaranty that the volume will be indispensable—its usefulness being patent at every turn—the contents include also a poem but lately discovered, *The seasons for fasting*, never before published in full.

The texts are derived "from seventy-two manuscripts and several other sources," almost all of them examined at first hand. No one will be surprised at the attention and respect given to the original documents, but we might have expected to find more of the editor's own observations among the details compiled from catalogues and paleographical treatises. The new collations have yielded a dozen hitherto unrecorded readings and, for dozens of other

passages where the former reports were conflicting, decisions that affirm or deny. As in other volumes of the series, the text is improved; but the improvements are usually of the kind that occurred to Kemble, Thorpe, or Grein, readings that an editor would be likely to advocate in his line-notes even if he printed a diplomatic text. For many emendations, however, though they may often be obvious enough, no authority is cited, so that the history of these texts, as of all the "Records," is but partially clear; it would hardly be fair to ask an editor to burden his exegetical notes with this information, yet many scholars may feel, as I do, that the poems are not accompanied by enough erudition at the bottom of the page. For all that, the manuscript readings seem to fare better here than in most re-editions of Old English poetry, the passages which Dobbie emends independently being less numerous than those in which all emendations, traditional or tentative, have been discarded.

With so many short poems to be surveyed, the introduction, though abbreviated with skill, has inevitably run to length. Taking for granted much less than his predecessor did in *The Junius manuscript*, Dobbie has produced something more fully suitable as a graduate-school textbook. Not unexpectedly, then, the scholarship is cumulative and eclectic; in search of new ideas, however, the expert can turn to the discussion of *Thureth*, for instance, where the term *halgungboc* is interpreted in a fresh and convincing way. The bibliographies in the "Records" have been consistently good, and now again one admires the thoroughness of the listing, especially the notice given to editions from the eighteenth century and the early nineteenth. Since these lists, for some of the poems the best we possess, will often be consulted for themselves alone, the compression within the large sections may be unduly a hindrance; individual entries would thus be more serviceable for each of the

Chronicle poems and the *Charms*. For the rest, the philological apparatus (the notes, as usual, are appropriate and cogent) calls for a few remarks in detail:

Brunanburh 12–13: the retention of *dænnede* (Dobbie accepts the corrector's 'n', but cf. *Brunanburh* in l. 5) and the rejection of *secgas huate* (cf. *eorlas arhwate*, l. 73) is a half-measure; unless we explain *dænnede* itself, Ashdown's treatment of the A text will have to do. *Coronation of Edgar* 13: *þa agan*, MS A, looks like a mistake for *þa gen*, an equivalent, perhaps dialectal, of *þa get*, MSS B and C. *Rune poem*: for "destroyed," p. xlvi, read "almost entirely destroyed"; in the notes, p. 153, it is unnecessary to star 'Wulfilan' *faihu*, and OIC. *irr* 'ox' should be mentioned in connection with OE *ur*. *Death of Alfred*: the first five lines are certainly alliterative and deserve a printing as verse; the writer began with an unsuccessful attempt at the old measure, then shifted to rhyme. *Durham* 18: *in in* as a spelling of *in on* is without parallel; perhaps we should read *inne in*, cf. *Mood* 17, or *in innan*, cf. *Solomon* 33. *Maxims II* 24: although Plummer printed *mégan*, Dobbie (p. cxii) does not list an accent here, and the note (p. 175) on the emendation to *mengan* does not remove my doubts about the MS reading. *Lord's Prayer II* 1–47*: there is a facsimile of these lines in Ångström, *Studies in Old English MSS* (Uppsala, 1937), Pl. 5. *Creed* 8: Dobbie inverts the MS *ða þu*, but *ða* may be an uncorrected miswriting of *þu*; moreover, *manega* can be kept, in view of the correspondingly ambiguous *sawla manega*, l. 31. *Thurelh*: on the name, see A. J. Robertson, *Anglo-Saxon charters* (Cambridge, 1939), pp. 368, 410, 421. *Epilogue to the Pastoral care* (see the introduction, p. cxii): Sweet himself (cf. his edition, p. 473), and not Holthausen, first noticed the metrical character of this piece. *Franks casket* and *Ruthwell cross*: both inscriptions were transliterated entire by Bruce Dickens, *Leeds studies in English*, I (1932), 17–19. *Charms II* 18, 31, 36, 45: apparently following the MS, Cockayne prints a cross before each of these lines; such indices may be directive in our analysis of the poem and, if there, should not be suppressed. *Charms II* 24, 34, and *III* 9: *geandade(st)* must be connected somehow with OE *andettan*, for a translation "promised, swore," fits each of the passages. *Charms IV* 13–14: for an emendation more convincing than Rieger's, see Kemp Malone, *ELH*, VIII (1941), 75, n. 3. *Charms IX*: begin the verse three lines

earlier; the passage corresponds to ll. 18–19. *Charms XI* 30: *Serafhin* is not the plural *Serafhim*; it is equivalent rather to *Serafion* (the Athanasian bishop), *Charms III* 4.

During the last two decades, research on the *Charms* has made genuine progress, yet they remain vexatiously difficult. Dobbie's approach, literary rather than anthropological, hardly carries beyond the fringe of the main problem, the obscurity of the magic and ritual. Desirable would be fuller references to the prose corpus of the Old English pseudo-medical recipes and to an index of relevant motifs; concerning *Wið ymbe* (*Charm VIII*), for instance, we wish more outside material than the *Lorsch Biennensegen*. But these are precisely the fields where existing research satisfies least—there is no such index—and one can only hope that this textually sound, otherwise well-equipped re-edition of the *Charms* will help to stimulate the needed inquiry.

The new poem, "an exhortation to fasting, especially on Ember days and during Lent," is a fragment of two hundred and thirty lines taken from Laurence Nowell's copy of MS Cotton Otho B xi. As a document in church history, its importance, though uncertain, is perhaps not very great—less than, at any rate, the *Menologium*, with which it invites immediate comparison. Although as a poem it lacks vigor save at the end, an almost regular division into eight-line stanzas makes it formally unique in the literature of the period. Offhand, the language, too, seems uneventful—it is the usual West Saxon of the tenth century—but the vocabulary contains several things to interest the lexicographer.¹ Without laying claim to the "further ingenuity" which the editor hopes will be expended upon the text, I would offer these notes in comment:

Line 20: for *þreoring* in Nowell's transcript an emendation to *dreorig* would seem better than Dobbie's *þrealic*. Line 23*: another solution would be *gedemdon [to deaðe]*; cf. *Elene* 500. Line 40: the deletion of *do* spoils the alliteration; read *dogeara gerim* and compare either *Menologium* 96 or *Beowulf* 2728. Line 57^b: read perhaps *þe*

¹ Nine words occur in this poem only, and twenty-six are found elsewhere only in the Old English prose.

[hie] *gelæs[t]en hafað*, taking *þe* as instrumental and parallel to *lofe*. Line 85: should not the comma follow *wat* instead of *het*? Line 87: read *supancymene* as a compound (adj. or noun). Line 124: omit *se* as an uncorrected mis-writing of the following *st-*; cf. *Charms IX* 12. Line 194: for *ligege[n] to fæste* cf. *ligeð lornnum fæst*, *Christ and Satan* 266. Lines 222-23: read *wigliað* as the earliest occurrence of English "wiggle," here meaning "zögern, zweifeln" (cf. Holthausen, *Altengl. etym. Wörterbuch*, s.v. "wiclian"), and keep *hwærne* (cf. *Andreas* 136), translating, "and dally not when they eat" (litotes).

Noteworthy would be any addition to the stock of Old English verse, and this *editio princeps* is distinguished by the resourceful inventiveness with which Professor Dobbie has matched the conservatism seen throughout his work. Patrons of the "Records" series, who may wish incidentally to congratulate the Columbia University Press on the quality of its printing,² will await with eagerness and confidence the volume devoted to the great *Beowulf* manuscript.

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The origin of the Grail legend. By ARTHUR C. L. BROWN. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1943. Pp. 476.

This is an important book and should be consulted by all students of medieval literature. The title is slightly misleading, since the subject is the body of Arthurian fairyland tradition and by no means the Grail legend alone or inclusively. Here the reader will find a thoroughgoing analysis and classification of Irish texts, which, according to the author, inspired writers in England and Europe, especially Chrétien de Troyes and Wolfram von Eschenbach. The jacket sets forth the theme of the book in the dramatic phrase: "Mr. Brown has proved that the Grail . . . was a heathen talisman in an Irish fairy palace," which is sure to jolt the reader's attention.

² In the footnotes are a few misprints: for *Parallel*, p. ix, n. 3, read *Parallel*; for *cyath*, p. 66 n., read *cyað*; for *beheadl*, p. 84 n., read *beheald*; and for *encreatea*, p. 194, l. 25, read *enratea*.

Let us consider, first, the basis of that claim and then pass on to the broader aspects of the author's theory. *Graal* is an OF word, the medieval Latin form of which was *gradalis*, attested as early as A.D. 1010. Brown, who refers to the French word as "mysterious" (p. 439), does not mention *gradalis* but would derive *graal* from Irish *criol*, 'basket' or 'casket' (cf. *Loch Erne*, the "comb and caskets" of Queen Medb), which he compares to the "basket of fruit" of Demeter in Greek myth. He says:

It is not necessary to suppose that *criol* ever became a Welsh or Breton word. It may always have remained an Irish word, but even so it would in Welsh or Breton, in many positions, be spelled *criol* and might pass into French as *graal* [p. 439].

To a linguist all this sounds a little perplexing. Is the reader to conclude that Chrétien had access to Irish and could read it? Or did the unsupported Breton **griol* become contaminated with ML *gradalis* and result in *greal*, *graal*, *grail*? In studying Romance words the wise principle always is to decompose them into their essential parts and then consider the stem. The *-al* of *graal* is L. *-alis* (cf. *natalis*), and the stem is best explained as *crāt-*, found in L. *crater*, 'bowl' or 'mixing vessel,' thus corresponding to Chrétien's use of the word as 'dish.' Even the *Peredur*, which nobody would claim was uninfluenced by Chrétien's *Conte del graal*, retains this meaning in its use of W. *dyscyl* (see *Perlesvaus*, II, 176). Incidentally, "the first appearance of the word" is hardly "in *Perceval*, vss. 3220-21," but in the *Alexandre* (MS B¹), vss. 617-18.

At the same time, I think Brown is right in stressing that the concept, if not the actual word, is Celtic. The reasons for this are numerous and have often been listed, though I miss in the present study any reference to the author's excellent article on "Celtic cauldrons of plenty" in the *Kirtledge papers*. Foremost among these reasons is the identity, at least functionally, of the Fisher King (Roi Pescheor or Riche Pescheor) with the Irish *Nuadu* (gen.

¹ The usual date given for the ten-syllable *Alexandre* is 1160. But, as Dr. Foulet of Princeton informs me, this date must be advanced to 1170-80. This would still place it earlier than the *Perceval*.

Nuatha), the Welsh *Nutt* or, in its Latinized form, *Nodons*—though it is well to consider that phonetically *Nutt* survives in OF as *Nu(t)*, a name that has no discoverable connection with Chrétien's Roi Pescheor. The basic data on *Nuadu* are these (see *Romanic review*, XXXIII [1942], 97–104): *Nuadu*, Gothic *nuta* (pl. *nulans*), is a NA- or NAV- stem, occurring also in L. *navis*, *naua* (*navita*), OF *notoniers*, Eng. *net*; it means 'wet' or 'swim.' *Nuta* is employed by Ulfila to translate Greek *ἀλιεύς*, 'fisher,' which itself is a SAL- stem found in L. *sal* (*salis*), Eng. *salt*. Chrétien's Roi Pescheor, therefore, is probably a translation of the Celtic term, which, it seems likely, he had heard in a Welsh or Breton form. He was in contact with Breton *conteurs* (cf. Wace), and his knowledge of Celtic legend came from them, except, of course, when it was taken from Geoffrey of Monmouth or Wace.

By the same token, the Grail—which in Chrétien is partly Christianized—must ultimately go back to the Dagda's Cauldron or its Welsh or Breton equivalent. Brown (p. 145) shows that *Nuadu Argetlám* ('silver arm'), after being wounded, wore a silver arm and ruled over the Tuatha Dé (fairies). The character of the Fisher King, his Otherworld setting, his symbolic function (mirrored by Brown), would lead one to expect a food-giving vessel like the *graal*, not Christian in origin but a hypostasis for a magic, pagan talisman.

As to the setting, Brown accepts my hypothesis (with modifications) that the Grail Palace with its central firedogs (*cheminal*, another -alis form) reflects a primitive Celtic scenario. He says: "The Irish were accustomed to identify fairyland with Ireland and the fairy castle with the banqueting hall at Tara" (p. 369), and "Wolfram's three fires in the center of the Grail hall are like the three fire-places in the hall at Tara" (p. 196). But Brown gives to all these analogues a much more literal interpretation than I should. With all my admiration for his scholarship, I question his theory of literary composition and transmission. It is essentially the old positivist method: the mechanical classification of similar traits into rigid groups and the further assumption that somehow these traits were transmitted,

more or less unchanged, through literary channels. To what extent this was true in Ireland I leave to Gaelic experts to judge, since that is beyond my ken. But Chrétien is a French author, with ideas and methods of his own, and the *Conte del graal* should be viewed primarily as a French (twelfth-century) composition, not an Irish one.² Brown is aware of this objection, or he would not say:

Nobody supposes that Chrétien borrowed from any Irish story that now exists, nor even that he borrowed from any Irish story at all; the utmost that can be imagined is that his sources were Welsh or Breton adaptations of Irish originals, and in all probability his immediate sources were French retellings of these Welsh or Breton adaptations [p. 11].

Yet on page 119 he asserts:

In Count Philip's book, which Chrétien . . . declares was his source, the stories which we call Y, Z, and AA were evidently told one after another.

And on page 25 we learn that Y, Z, and AA were among the "motives" (motifs) that occur in the Irish *Serglige*. So that, putting these scattered details together, the reader must assume (a) the Irish *Serglige*, (b) an unknown Welsh or Breton copy, (c) the *livre* attributed to Philip of Alsace, (d) Chrétien.

Again, page 174 tells us:

Besides Chrétien's *Perceval* Wolfram used minstrel versions and perhaps the so-called *Ur-Perceval*. The hypothesis is that Wolfram preserves to some extent a tradition that was independent of Chrétien

—a passage, tentative as it seems, which on page 175 becomes a certainty:

Wolfram must have had access to an *Ur-Perceval* (i.e., to Chrétien's source or something like it). He had Irish material that did not reach him through Chrétien.

I fear this type of argument will not strengthen the Celtic hypothesis, to which, in the main, I hold.

² On p. 54 it is said categorically: "That Chrétien had some connection with Irish literary tradition, as represented by *Tochmarc Emire*, seems indicated by his echoing certain of the Irish descriptive names." But the fact, mentioned above, that *Nuadu* is the same "character" (p. 454) as the Roi Pescheor does not prove that the latter name was derived directly from the other.

The difficulties in the way of Brown's theory are two: (1) the vague nature of the Welsh or Breton "adaptations of Irish originals" and (2) the gratuitous assumption that the very Christian Philip of Alsace gave Chrétien what was virtually a book of Irish, pagan stories, for that must be the interpretation which Brown places upon the "so-called *Ur-Perceval*." I therefore wonder whether this line of filiation can be correct. And I wonder whether Brown is not confusing an "analogue" with a "source." The Gaels and the Brythons (Welsh, Cornish, and Bretons) must have had a common fund of story material, particularly as regards the fairy world or *sidhe*. That there was some interchange of legend and saga between peoples so closely related is obvious, but that it was a matter of direct "literary" transmission in the manner indicated, I doubt. The uncertain lights and mists of Ireland—that "dim, green, and well-beloved isle"—tended to preserve the belief in the fairy Otherworld, but that they alone created it I am not ready to believe. As in the case of Wace, Chrétien must have had access to Breton stories and probably also to some Welsh ones. These contained motifs shared by the Celts—hence they recur in Irish saga in a learned, less popular form. It was the former that the French poet adapted to the Christian *courtois* and clerical world of his time.

On the solider qualities of the book, however, there can be no question. The entire basic section dealing with Irish texts, proper names (their correct spelling), and story motifs is a mine of information for future students. Especially good are the chapters on the "Hateful *fée*" (vii) and the "Boyhood exploits" (viii), the latter being one of the author's life-long interests. Doubtless the most useful chapter is that (ii) on the Irish and Welsh "Journeys to fairyland" because of its completeness. Here Brown reassures the reader: "Not one of the following stories is a folk tale." Granted that the ancient Irish were a learned people "who did not record a folk tale unless it happened to enshrine some topographical or genealogical lore, or unless it was made over into saga"—nevertheless, folk beliefs and superstitions must have been the basis of the

Otherworld concept; and it is hard to believe (p. 15) that *Aeneid vi* (with its two castles under the rule of Pluto) resulted, on the one hand, in the Irish *dún* of the giants and the French Dolorous Tower and, on the other, in the Irish Mag Mell and the French Castle of Maidens. Again (p. 28) we read:

The following pages tend to show that the Fisher King and Arthur are parallel figures, both are hypostases of Nuadu. Modred, who wounds Arthur, is like the Irish Fomorian, More, grandson of Lot.

That the historical Artorius, like the historical Alexander and Roland, acquired traits taken from local folklore (and even saga) it would be folly to doubt; see Roger S. Loomis, "King Arthur and the antipodes," *MP*, XXXVIII (1941), 289–304, for a convincing example. But that King Arthur, as he appears in Geoffrey and Chrétien, was virtually the product of such borrowing and that the pseudo-historical Camlan is a mere replica of the Irish Moytura (p. 311) is incredible (see *MLN*, LVIII [1943], 7 ff.).

In his devotion to the Irish, Brown exaggerates; to a complex and perplexing mass of tradition he applies the *esprit simpliste*; his conclusions, interesting and suggestive as they are, often fail to convince. Above all, he appears to forget that Continental writers like Wace (whose influence on Chrétien he misses), Marie de France, Chrétien, and Wauchier were dealing with a spoken tradition³ rather than with literary models, none of which the Celtic advocates are able to prove that the French had had before them. Hence Laudine in the *Yvain* has a kinship with LiBan or Fand of the *Serglige*; actually she is

cele qui prist
Celui qui son seignor ocist

—a folklore motif, exemplified by the Arician Diana story; *Imâne von der Beâfontâne* (Wolfram) is her counterpart, the equivalent of the *Imona* of the Poitou tablet. Beli, as Loomis has shown, can be equated with Pwyll—the same person as Pellés, *roi de la basse gent*, of the *Perlesvaus*, Geoffrey's Pellitus, Wace's Pelliz,

³ See Loomis, p. 304: "It was fundamentally a Celtic tradition and a lay tradition, transmitted by word of mouth by professional story-tellers."

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Eng. 'peller.' His association with Annwn comes under the head of "topographical lore" (p. 38) (see *MLN*, LVIII [1943], 4). Finally the Ama-n-gon of the so-called *Elucidation*, whom Brown identifies with the Amargen⁴ of the *Loch Erne* (the Amaug-u-ins of *Erec*, vs. 318) illustrates, I think, the same principle. He is a destructive agent, like the "red riders" in the *Togail Bruidne Da Derga*. He attacks the maidens of the "wells" or fountain (vegetation motif). He is a folklore character of wide distribution. Why should "Latin historians" (p. 428) be held responsible for "the spelling of his name"? The significant point is that he is Celtic in function and in name, which seems to me to be based on the root MAC- or MAG-, 'big', found in Greek μέγας, cf. μακρός, L. *magnus* and *mactus*, Germ. *macht*—hence Mag-alos or -ilo-s, Magan, Margon, Maragon, Ama-n-gon, Amargon, Aumagwin, Maaglant, etc., applied to "giant" personages.

Thus, my disagreement with Brown is a matter of interpretation and story transmission. I also attribute more originality than he does to Chrétien in all his works from *Erec* to *Conte del graal*. I am impressed with the complexity of Arthurian origins.⁵ But Brown's is a

⁴ But, in discussing the Amargen of Irish saga (p. 381), it is said that in *LG* (*Lebor Gabála*) the pseudo-historians "obliterated the incidents of Journey to Fairyland and omitted the fairy talismans because they could not pass them off as historical." Yet the theory of Brown, as stated on p. 454, is that the "ancient Irish gods survive today as fairies." This raises the whole question of the true relationship of "gods" and "fairies" so called. See Hartland, *Science of fairy tales*, esp. pp. 336-37; this needs to be followed up by such other studies as W. W. Baudissin, *Adonis und Eosmün*; Douglas Hyde, *Beside the fire* (a collection of Irish Gaelic folk stories); etc.

⁵ P. 6: Oriental folklore, Brown thinks, has not yielded "convincing parallels." But he fails to mention the "Tale of the ensorcelled prince," known as "King of the Black Islands," from the *Arabian nights* (Burton, I, 62 ff.); cf. the deserted mountains and the tarn, the white, red, blue, and yellow fish, the empty palace, the nature of the prince's enchantment ("lower half of stone"), the woman who has enchanted him, etc., and see my article, mentioned by Brown, in *Studies in honor of A. Marshall Elliott*, I, 19-51.

P. 21 and 119: Passing reference is made to the matriarchy motif (the Sister's Son). Brown holds that Chrétien "must have introduced the notion that Perceval's leaving his mother was a sin which caused his failure at the Grail castle." In leaving his mother Perceval broke a taboo (*a geis*); that strikes me as an obvious folklore motif (see *MP*, IX [1912], 291-322).

P. 30: Reference is made to the parallel "between

first-class treatise—the product of toilsome research and great devotion. It ranks with Birch-Hirschfeld and Heinzel as an indispensable aid in the study of the Grail romances. It serves as a basis for any thorough appraisal of Arthurian legend. It opens the door to further investigation in this fascinating field.

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A bibliography of British history (1700-1715), with special reference to the reign of Queen Anne. By WILLIAM THOMAS MORGAN and CHLOE SINER MORGAN. Vols. IV and V. Bloomington, Ind. [Indiana University], 1941, 1942. Pp. xi+381; xiv+487.

With the publication of these volumes, Mr. and Mrs. Morgan bring to a successful conclusion their ambitious project, undertaken many years ago, of recording the literary production of Great Britain during the first sixteen years of the eighteenth century. Their work has been designed "to serve two masters, the historian and the scholar in the field of English literature" (V, v), and it is already taking its place as a fundamental guide for the specialist in the history and literature of Queen Anne's reign. Its immense utility can be appreciated only by those who have worked in the enormous output of pamphlets and ephem-

the wounded Nuadu and a wounded god in other mythologies." This might have been elaborated into a chapter (see again my article in *Rom. rev.*, Vol. XXXIII). The parallel is rather between the Fisher King (note the nature of his wound: *parmi les hanches anbedeus*, and the description in Wolfram and the *Sone de Nansay*) and the oriental cults.

P. 124: The expression *forest soutaine* means 'solitary forest,' not 'under the earth' (*souterraine*).

P. 339, Brown argues that the Cronos guarded in his sleep by Briareus, according to Plutarch, is the Fisher King. I agree with Chambers that he is identical with the Gallic *Cernunnos*. But in Chrétien the similarity is with the father of the Fisher King, with him whom the *oiste* in the Grail sustains. Under another form he recurs in the *Perlesvaus* as the knight lying in the *tonel*. He is one of the "people [who] do not speak" (pp. 128 and 255), but this trait does not signify that he belongs to the Land of the Dead—it probably indicates the contrary (cf. *Rom. rev.*, XXXIII, 97-104).

P. 9: "expensive manuscripts" is only too true; but it must be a slip for "extensive manuscripts"—the only slip I have found in this well-edited book.

eral literature of the period. Praise must be given not only to the compilers, who have worked untiringly at their task (they refer feelingly to the "long years of drudgery and sacrifice" devoted to the project), but also to Indiana University in making possible the publication of these five large volumes. It is unfortunate that a work which required so much labor and upon which such great expense has evidently been lavished should not have been published in a larger and more accessible edition. The volumes are expensive, and Volume I is already out of print.

Volume IV is entirely taken up with listing and indexing unpublished manuscripts of the period. The term "unpublished" is apparently used here with some latitude, and the indexing sometimes duplicates otherwise accessible indexes, e.g., the catalogue of the manuscripts in the British Museum. Some of the descriptions here are fuller, however, than in the official catalogues, and in any case the student will welcome within the covers of one volume a guide to the unpublished material dealing with this period. This volume contains a separate index, with a number of entries under the names of Addison, Newton, Prior, Steele, and Swift, which will attract the attention of the student of literature.

Volume V contains supplementary material to the first three volumes and a reference list of "important ministers of state" and bishops, but most of the volume is taken up with a comprehensive index to Volumes I-III and to the supplementary matter in Volume V. This is not merely a listing of names and titles but a subject index as well—one of the most serviceable now in print. "Biographies" alone occupies over seven closely printed columns; and under such headings as "Ballads," "Clubs," "Correspondence," "Diaries," "Gardens," "Memoirs," "Poetry," and "Tunes," the student of literature will be guided to much out-of-the-way material. Of strictly literary figures, Defoe would seem to have the largest number of entries; and there are many references under such names as Swift, Addison, Steele, Congreve, and Pope.

The utility of such an index is to be measured by the ease with which references can be

gathered. Berkeley's *Essay towards a new theory of vision* (L33) is properly indexed under "Berkeley," "Essay," and "Vision," so that the reference can be easily found whether one is interested in Berkeley or in the general topic. On the other hand, *A new theory of continu'd fevers* (D78) is indexed under "New," but not under "Fevers," and the same criticism is to be applied to *A new theory of fevers* (E111). A more serious fault is the occasional listing of a title only under its first word. An example here is Samuel Wright's *Of praying for the King* (Q752), which is indexed under "Of," rather than under "Praying" or "King"; similarly *On the passion of our blessed Saviour*, by R.S., Gent. (K357), is listed under "On," and not under "Passion" or "Blessed" or "Saviour." In fact, a good deal of space is wasted in listing such entries, under D, as *De officio eorum, De ordine, De origine mali*. There is also some uncertainty in the indexing of foreign names: La Bruyère and Michael de La Roche one would expect to find under L, but the former is entered as Bruyère under B, and the latter as De la Roche under D.

The student should consequently be warned to exercise some ingenuity in the use of Volume V. The index is a really rich guide to materials, and he should test various places for references. Most of the items relating to Benjamin Hoadly he will find under H, but a few are placed under Bangor, including one not indexed under H. Likewise, the entries for Archbishop Tenison are about evenly distributed under Tenison and Canterbury. The index will reward the student who is willing to use it with care and patience.

DONALD F. BOND

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Johnsonian gleanings, Part VIII: A miscellany; Part IX: A further miscellany. By ALEYN LYELL READE. Privately printed for the author by Percy Lund, Humphries & Co., London, 1937, 1939. Pp. v+216; v+282.

In the preface to Part VII of the *Johnsonian gleanings* Mr. Reade said that he was uncertain whether his next volume would continue the story of Johnson's life after his return to London in 1740 (thus continuing Parts III, V, and

VI) or whether it would be necessary to devote another part to "various fresh matter bearing upon his early life that has cropped up during the progress of the work." Actually he has found it necessary to devote two parts (VIII and IX) to this matter, but with their completion he is at last able to see the final form which this portion of his studies will assume. There will be two more volumes, he tells us. Part X will be a straightforward narrative of Johnson's life down to 1740, a summary for the common reader of his researches up to this time. Part XI will be "a complete Index to the whole ten Parts, as well as to the Johnsonian portion of the parent work, *The Reades of Blackwood Hill and Dr. Johnson's Ancestry*, much fuller than the separate indexes, so as to render every detail of this big collection immediately and easily accessible to the enquirer." "That finished," Mr. Reade quietly adds, "I can proceed to deal with Johnson's life onwards from the time of his final settlement in London in 1740."

The latest additions to the *Johnsonian gleanings* contain more of the general materials of the sort to which the earlier parts, particularly Parts IV and VII, had introduced us. There is further information concerning Francis Barber (whose biography occupies the whole of Part II), Parson Ford, Phoebe Herne, Humphrey Hawkins, and a host of other minor figures who appear for the briefest moments in Johnson's letters or in Boswell's, Hawkins', or Mrs. Piozzi's pages.

Every possible Johnsonian connection is pursued to its utmost tenuity. For example, Johnson's affectionate tribute to Gilbert Walmesley, in the *Life of Edmund Smith*, led Mr. Reade to consult Walmesley's will in the hope of discovering more about him. Among the facts that he discovered in the will and published in one of his earlier volumes was that Walmesley "left a reversionary interest in an annuity of £200 to Philip Pargiter, Esq." In Part IX he is able to tell us that this Philip Pargiter was the son of Philip Pargiter, steward of Lichfield from 1683 to 1699, who made a speech of welcome to James II when he visited the city in 1687, and that that Philip Pargiter was succeeded in his office by William Fetti-

place Nott. William Fettiplace Nott was the husband of Sarah Hammond, the uncle of a hitherto-undisclosed Caroline Nott, and the inheritor, under the will of Richard Pyott, of Streethay, co. Straffs., esq., of a gold-headed cane. Richard Pyott was . . . etc., etc.

The pursuit goes forward as well as backward in time, and we learn such astonishing facts (in an earlier part) as that the grandson of Tetty's great-nephew wrote "Rocked in the cradle of the deep."

It would be most unjust, however, to imply that the *Gleanings* are only dimly related to Johnson, however remote particular items may seem. Mr. Reade's genealogical collections have immeasurable value and are bound to affect all future interpretations of Johnson's life and work. He documents beyond any doubt, for instance, the highly significant fact that Johnson deliberately and consistently disparaged his father's family, sharing and carrying on his mother's resentments. The material that he has gathered concerning Phoebe Ford suggests a reason for Johnson's coolness toward Gibbon that few if any of Johnson's contemporary biographers suspected. The *Gleanings* add substantially to our knowledge of Johnson's charities and benefactions and illuminate a score of other aspects of his character.

Exhaustive as Mr. Reade's searches have been, several problems remain unsolved. A lifetime of inquiry has failed to elucidate the connection between Johnson and John Hollyer of Coventry, though one of Johnson's letters makes it plain that they were related. And what kin was Johnson to the Miss Colliers of Ashburne whose cause he so earnestly championed even in his last sickness? And, above all, was Katherine Skrymsher the sister of Michael Johnson? If she was, as there is good reason to believe she was, then Johnson was connected with Thomas Boothby of Tooley Park, the greatest foxhunter in Leicestershire. But, if so, why didn't he say so? That such a connection was possible and that Johnson remained silent about it has been one of Mr. Reade's major perplexities for thirty-five years.

The squire of Tooley Park, one suspects, has become a symbol as well as a challenge to the author of the *Johnsonian gleanings*, since for

the sheer joy of hunting it is doubtful if all of literary history can show a parallel to these nine remarkable volumes. As one starts to read, one is amused at the detailed thoroughness of it. But this amusement changes to respect as the work's true values are perceived, and then, in time, the author's fever becomes contagious, and the once-supercilious reader finds himself sharing the excitement of the chase until at last he, too, is annoyed with Johnson for having concealed his connection with Thomas Boothby. If Katherine Skrymsher ever breaks cover, Mr. Reade's "View halloo!" will be echoed by a thousand Johnsons.

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BERGEN EVANS

German dramatists of the 19th century. By F. W. KAUFMANN. Los Angeles: Lymanhouse, [1940]. Pp. vi+215.

In this relatively slender volume Mr. Kaufmann has succeeded in presenting a study of the work of no less than eight outstanding nineteenth-century dramatists (Kleist, Grillparzer, Grabbe, Büchner, Hebbel, Ludwig, Wagner, Ibsen), including many of their minor dramas. This great compactness of content proves the work to be a distillation of intense and intelligent labor. Particularly gratifying is the attention paid to Christian Grabbe and Georg Büchner, both of whom have been frequently and undeservedly slighted in run-of-the-mill surveys of the period. On the other hand, it is surprising that Mr. Kaufmann makes no mention of Karl Gutzkow or of Heinrich Laube, especially since his approach, stressing as it does the content rather than the form of the works treated, would naturally lead us to expect a sympathetic treatment of these authors who strove so valiantly to solve their "existential problem" and felt compelled to give dramatic expression to this struggle.

Mr. Kaufmann's approach to his subject is explained in the introduction. It is defined as an "existential" point of view, which was "developed in connection with . . . literary investigations" and was "not based on a pri-

mary acquaintance with existential philosophy," though it did owe its "clarification" to Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* (p. iii). It is this point of view which lends Mr. Kaufmann's work freshness and a striking coherence, marred only by a somewhat forced and irrelevant survey of German philosophy from Kant to Nietzsche (pp. 7-26). Unquestionably, his is a manner of approach to literature which can yield interesting and possibly even lasting interpretations and evaluations. We find this demonstrated, for instance, by Mr. Kaufmann's interpretation of Kleist's *Amphitryon*, in which he points out that to understand this comedy one must view it as an "integral part of the author's whole work and [as an] expression of his fundamental ['existential'] problem, [i.e., of] Kleist's desire . . . to establish an emotional contact with this world and thereby to come to an understanding of its deepest and most vital reality" (p. 34). This fundamental problem of Kleist finds its dramatic expression, according to Mr. Kaufmann, in the character of Jupiter. To be sure, we do find his interpretation already suggested, for instance, by Thomas Mann in the brilliant essay on Kleist's comedy (see *Die Forderung des Tages* [Berlin, 1930], pp. 117-65); to Mr. Kaufmann, however, goes the credit of having stated it with the emphasis and directness it deserves (pp. 33 f.). Another striking instance of Mr. Kaufmann's approach to his subject matter is his analysis of Christian Grabbe. Here Mr. Kaufmann categorically rejects all interpretations which see "in Grabbe's work chiefly the problem of the leader-personality who fails through the stupidity of the masses" (p. 81). He then ably develops his own view, which sees reflected in Grabbe's personality as well as in his dramatic work "the disharmony and consequent reorientation" arising from "the general situation of a time which begins to turn from patriarchal self-sufficiency and the modest pleasures of the smallest sphere to a materialistic and utilitarian mode and aspect of life" (p. 81).

Throughout his work Mr. Kaufmann tends not to view a drama as an organically interdependent totality of content and form but to

single out its psychological and sociological content for very special or even sole consideration. Herein, it seems to me, lies hidden a serious danger. Viewing a work of art primarily as an expression of its author's "confession of the conflict between an inherited mass of pre-formed judgments and conventional attitudes, on the one hand, and the independent reaction against this inherited order, on the other" (p. 2), Mr. Kaufmann appears to be on the point of forsaking literary interpretation proper and of entering upon the fields of sociology and psychoanalysis. Mr. Kaufmann exhibits this dangerous tendency when he maintains that "for literary interpretation . . . a work less perfect esthetically may be more valuable than one of greater perfection, written at a period when the author has reached the solution of his existential problem . . . , and when he writes merely for the sake of writing, instead of from inner compulsion" (p. 6). If this point of view comes to hold general sway—and Mr. Kaufmann's work, by its very merits, certainly helps to strengthen it—literary criticism will be well on its way to become handmaiden to sociology and psychology, and professors and critics of literature had better bestir themselves in time to acquire a thorough knowledge of the concepts, techniques, and terminology of these disciplines—a labor, by the way, in which Mr. Kaufmann has already engaged with some success, to judge from the content and style of his book.

I have found only two errors in the excellently proofread text. On page 65 the quotation "Was er nimmt ist nicht so viel!" should, of course, read "Was er nimmt, es ist so viel!" and on page 109 the title of Büchner's *Lenore und Lena* should be corrected to *Leonce und Lena*.

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The language of Charles Sealsfield: a study in atypical usage. By OTTO HELLER, assisted by THEODORE H. LEON. ("Washington University studies," new series: "Language and literature," No. 11.) St. Louis: Washington University, 1941. Pp. xi+154.

The striking quality of the style of Charles Sealsfield (Karl Postl) has called forth numerous studies, the most recent of which is the monograph by Mr. Heller and Mr. Leon, which appeared from the press only a few days before Mr. Heller's death. Centering their attention on the "philological" aspects of Sealsfield's language rather than on the "contentual" or "esthetic implications of his usage" (p. 10), the authors have attempted, by "dissecting Sealsfield's prose," to "give a full picture of the German language as used by Sealsfield" (pp. 10-11).

Various stylistic features are grouped under three main heads: the "inherent characteristics," those qualities which reflect Sealsfield's "strictly personal relation to the medium in which he works" (p. 19); the characteristics which reflect his linguistic environment, both inherited and acquired through contact with foreign idioms ("linguistic background"); and those characteristics, especially "*Sprachmagerie*," which are the result of deliberate literary intent ("imitative German").

The first heading, the broadest in scope, throws light on fundamental aspects of Sealsfield's style. The nervous, "fidgety" tempo of Sealsfield's prose is related to his preference for verbal prefixes expressing the idea of motion (*ein-, ent-, her-, um-*) and to his use, frequently overuse, of highly charged verbs (*brüllen, gellen, prallen, quirlen, schnappen, zucken*). Apart from his borrowings from other languages, Sealsfield showed little inventiveness in the coinage of new words. His vocabulary range in general was small, since he preferred to work with a limited, although highly seasoned, vocabulary. As a consequence, redundancy and repetition are characteristic not only of the dialogue, where there is a conscious striving to reproduce the repetitiousness of conversational usage, but of the descriptive passages as well. Occasionally, Sealsfield's fondness for repetition leads him to an exaggerated leitmotiv technique. Word pairs of the conventional type, united by rhyme, alliteration, or assonance, are unusually frequent.

The section on "linguistic background," in addition to giving a useful survey of the lin-

guistic evidences of Sealsfield's Austrian background, deals with the French, Spanish, and English [American English] elements in Sealsfield's language. The final section, most specific in scope, deals with the subtler (and also cruder) impact of English on Sealsfield's German, caused by the conscious attempt to give the writings an exotic atmosphere. This *Sprachmengerei*—which, incidentally, makes Sealsfield a frequently quoted author in the *Dictionary of American English*—is analyzed as one of the most distinctive features of Sealsfield's prose.

The authors are well aware of the difficulty of achieving a satisfactory categorization of all the material (p. 11), and there will naturally

be disagreements as to specific classifications. It is not clear, for instance, why "Underlopers (corruption of 'interlopers')" should be listed (p. 111) under "English accurately reproduced" rather than with "Yankee Doddle" or "Tantarum (for 'tantrum')" under "English inaccurately reproduced."

Mr. Heller and Mr. Leon soundly concede that Sealsfield must be excluded "from the company of the great masters of the novel" (p. 15) and are as ready with rejection as with praise in evaluating the many individual phases of his style. This sober judgment adds value to the detailed analysis.

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ELIZABETH, ABBESS OF SCHÖNAU, AND ROGER OF FORD

RUTH J. DEAN

THE religious woman of the Middle Ages still awaits a historian. Of the role of her courtly sister in medieval literature we have heard much, and the study of the antifeminist movement has broadened our knowledge of medieval women in general. But the feminine mystics deserve a more complete study than they have yet had. Their literary activity extended over several centuries and much of Europe, taking form in sermons, letters, and accounts of spiritual visions which were conveyed from country to country, from age to age, by modes not yet—perhaps never to be—fully understood. There may have been direct influence by the mystics of one country upon those of another; or resemblances in some of this literary production may be due to spontaneous development of similar phenomena. Probably a good deal of information and reminiscence circulated verbally, both in general travel for trade and pilgrimage, and as a result of the trips, for ecclesiastical or secular purposes, of the relatives and friends of the mystics. Monks and friars on their visits to foreign houses sometimes sent or brought back materials—historical, literary, or hagiographical—derived from books which they had studied or acquired abroad. Some of the writings were in Latin, some in the vernaculars; and, as the vernaculars gained in importance,

texts originally in Latin were translated into them. In particular, there appears to have been German and Flemish influence in the tradition of mysticism in Norfolk, whether or not the writings of foreign mystics were directly known to English religious women. The question of the dynamics of diffusion is a complicated one at best and in this field requires detailed consideration of the dates and provenience of extant manuscripts belonging to the several traditions of feminine mysticism. The material gathered in the present study is concerned with one such tradition and is offered in the hope that it will contribute to the understanding of this problem, as well as to our knowledge both of mysticism and of the feminist movement.¹

One of the forerunners of this movement was Elizabeth, abbess of the Benedictine convent at Schönau in the diocese of Trier.² Her writings circulated in Eng-

¹ Miss Allen gives much material on this subject in *The book of Margery Kempe*, Vol. I, ed. S. B. Meech and H. E. Allen (E.E.T.S., O.S. No. 212 [London, 1940]), and promises a study of it in the second volume.

² Elizabeth was born in 1129 and died in 1165 (cf. *Bibliotheca hagiographica latina antiquae et mediae aetatis*, I [Brussels, 1898–99], 372–73). She was never canonized, though she is often called *sancta* or *beata* in MSS and her name was received into the Roman Martyrology in 1584. Nicholas Trevet, in his Anglo-Norman *Cronicles*, implies that her canonization was applied for and refused; this might have been as late as the second or third decade of the fourteenth century, since he makes no mention in his earlier *Annales* of the attitude of Rome toward Elizabeth (see below).